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ABSTRACT 
 
 
There are moments in history where the threat of Satanism and the Devil have been prompted 
by, and in turn stimulated, social anxiety. This thesis considers particular moments of ‘satanic 
panic’ in South Africa as moral panics during which social boundaries were challenged, 
patrolled and renegotiated through public debate in the media. While the decade of the 1980s 
was marked by successive states of emergency and the deterioration of apartheid, it began 
and ended with widespread alarm that Satan was making a bid for the control of white South 
Africa. Half-truths, rumour and fantasy mobilised by interest groups fuelled public uproar 
over the satanic menace – a threat deemed the enemy of white South Africa. Under P. W. 
Botha’s ‘total onslaught’ rhetoric, a large sector of white South Africa feared total ‘moral 
onslaught’. Cultural guardians warned against the satanic influences of popular culture, the 
corrupting power of materialism, and the weakening moral resolve of the youth. Others were 
adamant that Satanists sought to punish all good, white South Africans with financial ruin 
and divorce in their campaign to destroy white South Africa. From the bizarre to the macabre, 
the message became one of societal decay and a youth that was simultaneously out of control. 
While influenced by the international Satanism Scare that swept across the global West 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, this thesis argues that South Africa’s satanic panics 
reflected localised anxieties as the country’s social borders changed over time. While 
critically discussing the concept of the ‘moral panic’ and its analytical value in historical 
study, this thesis further argues that these moments of moral panic betray the contextually 
specific anxieties surrounding the loss of power and shifts in class and cultural solidarity. In 
so doing, this thesis seeks to elucidate the cultural changes in South Africa between 1976 and 
1993 by highlighting the social, temporal and geographic boundaries which were contested 
and renegotiated through the shifting discourse on Satanism. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
 
Daar is oomblikke in die geskiedenis toe die bedreiging van Satanisme en die Duiwel deur 
sosiale angstigheid aangespoor is en dit ook verder gestimuleer het. Hierdie tesis neem 
bepaalde momente van ‘sataniese paniek’ in Suid-Afrika – waartydens sosiale grense deur 
publieke debat in die media uitgedaag, gepatrolleer en heronderhandel is – in oënskou as 
oomblikke van morele paniek. Terwyl die 1980s gekenmerk is deur agtereenvolgende 
noodtoestande en die agteruitgang van apartheid, het dit begin en geëindig met 
wydverspreide verontrusting dat Satan poog om beheer oor wit Suid-Afrika te verkry. Halwe 
waarhede, gerugte en fantasie, gemobiliseer deur belangegroepe, het publieke onsteltenis oor 
die sataniese gevaar aangehits – ŉ vyandige bedreiging vir wit Suid-Afrika. In samehang met 
PW Botha se ‘totale aanslag’ retoriek, het ŉ groot deel van wit Suid-Afrika ook ŉ ‘totale 
morele aanslag’ gevrees. Die kultuurbewakers het gewaarsku teen sataniese invloede op 
populêre kultuur, die sedebederwende mag van materialisme en die verflouing van morele 
vasberadenheid onder die jeug. Ander was oortuig daarvan dat Sataniste daarop uit is om alle 
goeie, wit Suid-Afrikaners deur finansiële ondergang en egskeiding te straf in hulle veldtog 
om wit Suid-Afrika te vernietig. Van die grillige tot die makaber, die boodskap was een van 
sosiale agteruitgang en ŉ jeug wat terselfdertyd buite beheer was. Alhoewel Suid-Afrika 
beïnvloed is deur die heersende internasionale sataniese verskrikking wat gedurende die 
1980s en die vroeë 1990s, dwarsdeur die globale Weste gevind is, voer hierdie tesis aan dat 
die Suid-Afrikaanse sataniese paniek, soos die sosiale grense in Suid-Afrika verskuif het, 
gelokaliseerde angs gereflekteer het. Buiten die kritiese bespreking van die konsep van die 
‘morele paniek’ en die analitiese waarde daarvan, argumenteer hierdie tesis verder dat hierdie 
momente van morele paniek konteks-spesifieke angs blootlê, paniese angs wat met die verlies 
van mag en veranderings in klas- en kulturele samehorigheid saamhang. Hierdeur beoog die 
tesis om kulturele veranderinge in Suid-Afrika tussen 1976 en 1993 toe te lig, deur te fokus 
op die sosiale, temporale en geografiese grense wat deur die verskuiwende diskoers oor 
Satanisme betwis en heronderhandel is. 
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Chapter One:  
Introduction and Literature Review 
 
 
Adam and Evil  
 
Bloodless and bloated it drifted between London skies and muddy water. Washed up by the 
cold tide of the Thames, it bobbed beneath Tower Bridge where a passerby finally recognized 
it as human. The body of a small child, headless and limbless, was pulled from the river near 
the Globe Theatre on 21 September 2001. Dressed in a pair of bright orange shorts, the body 
had been in the river for up to ten days and was immediately connected to the otherworldly 
rituals of deviant occultists and African witches, initiating one of the most bizarre 
investigations in recent police history.
1
 After dismissing links to similar finds in Europe, 
police became increasingly fixated on the idea that the boy – christened ‘Adam’ by the 
London Metropolitan police – was the first recorded victim of an African black magic ritual 
in the United Kingdom. Although police detectives stressed that they were following other 
possible links, the notion that the Afro-Caribbean Adam was a sacrificial victim became the 
lead in story in press and police investigations. He died from a violent trauma to the neck, but 
there was little further evidence: Adam’s body revealed simply that he was aged between four 
and seven and that his shorts were bought from a Woolworths store in Germany.
2
  With the 
rest of his body missing and his identity unknown, the speculation surrounding the case of 
Adam grew darker.  
 
Within a month of its discovery this ‘Thames torso case’ was explicitly linked to African 
witchcraft, and more specifically to South African ‘muti’ killings.
3
 The British public was 
quickly ‘educated’: ‘muti’ is the Zulu word for medicine, it is practiced by witchdoctors and 
‘sangomas’ throughout South Africa and these African healers habitually use human body 
parts in concocting potions for their ‘clients’. The police, by all reports, were equally eager 
for education on the subject and a national conference was soon organized, attended by 
                                                 
1
 S. Tendler, ‘Murdered boy’s torso found in Thames’, The Times, 24 September 2001, 14; ‘Witchdoctor 
investigation in Torso Case’, 16 October 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/England/1602477.stm, 
available: 12 April 2011 and S. Tendler, ‘Macabre find raises ritual murder fear’, The Times, 26 January 2002, 3 
and G. Tramlett, ‘Tracing Adam’, The Guardian, 7 August 2003.  
2
 S. Tendler, ‘Dutch murder link to child found in Thames’, The Times, 25 September 2001, 13 and R. Kennedy, 
‘Mandela plea for help to identify torso of boy’, The Times, 20 April 2002, 6. 
3
 S. Bird, ‘Witchdoctor theory on boy’s torso’, The Times, 17 October 2001, 13.  
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detectives, criminologists and officials from the Home Office.
4
 Police also took heed of grisly 
stories of sacrifices rife throughout London and rumours that similar murders would soon 
occur. As commander Andy Baker of Scotland Yard commented, ‘there is some suggestion 
of ceremonies taking place and strong rumours that body parts are used. They could be 
brought in or taken from murdered bodies. Our fear is [that it is] the first of many.’
5
 Alarm  
over African rituals increased further when candles wrapped in sheets and inscribed with the 
West African name Adekoyejo Fola Adeoye were discovered in the Thames. Soon the British 
press began blithely ignoring geography, and reported that this West African link was tied to 
South African ‘sangomas’ who regularly preyed on children.
6
 British police believed they 
were, as Detective Inspector Will O’Reilly noted, ‘treading new ground’ and to this end 
South African ‘experts’ stepped forward to guide them through this unfamiliar territory. 
While a South African pathologist was brought in for a second post-mortem, British 
detectives journeyed to Nigeria and South Africa in search of leads.
7
 They were particularly 
hopeful that South African doctors, academics, spiritualists and police officers would share 
their knowledge of the ‘African occult’, and soon relayed to the British press that they had 
‘learnt things here that they don’t teach you at police college in London.’
8
 
 
The investigation soon turned to well-known Africans, albeit only those known in Europe, to 
make personal pleas for information to the ‘African community’. This included a personal 
appeal by Nelson Mandela. After all, as one British detective noted, ‘Mr Mandela is a highly 
valued, respected and revered man by people across the world, and particularly by Africans.’
9
 
Other appeals by African celebrities included that of Nigerian football player Nwakwo Kanu, 
who played for English football club Arsenal at the time.
10
 Scotland Yard also received 
expertise from Kobus Jonker, the retired head of the soon to be disbanded Occult Related 
Crimes Unit of the South African police – or, as it was labeled in some British reports, South 
Africa’s Occult Murder Squad. Also lending his expertise was Credo Mutwa, praised by the 
                                                 
4
 S. Tendler, ‘Macabre find raises ritual murder fear’, The Times, 26 January 2002, 3 and ‘Thames torso “was 
human sacrifice”’, 29 January 2002, http://news.bbc.co.il/2/hi/uk-news/england/1788452.stm, available: 12 
April 2011.  
5
 S. Tendler, ‘Macabre find raises ritual murder fear’, The Times, 26 January 2002, 3. 
6
 ‘Voodoo “practiced in UK”’, 8 March 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1861393.stm, available: 12 
April 2011 and S. Tendler, ‘Macabre find raises ritual murder fear’, The Times, 26 January 2002, 3. 
7
 J. Snell, ‘Child protection: Appeal for help in Thames torso case’, Community Care, 21 February 2002, 12.  
8
 ‘Witchdoctor investigation in torso case’, 16 October 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1602477.stm, available: 12 April 2011 and R. Kennedy, ‘Mandela 
plea for help to identify torso of boy’, The Times, 20 April 2002, 6.   
9
 S. Tendler, ‘Thames torso case appeal by Mandela’, The Times, 13 April 2002, 6 and ‘Thames torso police to 
meet Mandela’, 12 April 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1925193.stm, 12 April 2011.  
10
 G. Tremlett, ‘Tracing Adam’, The Guardian, 7 August 2003.  
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British press as ‘a Johannesburg-based sangoma’ and ‘expert in ritual killings’.
11
 These South 
African experts confirmed the theory that Adam had been the victim of a ‘muti’ murder. 
Indeed, Mutwa even contended that the young boy had probably been stalked by his killers 
before they sacrificed him in an ‘obeah’ ritual to a West African sea goddess. By this point, 
however, the suspicious candles had been ruled out as evidence with the help of the New 
York police department who had been contacted by Adekoyejo Fola Adeoye. Accentuating 
the diaspora of Africans and African culture in the twenty-first century: the candles and 
sheets found in London had been part of a West African prayer service which sought to 
protect the New York based Adeoye following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
12
 Despite the 
irrelevance of this particular West African ritual to the case, police attention shifted away 
from South African ‘muti’ and towards Nigerian ‘voodoo’.
13
  
In the meantime, raging press speculation stirred rumours and anxiety about just how 
widespread and commonplace these ‘ritual murders’ were in the United Kingdom. Having 
emerged as an expert on ‘ritual abuse’ during the Satanic Ritual Abuse Scares that had swept 
across the global West a decade earlier, well known British psychologist Valerie Sinason told 
the press that Adam’s body ‘bore all the hallmarks of a ritual murder.’ Indeed, the case was 
surely the beginning of a much larger trend, as Sinason continued, ‘I do not think this is a 
one-off.’
14
 Such sentiments were echoed by South African ‘cult cop’ Kobus Jonker, whose 
reputation as an ‘occult authority’ emerged during the transnational Satanism Scare. Known 
as ‘God’s Detective’ and the ‘Hound of God’ in the South African press, Jonker warned 
British journalists that ‘if there’s a guy operating in London, he’s going to need body parts 
again.’
15
 Consequently, fears that African ritual killers had brought their business to Europe 
became widespread. Soon three murders in Germany, Belgium and France were found to be 
similar to that of Adam: in France, a white man with missing feet and organs; in Antwerp, a 
Romany boy with missing genitalia; and in Frankfurt a white boy’s mutilated body had strips 
                                                 
11
 M. Dynes, ‘Torso boy was “sacrificed to sea goddess”’, The Times, 19 April 2002, 7.  
12
 ‘Candle clues ruled out in “muti” killing’, 14 February 2002,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_nes/england/1821411, available: 11 April 2011.  
13
 By June 2002 the focus had shifted almost entirely to Nigeria. See M. Bright and P. Harris, ‘Thames Torso 
boy was sacrificed’, The Observer, 2 June 2002.  
14
 Quoted in ‘Voodoo “practiced in UK”’, 8 March 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1861393.stm, 
available: 12 April 2011. Also see S. Boggan, ‘Where were their eyes when this boy bled, his eyes as he 
screamed?’, The Times, 17 August 2004, 4.  
15
 ‘“I was forced to kill my baby”’, 2 April 2992, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1899609.stm, available: 
12 April 2011.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 4
of flesh missing.
16
 Meanwhile the Today programme on BBC’s Radio 4 had conducted their 
own investigation, and revealed to the public that ‘voodoo rituals’ involving children and 
animal sacrifice were being performed across the United Kingdom. John Azah, the vice 
chairman of the Metropolitan Police Independent Advisory Group, bemoaned the fact that ‘in 
promoting cultural diversity we import the good and the bad…If this is a ritual killing then 
unfortunately – as bad as it may sound – we have imported those aspects of culture into 
mainland Britain.’
17
  
Explaining the continued pertinence of the case after a year of little progress, detective 
O’Reilly contended that the ‘ritual killing of children is an absolute reality’ and ‘[w]e do not 
want this to gain a foothold in this country.’
18
 Outsourced at times to medical specialists in 
New York, forensic investigations offered some clues.
19
 Early analyses of Adam’s stomach 
contents revealed that he was well nourished and cared for,
20
 whilst pioneering scientific 
methods pinpointed the boy’s origin to Nigeria.
21
 A new method of studying radioactive 
isotopes further discovered that Adam’s stomach contents contained a ‘bizarre concoction’ 
including a clay pellet, gold, quartz, crushed bone and vegetation – ‘almost certainly a black 
magic potion.’
22
 Other scientific methods were also used, including a breakdown of the 
chemical composition of Adam’s bones in order to pinpoint his homeland. Finding traces of 
pre-Cambrian rock, detectives traversed five African countries and over six thousand miles in 
collecting samples for further analysis.
23
 Additional studies of Adam’s lungs and intestines 
found that they harboured pollen spores, and indicated that the boy had been in London for 
less than seventy-two hours before he had died. Such findings, the media suggested, only 
fuelled ‘the theory that the boy was brought into the country specifically to be sacrificed.’
24
 
 
                                                 
16
 See, for example, B. Thompson, ‘Murders linked to Torso in Thames’, The Times, 28 May 2002, 7; ‘Candle 
clues ruled out in “muti” killing’, 14 February 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_nes/england/1821411, 
available: 11 April 2011 and ‘Europe’s police look at ritualistic killings’, Community Care, 1426, 13 June 2002.  
17
 ‘Voodoo “practiced in UK”’, 8 March 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1861393.stm, available: 12 
April 2011. 
18
 T. Thompson, ‘Thames torso detectives fear repeat killings’, The Observer, 1 September 2002. 
19
 S. Tendler, ‘Police hold 21 in hunt for killer of Thames torso boy’, The Times, 30 July 2003, 7. 
20
 T. Thompson, ‘Thames torso detectives fear repeat killings’, The Observer, 1 September 2002. 
21
 S. Tendler, ‘Science pinpoints torso murder boy’s homeland’, The Times, 1 February 2003, 6. Also see P. 
Hunter, ‘Adam: A 21
st
-Century Murder Mystery’, The Scientist, 30 June 2003, 30 and M. Murphy, ‘Isotopic 
techniques to provide fresh evidence’, Chemistry and Industry, 4 October 2004, 14. 
22
 T. Keane, ‘Pioneering tests show torso boy was black magic victim’, The Sunday Times (London), 20 October 
2002, 12. 
23
 S. Tendler, ‘Science pinpoints torso murder boy’s homeland’, The Times, 1 February 2003, 6. 
24
 T. Keane, ‘Pioneering tests show torso boy was black magic victim’, The Sunday Times (London), 20 October 
2002, 12. 
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Maintaining the West African link, police followed the reports of social workers who claimed 
to have spotted ‘strange voodoo-like’ items in the home of Joyce Asaguede, an asylum 
seeking West African living in Glasgow, Scotland.
25
 By this point – linked to deviant occult 
rituals, Africa, and immigration – the case of Adam had taken a human trafficking angle, and 
was also mentioned in other cases of organ trafficking and mass murder that made headlines 
at the time.
26
 In 2003, a year after Asaguede’s arrest, release and subsequent deportation, 
police raided nine addresses in London. One of which resulted in the arrest of a group of 
West Africans on charges of smuggling illegal immigrants into Britain and perhaps, 
newspapers speculated, more sinister deeds given the discovery of an animal skull in the 
group’s East London house.
27
 The raids purportedly stemmed from a report from the United 
Nations Children’s Fund, ‘Stop the Traffick!’, which added ritual murder to the list of 
possible fates facing the thousands of children illegally smuggled across borders.
28
 That same 
month a Nigerian named Sam Onogigovie was arrested in Dublin on charges of human 
trafficking and quickly identified as a suspect in the Case of Adam. After all, near the time of 
the murder Onogigovie had been residing in Germany, where Adam’s shorts had been 
purchased.
29
  
 
The arrests soon prompted a response from Nigerian community leaders in the United 
Kingdom who urged the public to understand that such actions were those of a few and not 
all Nigerians, and that instances of ritual murder were hardly commonplace.
30
 These arrests 
also saw the re-questioning of Joyce Osagiede, the since deported Nigerian asylum seeker, 
who now claimed that she and her husband had been establishing demon worshipping cults in 
Germany and London. Osagiede told police that she had had been in the process of escaping 
her husband, who had killed eleven children including one of her daughters in cult rituals.
31
 
According to newspapers, this West African cult was actually a sect of an Asian religious 
                                                 
25
 S. Tendler, ‘Woman is held in Torso case’, The Times, 10 July 2002, 5 and T. Thompson, ‘Thames torso 
detectives fear repeat killings’, The Observer, 1 September 2002. 
26
 D. Adams, ‘Organ trafficking suspected in mass murder case’, The Times, 27 May 2003, 13. 
27
 S. Tendler, ‘Police hold 21 in hunt for killer of Thames torso boy’, The Times, 30 July 2003, 7 and W. Hodge, 
‘World Briefing Europe: Britain: 21 Nigerians Held in Murder Inquiry’, The New York Times, 30 July 2003, 4. 
28
 R. Milne, ‘Child trafficking suspects held after police swoop’, The Financial Times, 30 July 2003, 5. 
29
 S. Miller, ‘Nigerian man could provide DNA link to torso murderer’, The Sunday Times (London), 6 July 
2003, 2; S. Tendler, ‘Thames torso boy murder suspect held in Dublin’, The Times, 3 July 2003, 5 and ‘Dublin 
files help torso murder probe’, The Sunday Times (London), 3 August 2003, 1. 
30
 S. Miller, ‘Nigerian man could provide DNA link to torso murderer’, The Sunday Times (London), 6 July 
2003, 2 and S. Tendler, ‘Thames torso boy murder suspect held in Dublin’, The Times, 3 July 2003, 5. 
31
 A. Nathan, ‘Torso in Thames link to 11 murders’, The Sunday Times (London), 3 August 2003, 1. 
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group, but Osagiede was admittedly vague on any facts relating to Adam and his death.
32
 The 
latest addition to Adam’s bizarre story came with reports that the boy had been fed a ‘black-
magic bean’ before his death. The calabar bean, ‘used in Nigeria in witchcraft rituals’, would 
have paralysed the small boy and allowed his murderers to dismember him alive and with 
ease.
33
 However, it is unclear whether the police took Osagiede’s claims seriously, and 
investigations continued to focus on the human smuggling element, with several more arrests 
and extraditions over the years.
34
  
 
An increasingly cold case, Adam continued to bear mention in media stories, particularly 
those related to African immigrants, missing children, domestic slave rings, and human 
trafficking. In 2005, for example, British child welfare experts claimed that the number of 
African children who had gone missing from schools was in the thousands, adding that at 
least three hundred children matching Adam’s race and age group had gone missing in 2001 
alone.
35
 These concerns remained undergirded with occult references, including stories of 
innocent children being exorcised by evangelical African cults. Here specifically, the murder 
of eight year old Violet Climbie and torture of ‘Child B’ were linked to that of Adam and 
revealed as cases of ‘ritual abuse’.
36
 Police were reported to have rescued some nineteen 
children from abusive evangelicals by December 2005, whilst other estimates of children 
suffering ‘ritual abuse’ at the hands of Christian sects ranged from thirty-eight documented 
cases since 2000,
37
 to fifty cases in London alone.
38
 Reports claimed that these children were 
being beaten, starved, cut, burned, neglected and sold by African and South Asian adults who 
were convinced that these children were possessed by demonic forces.
39
 As another possible 
example on this list, and surely a victim of ‘ritual abuse’, Adam’s murder moved from South 
                                                 
32
 D. James-Smith, ‘In the trail of the voodoo child’, The Sunday Times (London), 3 August 2003, 19. 
33
 S. Tendler, ‘Torso boy given black-magic bean before slaughter’, The Times, 17 October 2003, 5. 
34
 S. Marsh, ‘Trafficker linked to ritual murder’, The Times, 7 July 2004, 9 and ‘Jailed child trafficker to help in 
torso case’, The Times, 27 July 2004, 5. Also see D. Lister, ‘Daughter of minister beheaded in “ritual killing”’, 
The Times, 13 August 2004, 5; K. Dowling and D. Leppard, ‘African girls lured to vice by voodoo’, The Sunday 
Times (London), 21 June 2009, 12 and B. Freer, ‘The children who don’t make a sound’, The Sunday Times 
(London), 17 April 2011. 26. 
35
 A. Frean, ‘The riddle of 300 young boys missing from London schools’, The Times, 14 May 2005, 19 and A. 
Cowell, ‘300 Missing Boys in Britain Fuel Child-Trafficking Fear’, The New York Times, 15 May 2005, 10. 
36
 N. Woolcock, ‘Exorcist trio face jail for torturing “witch”’, The Times, 4 June 2005, 3 and S. Tendler and N. 
Woolcock, ‘Police fear for children abused by religious sects’, The Times, 12 December 2005, 25. 
37
 A. Frean, ‘Faiths that abuse children by ritual “should face law”’, The Times, 30 June 2006, 32. 
38
 J. Grimston, ‘“Witch child” abuse spreads in Britain’, Sunday Times (London), 25 June 2006, 5. 
39
 A. Frean, ‘Faiths that abuse children by ritual “should face law”’, The Times, 30 June 2006, 32 and J. Clayton, 
‘Revivalist churches bring fears of abuse to London: Witchcraft in the Congo’, The Times, 21 November 2006, 
31. 
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African ‘muti’ murder, to Nigerian ‘voodoo’, to fears surrounding the practices of African 
revivalist churches in Britain. 
 
Media, Meaning and the Occult 
 
An ongoing investigation that spanned several years, continents, and cultures, the case of 
Adam has never been solved. The boy’s remains, a small hunk of meat and bone measuring 
just forty-six by twenty centimeters, were finally laid to rest in December 2006. Buried with 
the name British police had given him, Adam’s funeral was attended by the officers who had 
appointed themselves his surrogate family in 2001.
40
 An investigation that sought answers 
and, above all, the boy’s identity, the case of Adam gathered layers of meaning that crossed 
geographic, social and temporal boundaries. Sensationalized, protracted, and expensive, it 
was a case nuanced by the novelty of the ‘African occult’ and inflected by undercurrents of 
anxiety surrounding the globalization and immigration of Africans and their ‘deviant’ beliefs. 
As one British detective asserted, ‘while the majority of African people are appalled by muti 
and ritual murder, the migration of cultural beliefs means that such murders are likely to 
happen again.’
41
 Essentially, ‘Adam’ gained a complex identity within the social fabric of 
contemporary Britain: evolving from a nameless and unidentified murder victim to become 
symbolic of broader issues, the centerpiece in debates ranging from public policy to 
multiculturalism in the twenty-first century.  
 
The case of Adam illustrates a fundamental concern of this thesis: the intersection of social 
anxiety and the consumption of myth in the creation of a social threat. Indeed, the case of 
Adam gave impetus to the policing, both actual and discursive, of cultural boundaries and 
underpinned African cultures with a necessary deviancy. In critiquing this, veteran Africanist 
scholar Terence Ranger identified the problem of the ‘aggregated African occult’ in both 
academic and popular thinking.
42
 Certainly the highly publicized case coincided with a 
                                                 
40
 ‘Torso murder reward offered’, 21 December 2001, http:/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/news/england/1723795.stm, 
available: 12 April 2011 and ‘Ritual killing link to dead boy’, 25 January 2002, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/1780990.stm, available: 12 April 2011. 
41
 S. Boggan, ‘Where were their eyes as this boy bled, their ears as he screamed?’, The Times, 17 August 2004, 
4.  
42
 T. Ranger, ‘Scotland Yard in the Bush: Medicine Murders, Child Witches and the Construction of the Occult: 
A Literature Review’, Africa, 77, 2 (2007), 272 – 283. Examples of Ranger’s work include T. O. Ranger, 
Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study (Oxford: James Currey, 1985); 
T. O. Ranger, Are We Not Also Men? The Samkange Family and African Politics in Zimbabwe (Oxford: James 
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resurgent fascination with the ‘African occult’ within and beyond the academic realm. A 
burgeoning field of interest in Africanist scholarship, the ‘occult’ has served as an analytical 
lens into changing patterns of belief, morality and consumption in modernizing and 
globalizing African societies.
43
 In an approach typified by the Comaroffs, witchcraft and 
‘occult practices’ in contemporary African societies are viewed as ‘thoroughly modern 
manifestations of uncertainties, moral disquiet and unequal rewards and aspirations in the 
contemporary moment.’
44
 For Ranger, however, this growing body of work implicitly 
undergirds European assumptions about African cultures, and had done little to undercut the 
‘farrago of contemporary myths.’
45
 The investigation of British police into the death of 
‘Adam’ was emblematic of the conflation of myth and meaning in the ‘aggregated African 
occult’. After all, British investigators readily exchanged one ‘occult’ ritual for another and 
maintained an ‘absurd’ fixation with South Africa in turning to an array of self-proclaimed 
‘experts’ like Credo Mutwa.
46
 Indeed, Mutwa is regularly decried as ‘a fake, a fraud, and a 
charlatan’ in South Africa, having also professed to being a Zulu shaman, prophet, healer, 
environmentalist and authority on extraterrestrials.
47
  
 
Of particular influence was the South African ‘cult cop’ Kobus Jonker and his Occult Related 
Crimes Unit, which was hailed by the British press as the world’s only specialized police task 
                                                                                                                                                        
Currey, 1995) and T. O. Ranger, Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History in the Metopos Hills of 
Zimbabwe (Oxford: James Currey, 1999).  
43
 See, for example I. Niehaus, Witchcraft, Power and Politics: Exploring the Occult in the South African 
Lowveld (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 2001); A. Ashforth, Witchcraft, Violence, and Democracy in 
South Africa (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); L. White, Speaking with Vampires: Rumor and 
History in Colonial Africa (London: University of California Press, 2000); D. Ciekawy and P. Greschiere, 
‘Containing Witchcraft: Conflicting Scenarios in Postcolonial South Africa’, African Studies Review, 41, 3 
(1998), 1 – 14.; G. Clement Bond and D. M. Ciekawy, eds, Witchcraft Dialogues: Anthropological and 
Philosophical Exchanges (Ohio: Center for International Studies, 2001) and R. Pelgrim, Witchcraft and 
Policing: South African Police Service attitudes towards witchcraft and witchcraft-related crime in the 
Northern Province (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2003).  
44
 H. L. Moore and T. Sanders, Magical Interpretations, Material Realities: Modernity, witchcraft and the 
occult in postcolonial Africa (London: Routledge, 2001), 3. Also see T. Sanders, ‘Reconsidering Witchcraft: 
Postcolonial Africa and Analytic (Un)Certainties’, American Anthropologist, 105, 2 (2003), 338 – 352; J. 
Comaroff and J. Comaroff, ‘Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African 
Postcolony’, American Ethnologist, 26, 2 (1999), 279 – 303 and G. Ter Haar, Imagining Evil: Witchcraft Beliefs 
and Accusations in Contemporary Africa (Eritrea: Africa World Press, 2007). 
45
 Quoted in Ranger, ‘Scotland Yard in the Bush’, 274.  
46
  Ranger, ‘Scotland Yard in the Bush’, 274. For responses to Ranger’s arguments see G. Ter Haar and S. Ellis, 
‘The Occult Does Not Exist: A Response to Terence Ranger’, Africa, 29, 3 (2009), 399 – 412 and B. Meyer, 
‘Response to Ter Haar and Ellis’, Africa, 79, 3 (2009), 413 – 415. 
47
 D. Chidester, A. Tayob and W. Weisse, Religion, politics and identity in changing South Africa (Germany: 
Waxmann Verlad, 2004), 71. Mutwa himself is a good example of the transnationalisation of such beliefs, self-
defining as an authority on local African (particularly Zulu) beliefs while also subscribing to David Icke’s 
notion of the reptilian alien annexation of Earth. 
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force dedicated to the task of investigating ‘ritual murder’.
48
 Crime related to witchcraft and 
the belief in the supernatural is a serious problem in South Africa, warranting a special 
commission just a year after the African National Congress won the country’s first 
democratic election.
49
 The continued outbreaks of vigilante violence and witch purging, as 
well as the apparent rise in ‘muti’ medicine murders have garnered increasing academic and 
popular attention.
50
 However, attempts to disaggregate the dimensions of the ‘occult’ in 
South Africa and trace the repercussions of this generalized term on the policing of ‘occult-
related crime’ are relatively recent. In an ethnographic study of police attitudes towards 
witchcraft, Pelgrim has argued that the South African Witchcraft Suppression Act (1957), 
constructed during apartheid and on a European understanding of the ‘occult’, exists in 
tension with ‘an ancient system of dealing with social problems and anomalies.’
51
 
Underscoring this problem of the ‘aggregated occult’, the South African Police Service’s 
definition of ‘occult-related crime’ includes ‘any human conduct that constitutes any legally 
recognized crime, the modus operandi of which relates to or emanates primarily from any 
belief or seeming belief in the occult, witchcraft, Satanism, mysticism, magic, esotericism 
and the like.’
52
 Under this broad purview of the ‘occult’, the specialized Occult Related 
Crimes Unit predominantly targeted the threat of Satanism in South Africa. Indeed, the 
conceptualization of the world’s only ‘ritual murder’ task force was fostered in the last 
embers of apartheid South Africa during a white, satanic panic.  
 
Essentially, the language with which the case of Adam was articulated, and the ‘aggregated 
African occult’ translated, emerged in the Eurocentric, transnational Satanism Scares of the 
1980s and early 1990s. The very term ‘ritual abuse’ is the finessed version of ‘satanic ritual 
abuse’, which was coined in the 1980s to classify a new type of crime believed to be 
perpetrated by deviant, European Satanists. A modern witch-hunt, hundreds of people across 
                                                 
48
 Ranger, ‘Scotland Yard in the Bush’, 273. 
49
 The Ralushai Commission of Inquiry into Witchcraft Violence and Ritual Murder in the Northern Province 
(1995).   
50
 See D. Kohnert, ‘Witchcraft and transnational social spaces: witchcraft violence, reconciliation and 
development in South Africa’s transition process’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 41, 2 (2003), 217 – 245; 
Niehaus, Witchcraft, Power and Politics (2001) and Ashforth, Witchcraft, Violence, and Democracy in South 
Africa (2005). 
51
 Pelgrim, Witchcraft and Policing, 17 – 18. Also see S. Jensen, ‘Everyday Policing and the Occult: Notions of 
Witchcraft, Crime and “the People”’, African Studies, 63, 3 (2004), 193 – 211 and J. Comaroff and J. Comaroff, 
‘Policing Culture, Cultural Policing: Law and Social Order in Postcolonial South Africa’, Law & Social Inquiry, 
29, 3 (2004), 513 – 545.  
52
 T. S. Petrus, ‘An anthropological study of witch-craft related crime in the Eastern Cape and its implications 
for Law Enforcement policy and practice’ (PhD thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port 
Elizabeth, 2009), 139. 
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the United States, Europe and Australia were indicted on charges that they were members of 
a secret satanic cult that preyed on children. During its height, an instigation of ‘satanic ritual 
abuse’ could result in the removal of children from their parents and the physical inspection 
of children for signs of sexual abuse and torture.
53
 Like the case of Adam, although with far 
greater intensity, the Satanism Scares depended on the amalgamation of social anxiety and 
rapid myth-making in the creation of a deviant social threat. However, as this thesis will 
show, at times a ‘satanic peril’ was produced and mobilized during particular moments of 
moral panic in white South Africa.  
 
Taking Satan Seriously: Methodological Considerations  
 
The Devil is not particularly popular in academia, particularly in South Africa. A small 
number of alarmist texts have been penned by South Africans in what is termed ‘anti-satanist’ 
literature: a voluminous but narrow corpus of work that warns against the dangers of 
Satanism and the ‘satanic influences’ of popular youth culture.
54
 An even smaller body of 
works has been written from the academic perspective.
55
 Although De Villiers has included 
Satanism in his work on Afrikaner spirituality, only Ivey has begun to undertake a closer 
study of Satanism with his psychological assessment of fifteen self-proclaimed Satanists. 
While all these works contend that Satanism in South Africa is largely a white social 
problem, Ivey has further argued that satanic involvement is predominantly found among 
white, working class youths as a consequence of declining white status in a democratic South 
Africa.
56
 Perceived as racially and culturally limited to the ‘white’ and the ‘Western’, 
Satanism has attracted relatively little attention from studies of the ‘occult’ in Africa or South 
Africa. The Comaroffs only mention Satanism in connection to Setswana youths
57
 and others 
                                                 
53
 Discussed in Chapter Four. 
54
 See for example L. Els and K. Jonker, Satanism in South Africa (Lynwood Ridge: Amabhuku Publications, 
2000); J. Gardiner and H. Gardiner, How Safe is My Child? TV, Toys and the Occult in South Africa (Cape 
Town: Struikhof, 1991); J. Gardiner and H. Gardiner, The Seduction of South Africa’s Youth (Port Elizabeth: 
Lion Life, 1990); N. Goldman and K. Jonker, Youth and Satanism Exposed (Port Elizabeth: Lion Life, 1990) 
and J. Jonker, Satanism Exposed (Pretoria: Sigma Press, 1992).  
55
 There are academic theses that have looked at the issue of Satanism, although most often from a Christian 
perspective. See: H. E. A. Staples, ‘Satanism and Associated Phenomena: A Study in the Philosophy of 
Education’, (PhD thesis, University of Potchefstroom, Potchesfstroom, 1993); E. A. Nightingale, ‘The 
Preparedness of Social Workers to render intervention to client-systems involved in Satanism” (MA thesis, 
University of Port Elizabeth, Port Elizabeth, 1996) and J. P. Du Toit, ‘Bad Faith – the Psychological Life of a 
Satanist who committed murder’ (MA thesis, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 2001). 
56
 G. Ivey, ‘The Psychology of Satanic Cult Involvement: An Archetypal Object Relations Perspective’ (PhD 
thesis, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1997), 337.  
57
 Comaroff and Comaroff, ‘Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction’, 287 – 288.  
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in the growth of independent Christian churches among African communities,
58
 while 
Niehaus focuses on African beliefs, including whites only through the lens of how images of 
white power or dominance manifest in African notions of witchcraft.
59
 This thesis is not 
study of Satanism itself and has not sought to explore the objective dimensions of the 
‘occult’. Rather it is an exploration of a particular aspect of Satanism: the ‘satanic peril’. 
 
Moral Panic and Historians 
 
Detached from the practices, beliefs or history of Satanism itself, the ‘satanic peril’ is located 
in the arena of perception and discourse and emerges during particular moments of social 
anxiety. This thesis does not provide an intellectual history or a theological analysis of 
Satanism in South Africa or abroad, nor does it seek to uncover the ethnographic realities of 
Satanists. Instead it concentrates on particular manifestations of ‘satanic panic’ in South 
Africa in which the creation of Satanism as a social threat signified the occurrence of a moral 
panic. Coined in 1972 by Stanley Cohen, the term ‘moral panic’ refers to a particular social 
phenomenon in which underlying social anxieties and blurring social boundaries are 
heightened and coalesced into the symbolic figure of the ‘folk devil’. Concerned with the 
identification, categorization and castigation of a ‘folk devil’, moral panics are volatile social 
reactions to a perceived threat. Ranging from the retrospectively ‘trivial’ to matters of real 
danger, moral panics blend fact and fiction and see the distortion and exaggeration of 
objective threats. Such meaning-making occurs through the media, and bears parallels to the 
streams of meaning which characterized the Case of Adam in the British public imagination. 
Indeed, the Case of Adam became symbolic of larger threats to society and acquired a 
shifting social definition. The satanic panics studied in this thesis are symptomatic of this 
process, and offer a useful case study to analyse the various layers of meaning crystalised in 
moral panic discourse. Aware that the interface between analysis and actuality is always 
blurred and permeable, this thesis critically explores the dynamics of moral panic theory and 
its application to particular historical phenomena. 
 
Essentially concerned with the malleable and changing discursive definition of a social 
problem, moral panic scholarship is concomitantly broad – the phenomenon itself not limited 
                                                 
58
 See, for example, R. I. J. Hackett, ‘Discourses of Demonization in Africa and Beyond’, Diogenes, 50, 3 
(2003), 61 – 75.  
59
 Niehaus, Witchcraft, Power and Politics, 63 – 82.  
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to any particular geographic, temporal, or cultural context. In African studies the concept has 
been used, and the phenomenon studied, in topics ranging from social reactions to HIV/AIDS 
and the politicisation of sexual violence, to grassroots responses to changes in cultural and 
political hierarchies in Malawi and South Africa.
60
 The concept of a moral panic has only 
recently begun gaining a foothold in South African academia. Niehaus, for example, has 
studied moral panics on the plains of the South African lowveld as an expression of 
discontent with black African masculinity.
61
 However, most scholars have employed the 
concept uncritically as self-evident in its meaning, which can have adverse effects on the 
interpretation and explication of an argument. Recourse to the label ‘moral panic’ without 
nuanced analysis of the term itself sometimes leads to it appearing as though the phenomenon 
itself is purely imagined and illusory. Posel’s argument about ‘baby rape’ as a moral panic in 
South Africa, for example, fails to draw an adequate distinction between actual occurrences 
of ‘baby rape’ and the disproportionate and exaggerated response to the perceived threat and 
meaning of the crime. Consequently Posel gives the impression that ‘baby rape’ is in itself an 
insignificant – or possibly non-existent – crime that is unworthy of social concern.
62
 This 
thesis addresses this potential pitfall in Chapter Two. 
 
Nonetheless, the study of scares and perils, panics and devils is still relatively limited in 
South African historiography. Although, the meanings evoked by such social perils at various 
points in history form part of a broader academic interest in cultural rebellion and control: the 
policing of racial, moral and geographic boundaries.
63
 A recurring social peril in white South 
African history and historiography is that of the ‘black peril’, discussed in the work of Van 
                                                 
60
 See, for example, P. Kaarsholm, ‘Moral Panic and Cultural Mobilization: Responses to Transition, Crime and 
HIV/AIDS in KwaZulu-Natal’, Development and Change, 36, 1 (2005), 133 – 156; G. Petros, C. O. 
Arhihenbuwa, C. Simbayi, S. Ramlagan and B. Brown, ‘HIV/AIDS and “Othering” in South Africa: The Blame 
Goes On’, Culture, Health and Sexuality, 8, 1 (2006), 67 – 77; N. Dolby, ‘Popular Culture and the Public Space 
in Africa: The Possibility of Cultural Citizenship’, African Studies Review, 49, 3 (2006), 31 – 47; L. Vincent, 
‘Moral Panic and the politics of populism’, Representation, 45, 2 (2009), 213 – 221; C. Gould, ‘Moral Panic, 
human trafficking and the 2010 Soccer World Cup’, Agenda, 24, 85 (2010), 31 – 44; H. Englund, Prisoners of 
Freedom: Human Rights and the African Poor (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006) and H. 
Englund, ‘Witchcraft and the Limits of Mass Mediation in Malawi’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute, 13, 2 (2007), 295 – 311.  
61
 I. Niehaus, ‘Maternal Incest and Moral Panic: Envisioning Futures without Fathers in the South African 
Lowveld’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 36, 4 (2010), 833 – 849.  
62
 D. Posel, ‘The Scandal of Manhood: “Baby Rape” and the Politicization of Sexual Violence in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa’, Culture, Health and Sexuality, 7, 3 (2005), 239 – 252.  
63
 See, for example: S. Swart, ‘The “Five Shilling Rebellion”: Rural White Male Anxiety and the 1914 Boer 
Rebellion’, South African Historical Journal, 56, 1 (2006), 88 – 102; K. Mooney, ‘“Ducktails, Flick-Knives and 
Pugnacity”: Subcultural and Hegemonic Masculinities in South Africa, 1948-1960’, Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 24, 4 (1998), 753 – 774 and A. Grundlingh, ‘“Rocking the Boat” in South Africa? Voelvry Music and 
Afrikaans and Anti-Apartheid Social Protest in the 1980s’, The International Journal of African Historical 
Studies, 37, 3 (2004), 483 – 514.   
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Onselen, Etherington and Cornwall.
64
 These works also illustrate the implicit and explicit use 
of the ‘moral panic’ concept as a theoretical framework. Etherington’s approach is wary, 
Cornwall’s embracing, and Van Onselen’s absent altogether. Indeed, Van Onselen’s work on 
the ‘kitchen boy scare’ in the Witwatersrand between 1890 and 1914 makes no explicit use of 
the moral panic concept. But it relies implicitly on its frame-work, its terminology submerged 
in the language of ‘hysteria’ and ‘peril’ as waves of ‘collective sexual hysteria’ gripped the 
white population in the fear that black men were determined to rape white women. This thesis 
argues that historical analysis of such phenomena can only benefit from a concept that 
clarifies the dynamics, limitations, and homogeneity of its discourse and contours. However, 
this thesis also takes heed of an important point made by Van Onselen to ‘scrutinise the lull 
before and between the social storms.’
65
 As such, this thesis makes a particular point of 
studying the ‘satanic peril’ through the lens of change over time in disaggregating the local 
from the global, the immediate from the historical. In discussing a hitherto unexplored aspect 
of Satanism as a social peril in white South Africa, this thesis interweaves a number of 
threads of social history. This has resulted in a largely recursive literature review, which 
means that the discussion returns to the definition of moral panic throughout the thesis in 
order to elucidate it fully.  
 
Analysing Moral Panic through a Case Study  
 
This thesis considers particular moments of alarm in mainly white communities in South 
Africa during which the prevention of the ‘satanic peril’ became tantamount to the moral and 
physical security of all white South Africans. In doing so, this thesis argues that a critical 
understanding of the moral panic concept is beneficial to social historians. In utilizing the 
‘moral panic’ as an analytical tool, the arguments of this thesis are built upon the dislocation 
between the folk devil of the moral panic and the objective dimension of the threat: it is 
fundamentally concerned with the portrayal of Satanism and white rebellion at particular 
moments of social crisis, rather than the actual existence of Satanism or forms of cultural 
rebellion. This has direct consequences on the interpretation of ‘satanic panic’ in South 
Africa, and directs the focus to two periods of nationwide and volatile moral panic between 
                                                 
64
 See N. Etherington, ‘Natal’s Black Rape Scare of the 1870s’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 15, 1 
(1998), 36 – 53; C. Van Onselen, New Babylon, New Nineveh: Everyday Life on the Witwatersrand 1886 – 1914 
(Jeppestown: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2001) and G. Cornwell, ‘George Webb Hardy’s “The Black Peril” and 
the social Meaning of Black Peril’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 22, 3 (1996), 441 – 453. 
65
 Van Onselen, New Babylon, New Nineveh, 257. 
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1976 and 1993. Allegations of satanism were not always unfounded, nor were they limited to 
these moral panics. But during these moments of ‘satanic panic’, such allegations were 
bolstered by large scale rumour mongering and anxiety that effectively bound the seemingly 
‘absurd’ with crimes like paedophilia, rape and physical abuse. Moreover, as this thesis will 
show, while the discursive boundaries of these moral panics were at times porous, there were 
distinct lines: articulated, shaped, and disseminated by white moral guardians and white 
newspapers. As such, the moments of satanic panic discussed in this thesis were largely 
confined to white Afrikaans and English societies, and were acute expressions of ideological 
discontent in white South African society.    
 
Essentially, this thesis weaves two objectives: to explore the emergence of the ‘satanic peril’ 
as a widespread and national threat, and to illustrate the dynamics of the moral panic as both 
a phenomenon and a mode of analysis in the process. In seeking to add a new dimension to 
the understanding of cultural change in white South Africa between 1976 and 1993, this 
thesis first lays the theoretical framework of the ‘moral panic’ in Chapter Two. In critically 
analysing the concept, Chapter Two suggests a particular interpretation for historians in 
advocating a specific awareness of the social, geographic, and temporal contours of moral 
panics, social problems, and discourse. This understanding of the moral panic is then 
illustrated in the next three chapters of this thesis, which link the broad strokes of socio-
political change with the discursive terrain. Chapter Three examines the period of satanic 
moral panic between 1978 and 1982, and argues that this moral panic reflects the backlash of 
political and cultural fragmentation in the first four years of P. W. Botha’s premiership. 
Chapter Four broadens the scope and compares the global and the local between 1983 and 
1990. The decade of the 1980s one of considerable change in South Africa, as well as the 
explosion of a modern witch-hunt in the transnational Satanism Scare that touched, but never 
lingered in, the South African imagination. Chapter Five returns to South Africa and looks at 
the virulent satanic moral panic that raged during the country’s transition to democracy, a 
period in which the local and global discourses discussed in Chapters Three and Four 
intersected, and in which a variety of local anxieties manifested in acute alarm regarding 
Satanism and white hegemony. Finally, the arguments of these chapters are drawn together to 
show change over time, as well as to draw broader conclusions about the value of moral 
panic analysis to historical study, the limits of this thesis, and suggests further areas of 
research within the arenas of Satanism, social peril and cultural change in South Africa.  
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Chapter Two: 
Panics and Proxies: Folk Devils, Moral Panics and Theoretical Departures 
 
 
Introduction  
 
When moral boundaries are undergoing wholesale reappraisal or revision, as, for 
instance, in the wake of a revolution…moral uncertainty can lead to great 
anxiety or ‘moral panic’ and to the demand for a reassertion or redefinition of 
moral boundaries.
1
   
 
The shifting language of morality shapes history, as it is the measure by which every action is 
weighed, judged and justified. It is the basis upon which absolution is bestowed or denied for 
the lines crossed and the boundaries drawn. So much of this history is predicated on 
construction of boundaries – the geographic, temporal, and social lines that direct human 
experience. Where moral rhetoric is at its most powerful is in the delineation of devils, 
monsters, and barbarians.
2
 Crowd or mob, protest or riot – the unmasking of threats, the 
rooting out of devils, and the exclusion of the other are commonplace in the pages of history. 
Attempts to control moral boundaries and the rhetoric of inclusion and exclusion direct both 
thought and action: from witch crazes to witch hunts, crusades to perils, scares to panics.   
 
Within this locus of moral boundaries and codes of social behaviour lies the phenomenon of 
the ‘moral panic’, a term coined in 1972 by Stanley Cohen.
3
 A young sociology graduate who 
left his homeland of South Africa due to its politics, Cohen was interested in the way that 
social control mechanisms reacted to sensational reports and signs of deviant behaviour.
4
 The 
                                                 
1
 J. C. Davies quoted in A. Hunt, ‘“Moral Panic” and Moral Language in the Media,’ The British Journal of 
Sociology, 48, 4 (1997), 632 – 633. 
2
 David Day, for example, had provided numerous examples of conquest narratives wherein ‘dehumanizing of 
the indigenous inhabitants is a common reaction of supplanting societies when they need to justify the 
dispossession of others and are intent on unleashing a savagery of their own to achieve it.’ D. Day, Conquest: 
How Societies Overwhelm Others (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 71. It is also worth noting that 
morality is often used as a synonym for culture, and vice versa, at least insofar as debates surrounding ‘moral 
relativism’ or ‘cultural relativism’ are concerned. See, for example, J. W. Cook, Morality and Cultural 
Difference (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).  
3
 Jock Young, a colleague of Cohen, originally used the description ‘moral panic’ in 1971. However, it was 
Cohen who used the term ‘moral panic’ to describe a particular phenomenon and defined the term in the way it 
is understood today. Noted by E. Goode and N. Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social Construction of 
Deviance (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 12. 
4
 Cohen’s work drew focussed on the way in which the media and public had responded to the minor acts of 
vandalism by the so-called ‘Mods’ and ‘Rockers’ in the small seaside town of Clacton, 1964. In particular, 
Cohen highlighted the processes through which the media frenzy and heightened public concern following these 
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opening paragraph of Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and 
Rockers (1972) provides the most cited definition of the ‘moral panic’. Indeed as a quote, 
footnote, or endnote this definition remains the cornerstone of moral panic analysis and is 
worth quoting at length:  
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A 
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and 
stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by 
editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited 
experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or 
(more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or 
deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is 
quite novel and at other times it is something which has been in existence long 
enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over 
and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has 
more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as 
those in legal and social policy or even in the way the society conceives itself.
5
 
 
The definition underscores the importance moral panic analysis places on the interpretations 
and perceptions of events or behaviour as either threatening or benign and as demonstrative 
of a society grappling with change. Clearly evocative, ‘moral panic’ is one of the academic 
terms to pass successfully into the general lexicon – soon falling as easily from the tongues of 
journalists as from those of academics.
6 
The popularity of Cohen’s notion of the moral panic 
lies in that it articulates explicitly a phenomenon long recognized and studied, albeit 
implicitly. As Erich Goode and Nachmann Ben-Yehuda note: ‘[w]hilst the moral panic 
concept is fairly recent, the concrete manifestations of moral panics have been described and 
analysed for some time in a more or less implicit fashion.’
7
 All too familiar are the warnings 
capitalized in newspaper headlines, and debated over radio, television, the Internet, and local 
soapbox. The presentation of some form of crime or youthful activity as a threat to the moral 
                                                                                                                                                        
youthful disturbances solidified the image of the ‘mods and rockers’ as representative of what was wrong with 
society. See S. Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers (Great Britain: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1972). Erich Goode and Nachmann Ben-Yehuda, who worked with Cohen in producing their 
own work on moral panics, describe him as ‘[a] South African who left his homeland for political reasons, a 
radical who was attracted to the causes and activities of underdogs and eager to critique the doings of the smug 
and the powerful, Cohen found society’s reaction to the exuberant activities of rebellious youth both disturbing 
and intriguing.’ Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 23. Such interests were perhaps typical of a young 
graduate in the heat of the social changes of the 1960s, who looked at the agencies of social control and power 
with fresh eyes and a great deal more suspicion. For discussions of the cultural and theoretical context of 
Cohen’s theory see D. Garland, ‘On the concept of moral panic’, Crime Media Culture, 4, 1 (2008), 9 – 30. 
5
 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 9.  
6
 See D. L. Altheide, ‘Moral Panic: From sociological concept to public discourse’, Crime Media Culture, 5, 1 
(2009), 79 – 99 and G. Zajdow, ‘Moral Panics: The Old and the New’, Deviant Behaviour, 29 (2008), 640 – 
664. 
7
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 11.  
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integrity of a society is, as Kenneth Thompson notes, nothing new.
8
 Added to the popular 
vocabulary the press have been able to report with increasing latitude a host of moral panics,
9
 
whilst its academic usage has seen the moral panic become a key concept in sociology, 
criminology and various other disciplines.
10
 As it was, in the second edition of Folk Devils 
and Moral Panics (1980), Cohen noted with some chagrin that the notion of the moral panic 
was ‘taken as an instant pop sociological response to the problems of the day.’
11
 
 
However, Cohen’s definition – its meaning clear, its phrasing pithy, and its reality easily 
apparent – does not always accompany the term. Whilst it has become a fixture in the 
vocabulary of the press and academics alike, it has also gained a pejorative connotation. 
Certainly, as Hunt has argued, by the 1980s the popular usage of the term ‘moral panic’ in the 
press was as a rhetorical (rather than analytical or exploratory) device to nullify public 
reactions to certain issues and problems.
12
 As such, the term ‘has become a form of 
sociological shorthand or insult to throw at societal reactions’ – a means of dubbing concern 
as irrational, unfounded and conservative.
13
 As one wary journalist for the Independent on 
Sunday remarked, 
                                                 
8
 K. Thompson, Moral Panics (London: Routledge, 1998), 1.  
9
 The term ‘moral panic’ has been applied to a number of issues including football hooliganism, child abuse, 
paedophilia, rock music, and human cloning. However, it must be noted that the idea of the ‘moral panic’ has 
been (and continues to be) employed by the media in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and 
Sweden – but has had little or no usage in the South African media. 
10
 See, for example, Altheide, ‘Moral Panic: From sociological concept to public discourse’, 79 – 99. Examples 
of moral panic analysis include G. K. Behlmer, ‘Grave Doubts: Victorian Medicine, Moral Panic, and the Signs 
of Death’, The Journal of British Studies, 42, 2 (2003), 206 – 235; W. Boddy, ‘Approaching “The 
Untouchables”: Social Science and Moral Panics in Early Sixties Television’, Cinema Journal, 35, 4 (1996), 70 
– 87; C. E. Cocca, ‘From “Welfare Queen” to “Exploited Teen”: Welfare Dependency, Statuary Rape, and 
Moral Panic”, NWSA Journal, 14, 2 (2002), 56 – 79; S. P. Hier, ‘Raves, Risks and the Ecstacy Panic: A Case 
Study in the Subversive Nature of Moral Regulation’, Canadian Journal of Sociology, 27, 1 (2002), 33 – 57; A. 
Hunt, ‘The Great Masturbation panic and the Discourses of Moral Regulation in Nineteenth- and Early 
Twentieth-Century Britain’, Journal of the History of Sexuality, 8, 4 (1998), 575 – 615; J. Lynxwiler and D. 
Gay, ‘Moral boundaries and deviant music: public attitudes toward heavy metal and rap’, Deviant Behaviour, 
21, 1 (2000), 63 – 85; A. Schinkel, ‘Contexts of Anxiety: The Moral Panic over “Senseless Violence” in the 
Netherlands’, Current Sociology, 56, 5 (2008), 735 – 756; P. Sikes, ‘At the Eye of the Storm: An Academic(‘s) 
Experience of Moral Panic’, Qualitative Inquiry, 14, 2 (2008), 235 – 253; M. Welch, E. A. Price and N. Yankey, 
‘Moral Panic Over Youth Violence: Wilding and the Manufacture of Menace in the Media’, Youth Society, 34, 1 
(2002), 3 – 30; R. Wright, ‘“I’d Sell You Suicide”: Pop Music and Moral Panic in the Age of Marilyn Manson’, 
Popular Music, 19, 3 (2000), 365 – 385 and L. Guy, ‘“Moral Panic” or Pejorative Labelling? Rethinking the 
Mazengarb inquiry into Underage sex in the Hutt Valley in 1954’, Journal of Religious History, 33, 4 (2009), 
435 – 451.  
11
 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, i.  
12
 Essentially this implies that the meaning of moral panic is less clear-cut than it appears and is employed 
differently by academics and the media. See Hunt, ‘“Moral Panic” and Moral Language in the Media’, 629 – 
648.  
13
 K. Thompson quoted in P. Jenkins: Intimate Enemies: Moral Panics in Contemporary Great Britain (New 
York: Aldine du Gruyter, 1992), 8. 
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Moral Panic is one of those deflating phrases used by sociologists and other 
allegedly impartial students of human behaviour to condescend to excitements 
among the general populace…The doctoral message is calming: do not worry, 
we have been here before, your concerns are and ersatz compound 
manufactured by the media, a few odd bishops, strident voices from the left and 
the right, moralists and nostalgists [sic] of all kinds.
14
  
 
Defining something as a moral panic became increasingly understood not as a diagnosis bred 
out of concern but rather as a diagnosis as no cause for concern. Thus ‘moral panic’ has come 
to be a term of chastisement, seeming to imply an irrational or insincere reaction to an 
imagined threat.
15
  
 
Certainly, as Heir has noted, the diverse meanings associated with concept have divided 
academics on the analytical value of the concept,
16
 and many critics decry it as an 
‘ideologically loaded or value-laden’ term.
17
 Students of moral panic analysis, including 
Cohen’s colleague Jock Young, have defended the term by explaining that ‘moral panic’ 
refers not to an irrational reaction but to one that is disproportionate. Cohen also explained 
that moral panics seldom occur without impetus, but rather characterize situations that are 
sensationalized, exaggerated and based on little more than seemingly ‘self-evident facts’.
18
 
However, even staunch advocates of moral panic theory have asserted that the word ‘panic’ – 
the culprit in the term that appears to imply irrationality – seems something of ‘an 
unfortunate choice’.
19
 Moreover, critics like McRobbie and Thornton have interpreted ‘moral 
panic’ as an anthropomorphic term that ‘depicts a complex society as a single person who 
                                                 
14
 Independent on Sunday, February 21, 1993. Quoted in Hunt, ‘“Moral Panic” and Moral Language in the 
Media’, 641. 
15
 For example, in reaction to a young PhD student’s research into prostitution in an area of Melbourne – titled 
Sex, Money and Power: Deconstructing Moral Panic around Street Prostitution in St Kilda – an irate Andrew 
Bolt decried the use of ‘moral panic’ as little more than a ‘buzz-word of the post modern academic.’ Bolt 
continued, ‘moral panic, which means being so silly as to worry, rather than just let people wreck themselves 
and be wrecked. Because what’s morality anyway?’ See A. Bolt, ‘When moral panic is immoral’, Sunday 
Herald Sun (Melbourne), June 6, 2004. 
16
 S. P. Hier, ‘Conceptualizing Moral Panic through a Moral Economy of Harm’, Critical Sociology, 28, 3 
(2002), 311 – 312.  
17
 Thompson, Moral Panic, 10. 
18
 Cohen (1980) and C. Critcher (2006). See B. E. Denham, ‘Folk Devils, News Icons and the Construction of 
Moral Panics’, Journalism Studies, 9, 6 (2008), 946. Thompson and Hunt have explored the changes in the 
term’s usage and reception in the media and public. See Thomson, Moral Panic and Hunt, ‘“Moral Panic” and 
Moral Language in the Media’, 629 – 648. 
19
 Thompson, Moral Panic, p. viii. In an attempt to avoid the difficulties associated with the term ‘panic’, the 
editors of Behaving Badly: Social Panic and Moral Outrage – Victorian and Modern Parallels (2003) chose to 
refer to periods of ‘moral outrage’ occurring within a broader period of ‘social panic’. The distinction is 
uncomfortable, as periods of social anxiety are far more likely to produce moments of panic, moral or otherwise. 
See J. Rowbotham and K. Stevenson, eds, Behaving Badly: Social Panic and Moral Outrage – Victorian and 
Modern Parallels (England: Ashgate, 2003), 8 – 9 and J. Bourke, ‘Fear and Anxiety: Writing about Emotion in 
Modern History’, History Workshop Journal, 55, (2003), 111 – 133. 
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experiences sudden fear about its virtue’ in asserting that the term may prove more obscurant 
than illuminating.
20
 Compounding these terminological difficulties still further, Cohen later 
pointed out that the term referred not to an actual theory or model, but more simply to an 
abstract concept.
21
 This prompts, particularly perhaps in the theory-wary historian, the 
question of why the concept of the moral panic should be utilized at all. As noted, ‘moral 
panic’ is a recent term for a relatively old phenomenon,
22
 one that has been studied without 
resorting to so troublesome a term.
23
 Even then, critics argue, it points not to a theory but to a 
fluid concept that has allowed a great deal of interpretation of the same phenomenon to fall 
under a single term.   
 
Despite such critique, the moral panic, as both a term and a mode of analysis, brings to the 
fore the dynamics at work within a historically recognizable phenomenon during which the 
moral contours of a society are shifted and redefined. As Goode and Ben-Yehuda assert, 
‘[h]aving a specific concept to classify and capture the phenomena enables us to notice 
elements and dynamics that we would have otherwise missed.’
24
 This chapter explores the 
usefulness of the moral panic concept to historians. In laying the theoretical foundation of 
this thesis, this chapter evaluates the dynamics that moral panic analysis can expose, as well 
as the value that moral panic study holds for historical research. This chapter contends that 
the moral panic is both an actual phenomenon and a mode of analysis, and that it occurs 
within both the discursive and the objective arenas of human experience. In clarifying these 
dynamics, this chapter points to value of placing the moral panic within its historical context 
and within the nexus of its social, temporal, and geographic boundaries.
25
 Moreover, this 
chapter will argue that rather than ‘unfortunate’ or misguided, the term ‘moral panic’ 
elucidates clearly these dynamics – creating a useful lens through which to study the flux of 
moral discourse, social boundaries, and cultural change over time.  
                                                 
20
 A. McRobbie and S. L. Thornton, ‘Rethinking “Moral Panic” for Multi-Mediated Social Worlds’, The British 
Journal of Sociology, 46, 4 (1995), 567. 
21
 Denham, ‘Folk Devils, News Icons and the Construction of Moral Panics’, 946.  
22
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda provided three examples from the American context of precursors to modern moral 
panics (in addition to case studies of moral panics from different periods of history) including the Prohibition 
Movement (1900 – 1920), the Crusade for Anti-Marijuana legislation in America during the 1930s, the debates 
and legislation regarding Sexual Psychopaths between the 1930s and the 1950s. See Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 
Moral Panics, 14 – 19. 
23
 See Chapter One. 
24
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 11 – 12.  
25
 More recent scholarship has begun to place more emphasis on the geographic and temporal dynamics of 
moral panics. See Jenkins: Intimate Enemies; Hier, ‘Conceptualizing Moral Panic through a Moral Economy of 
Harm’, 311 – 334; A. Rohloff and S. Wright, ‘Moral Panic and Social Theory: Beyond the Heuristic’, Current 
Sociology, 58, 3 (2010), 403 – 419 and Garland, ‘On the concept of moral panic’, 9 – 30. 
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The Moral Panic as a Phenomenon 
 
A great deal has been written, on a continuum between admonition and approbation, about 
the surges of social sentiment and the spur to action. Fads and crazes, revolutions and 
protests, activism and terrorism – there are a variety of ways in which panic and anxiety 
manifest themselves. Certainly a great deal of writing on the phenomenon of the moral panic 
has devoted itself to the latter, more contentious, half of the term. However, the ‘moral’ of 
moral panic demarcates the phenomenon in question from the broader history of social 
problems and fear narratives, which are both geographically and temporally more complex 
than they appear. As Thompson notes, the ‘reason for calling it a moral panic is precisely to 
indicate that the perceived threat is not to something mundane – such as economic output or 
educational standards – but a threat to the social order itself or an idealized (ideological) 
conception of some part of it.’
26
  
 
Moral discourse is integral to the study of the moral panic, and it is here that the creation of 
the folk devil and the patrolling of moral boundaries occur under the divergent voices of 
interest groups, experts, politicians, and concerned members of the public. It is also in this 
process of meaning-making that moral boundaries are constructed, and where convergence – 
a process key to moral panics and its analytical value for comparative history – emerges. This 
section looks at the concept of the moral panic more closely in exploring each half of the 
term and the way in which it forms a mode of analysis for a historical phenomenon. In 
exploring the discursive element of the moral panic, it becomes clear that the ‘moral’ half of 
the term directs the analysis to both the specific concern of the panic and the broader 
discursive realm in which moral boundaries are enacted. The more controversial half of the 
term moral panic, so often taken to imply irrationality, is explored by taking into account the 
objective indicators of the moral panic as a phenomenon, as well as the theoretical stance that 
‘moral panic’ takes as a mode of analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 Thompson, Moral Panic, 8.  
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The Moral Panic 
 
Debates about the moral integrity of society are neither new nor specific to moments of 
heightened social anxiety.
27
 Similarly, discourse is neither static nor cohesive, but at 
particular historical junctions might be heightened or shift dramatically (which Hier has 
referred to as the ‘volatility of moralization’).
28
 The language of moral panics does not 
necessarily represent a break from this discourse but rather a process of dragging it to the 
fore, adding to it, and placing it in the spotlight of the public stage. This sudden and effective 
visibility of a deviant in society, and its subsequent codification as a ‘folk devil’, may serve 
to reassert an established system of values whilst creating a sense of social solidarity in the 
face of a perceived threat.
29
  
 
The folk devil is essentially a deviant and shares its characteristics. The act of scapegoating 
produces something of rock to which a society – or segments of a society – might cling when 
the processes of change seem more chaotic than usual. As John Curra notes,  
Deviance is branded as dysfunctional, unhealthy, evil, dangerous, or 
abnormal. The successful definition of alternate realities as inauthentic, 
pathological, or deviant reinforces the dominant view of reality and makes it 
appear more immutable and concrete than it actually is.
30
  
 
Although the perceived threat of a moral panic usually possesses an objective dimension, the 
way in which it is stigmatised through the public media sees the construction of a folk devil 
replete with deviant characteristics.  
 
This process invariably strips the folk devil (and its associates) of any positive characteristics 
and places on them the burden of public blame.
31
 Such a process of interpellation is 
                                                 
27
 See, for example, G. Pearson, Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears (London: Macmillan Press, 1983). 
28
 S. P. Hier, ‘Thinking Beyond Moral Panic: Risk, Responsibility, and the politics of moralization’, Theoretical 
Criminology, 12, 2 (2008), 173 – 190. Foucault’s definition of discourse, as noted by Thompson, is ‘a group of 
statements which provide a language for talking about – a way of representing – the knowledge about a 
particular topic at a particular historical moment.’ Thompson, Moral Panic, 24.  
29
 As Emile Durkheim, the father of deviance studies, noted of the social dimension of the deviant in society: 
‘The deviant individual violates rules of conduct which the rest of the community holds in high respect; when 
these people come together to express their outrage over the offense and bear witness against the offender, they 
develop a tighter bind of solidarity than existed earlier.’ E. Durkheim quoted in Jenkins, Intimate Enemies, 4. 
Durkheim, Erikson, and Cohen championed the importance of panics in reasserting an established value system. 
See Jenkins, Intimate Enemies, 7; Garland, ‘On the concept of moral panic’, 9 – 30 and (more broadly) P. Smith, 
‘Durkheim and Criminology: Reconstructing the Legacy’, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 
41, 3 (2008), 333 – 344.  
30
 J. Curra, The Relativity of Deviance (California: Sage Publications, 2000), 8. 
31
 Thompson, Moral Panic, 4.  
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symptomatic of moral panics, as Goode and Ben-Yehuda note ‘[a]ll moral panics, by their 
very nature, identify, denounce, and attempt to root out folk devils.’
32
 However, it is 
important to note that whilst a particular folk devil becomes symbolic of all that is wrong 
with a society, a vehicle of social expression so to speak, it is not the source of the moral 
panic.
33
 As the scapegoat, the folk devil essentially acts as a straw man upon which a society 
can pin its problems and present it to the young, naïve, or morally wavering as something of a 
‘moral scarecrow’.
34
 Through a process of symbolization, in which ‘images are made much 
sharper than reality’, the folk devil becomes representative of various social ills through the 
further processes of convergence and amplification.
35
  Convergence occurs when two or more 
activities are linked together in the image of the folk devil, that is two or more separate acts 
are merged into a single threat, thereby amplifying the threat potential of both.
36
 Together 
these processes of symbolization, convergence and amplification feed into and from one 
another. To which Cohen noted in the third edition of Folk Devils and Moral Panics (2004), 
‘successful moral panics owe their appeal to their ability to find points of resonance with 
wider anxieties.’
37
 Moreover, as Hunt has noted, 
One kind of threat or challenge to society seems larger, more menacing, if it 
can be mapped together with other apparently similar phenomena…As issues 
and groups are projected across the thresholds, it becomes easier to mount 
legitimate campaigns of control against them.
38
 
 
This process of meaning-making, in which the image of the folk devil is solidified as both a 
threat to society and a symptom of social decay, usually evokes a nostalgia in which the past 
is presented in an idealized fashion and juxtaposed with the present. The seemingly 
unchecked flux of the present is contrasted to the apparent stasis of a time past in which 
morals were certain and society unencumbered by current social ills.  Of this nostalgia 
                                                 
32
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 29.  
33
 Arnold Hunt sees the folk devil as the object of the moral panic as ‘the moral panic must have an object, it 
must be about something.’ Hunt, ‘“Moral Panic” and Moral Language in the Media’, 631. However, as noted, 
whilst the folk devil is the object of the moral panic, the various anxieties of a society are attached to this object 
– and the folk devil should not be mistaken for the moral panic itself. See Hier, ‘Thinking beyond moral panic’, 
176. 
34
 This is not to say that the moral discourse is one-sided, or that the ‘folk devils’ never challenge the charges 
laid against them. See McRobbie and Thornton, ‘Rethinking “Moral Panic” for Multi-Mediated Social Worlds’, 
559 – 574. 
35
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 28. 
36
 Such notions did not spring fresh from the field of moral panic scholarship; rather it was cultivated in from 
earlier works. Leslie Wilkins put the concept of ‘deviance amplification’ forward in 1964 to describe the process 
in which more powerful groups in a society denote other, smaller groups as deviant – effectively reaffirming 
accepted moral codes. See Denham, ‘Folk Devils, News Icons and the Construction of Moral Panics’, 946. 
37
 Quoted in Garland, ‘On the concept of moral panic’, 12. 
38
 A. Hunt, ‘Anxiety and Social Explanation: Some Anxieties about Anxiety’, Journal of Social History, 32, 3 
(1999), 511. 
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Pearson asserts, ‘we are dealing with a form of moral dodo-ism, marked by its inability to 
keep pace with a moving world and to adapt its complaints to sometimes dramatic social 
alterations.’
39
 Whilst the past, or aspects of it, become an idealized ‘golden age’, this 
discourse also sharpens the boundary between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. Sometimes the folk devil is 
perceived as having no regard for social mores whatsoever, and is believed to transgress – 
indeed revel – in taboo behaviour. Rape, abortion, cannibalism, homosexuality, incest, 
murder, deformity, disease – taboos often come into play when decrying some ‘new’ form of 
behaviour or re-emergent deviant. As Mary Douglas argued, taboos correspond to social 
boundaries, as they are produced by persistent social anxiety regarding the solidarity of social 
borders and the integrity of social mores.
40
 In a milieu now perceived as unsafe, the image of 
children at risk heightens the anxiety experienced during a moral panic. Physically weaker, 
their health and safety the charge of society, children occupy an image of innocence and 
potential, and thus symbolically represent the current and future health of a society. Thus the 
image of the child endangered drastically increases the threat of the folk devil, its deviant 
behaviour all the more evil, and the problem intensified in the eyes of the public.
 41
 As such, 
folk devils are created out of both new and pre-existing cultural elements. Scraps of rumour 
and urban legend, off-cuts of old grievances and the fresh material of social change are sewn 
into familiar narrative patterns regarding evil and wickedness. Effectively the process is one 
in which ‘a full-scale demonology takes place by which the members of a new evil category 
are placed “in the gallery of contemporary folk-devils.”’
42
   
 
Often the more fervent and stirring voices calling out against the folk devil belong to so-
called moral entrepreneurs or moral crusaders. Sociologist Howard Becker coined the term 
‘moral entrepreneur’ in describing those individuals or groups who seek to provide a society 
of certain moral codes or rules.
43
 As Becker asserted,  
Whenever rules are created and applied we should be alive to the possible 
presence of an enterprising individual or group. Their activities can be 
properly called ‘moral enterprise’ for what they are enterprising about is the 
                                                 
39
 Pearson also asserted that ‘[w]hat this historical journey has revealed to us, by contrast, is a seamless tapestry 
of fears and complaints about the deteriorated present; a long and connected history that makes plain the 
shortcomings of the more usual view of our cultural inheritance which is severely limited by its simplistic 
nostalgia for “the old way of life”.’ See Pearson, Hooligan, 207 – 211. 
40
 Noted in Hunt, ‘Anxiety and Social Explanation’, 511. 
41
 See Thompson, Moral Panics and C. Critcher, Moral Panics and the Media (Buckingham: Open University 
Press, 2003).  
42
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 29 – 30.  
43
 Becker elaborated the term ‘moral entrepreneur’ in a case study of legislation regarding marijuana in America 
in Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (1963). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 24
creation of a new fragment of the moral constitution of society, it’s code of 
right and wrong.
44
  
 
Becker described the moral entrepreneur as bound to an absolute ethic and following a 
dogmatic distinction between what they perceive as good and evil with little or no 
qualification. There is always a strong presence of moral entrepreneurs during a moral panic, 
as this thesis will show. Indeed, as Hier contends, it is only through the claims of moral 
entrepreneurs that folk devils become symbolic of social ills. Presented as fact in the media, 
these claims together with the process of news-making solidify the image of the folk devil.
45
 
Unsurprisingly, then, it is usually the moral entrepreneur whose concerns match those of the 
moral panic who finds the public stage more welcoming because there is a more attentive 
audience.
46
 There are a host of voices – often discordant – surrounding the folk devil during a 
moral panic. These voices speak from various sectors of society, alerting the public to the 
threat and the apparent omens of moral decay. Whilst police issue warnings and tighten 
public security, experts step forward, politicians reassure their constituents or blame their 
opponents, interest groups lobby their cause and their remedy, while the anxious public 
watches and responds. Certainly, for Cohen moral panics were the result of ‘a complex chain 
of social interaction’,
47
 if not the conjunction of social processes including the overt actions 
of moral entrepreneurs, claims makers, and media with the underlying processes of cultural 
change and anxiety.
48
 
 
The mouthpiece of these voices is the media. Newspapers, magazines, television, radio, 
pamphlets, bulletins, posters, and more recently the internet (with its blogs, chat rooms, and 
video sites) – the pervasive presence of media serves as the public platform. Information 
                                                 
44
 Quoted in Jenkins, Intimate Enemies, 6. 
45
 Hier, ‘Thinking Beyond Moral Panic’, 176. 
46
 Note that neither moral entrepreneurs nor their concerns are specific to moral panics.  
47
 Hier, ‘Thinking Beyond Moral Panic’, 176. 
48
 Much of the work on moral panics has been devoted to asking how they occur and who is responsible for 
them. Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics looked specifically at the symbolization process and the reactions 
of society and social control mechanisms. Inspired by Cohen’s work – Stuart Hall and his colleagues offered a 
more Marxist and teleological understanding of moral panics and deviance, and turned attention directly to the 
operations of the State. The publication of S. Hall et al., Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and 
Order (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1978) was well received and its emphasis on the political motivations of 
interest groups has resounded in subsequent work. The approach of Policing the Crisis was later seen as the 
‘elite engineered’ model of moral panics in Erich Goode and Nachmann Ben-Yehuda’s work Moral Panics: The 
Social Construction of Deviance (1994). Goode and Ben-Yehuda also noted two other models – a ‘middle-
grounds’ model seen in Cohen’s work, and a ‘grass roots’ model that they saw as occurring in the moral panic of 
the European witch hunts. The ‘model’ used throughout this thesis is the ‘middle grounds’, ‘interest group’ or 
‘classic’ moral panic epitomized by Cohen’s original work. The interest group explanation of the moral panic 
sees it as the unintended or unanticipated outcome of the actions of moral entrepreneurs at particular moments 
of social anxiety.  
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about a society’s normative contours is largely gleamed from the mass media, as Cohen 
notes: 
[The mass media] informs us about right and wrong, about the boundaries 
beyond which one should not venture and about the shapes that the devil can 
assume. The gallery of folk types – heroes and saints, as well as fools, villains 
and devils – is publicized not just in oral-tradition and face-to-face contact but 
to much larger audiences and with much greater dramatic resources.
49
 
 
According to Cohen the moral panic is birthed through the sensational claims made and 
disseminated by the media. In fact a large part of his study is devoted to the role of the mass 
media in the creation of folk devils and moral panics because, as Cohen argues, the mass 
media ‘devote a great deal of space to deviance: sensational crimes, scandals, bizarre 
happenings, and strange goings on.’
 50
 As such, it is the press who usually appears to lead the 
charge of the moral panic, if only through reporting and advocating the claims of moral 
entrepreneurs and interests groups. Of course, sensational stories sell more copies, feeding 
into the concern and anxiety of the public who become ever more likely to lap up the next 
story as the moral panic unfolds. For Cohen this is an unintended by-product of news making. 
The media, Cohen notes, ‘have long operated as agents of moral indignation in their own 
right: even if they are not self-consciously engaged in crusading or much-raking, their very 
reporting of certain “facts” can be sufficient to generate concern, anxiety, indignation or 
panic.’
51
 This spiralling process is easy to identify, and indeed integral to the moral panic. 
This is particularly overt in the creation of ‘looping effect’ wherein the reaction of society 
enacts on the thing being responded to and transforms it – evident in the occurrence of 
symbolization, convergence and amplification.
52
  
 
However, some scholars hold that the press is directly responsible for moral panics and argue 
that the media purposefully instigate moral panics in order to sell newspapers.
53
 Whilst they 
urge the need to take into account the growing complexity of modern media, McRobbie and 
Thornton, for example, see the moral panic as the goal of the media rather than a 
                                                 
49
 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 17. Also see S. Cohen, ed., Images of Deviance (England: Penguin 
Books, 1971) and S. Cohen and J. Young, eds, The manufacture of news: Social problems, deviance and the 
mass media (Great Britain: Constable and Co, 1973). 
50
 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 17. 
51
 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 16. 
52
 Described as such by Hacking in The Social Construction of What? (2000) cited in Garland, ‘On the concept 
of moral panic’, 14.  
53
 This process is usually referred to as an ‘amplification spiral’ or ‘signification spiral’. As to the role of the 
media in moral panics, see Critcher, Moral Panics and the Media; Denham, ‘Folk Devils, News Icons and the 
Construction of Moral Panics’, 945 – 961; Altheide, ‘Moral Panic’, 79 – 99 and Hunt, ‘“Moral Panic” and 
Moral Language in the Media’, 629 -648.   
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consequence.
54
 Although this argument is popular in media studies, it is contested. One 
problem, as Heir points out, is the need to differentiate between a moral panic and media 
sensationalism.
55
 This further emphasizes the need for analytical clarity when defining an 
event as a moral panic, given the relatively eclectic scope of meanings applied to the term 
and its usages in popular and academic discourse. Essentially, it is misleading to regard the 
broad scope of the media and the news-seeking and news-making press as synonymous. 
Rather the press is a facet of the media, and it is in the press that issues are often 
sensationalized, distorted, and exaggerated.
56
 As such, the press acts as both a voice as well 
as a mouthpiece in the moral panic – reporting, commenting, and framing its subject matter.
57
 
 
The discursive process of the moral panic lies in the recognition and codification of a social 
deviant. Now categorized, this deviant is decried and demonized as a threat to social values 
by moral entrepreneurs and the public alike. The folk devil emerges, a hybrid creature that is 
part real and part invention. Together with a nostalgic ‘remembrance’ of more secure times 
since waned, the creation of the folk devil sharply demarcates social boundaries between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’. Spurring society into action, negative elements merge together as various 
concerns are brought to the public platform through the media, often invoking fears 
surrounding taboos and children at risk. Through the process of symbolization the folk devil 
comes to represent social evil. During this process, convergence implicitly and explicitly 
links social activities and anxieties to the folk devil – amplifying the threat potential of 
both.
58
 The net effect of this discursive process is the strengthening of moral boundaries 
through a debate of society’s mores on a public platform as the emotionally charged 
discourse, sensational stories, and the remedies proposed work to draw out voices from the 
social terrain.  
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 McRobbie and Thornton, ‘Rethinking “Moral Panic” for Multi-Mediated Social Worlds’, 559 – 574.  
55
 Hier, ‘Conceptualizing Moral Panic through a Moral Economy of Harm’, 331. 
56
 These aspects are crucial in determining whether or not the response is disproportionate, a key indicator of a 
moral panic. The media is also the arena in which the label of ‘deviant’ may be conferred, and where a process 
that Joseph Gusfield referred to as ‘moral passage’ may occur. Cohen uses Gusfield’s example of the ‘problem 
drinker’ whose description in the media changes from ‘repentant’ to ‘enemy’ to ‘sick’ – following society’s 
ideas about what causes this behaviour and what its threat potential is. See Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral 
Panics, 16 – 17. It is also worth taking into account the extent to which reports may be second hand, often 
repeated from other media sources. As Baudrillard noted ‘We are in a postmodern epoch of media culture in 
which the public sphere is more like a hall of mirrors where all that exists is media reflections of other media 
representations.’ Quoted in Thompson, Moral Panics, 24. 
57
 As McRobbie and Thornton assert ‘mass media both frame subculture as major events and disseminate them.’ 
McRobbie and Thornton, ‘Rethinking “Moral Panic” for Multi-Mediated Social Worlds’, 565.  
58
 As Thompson notes, ‘Convergence occurs when two or more activities are linked in the process of 
signification as to implicitly or explicitly draw parallels between them...the net effect is amplification, not in the 
real events being described but in their threat potential for society.’ See Thompson, Moral Panics, 20. 
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The Moral Panic 
 
This moral discourse – with its entrepreneurs, lobby groups and campaigns to put right the 
apparent moral upset of society, its rumour and media storm of sensational news reports, and 
its currents of nostalgia and public concern – is fundamental to explaining the moral panic. 
Certainly it is nearly axiomatic of moral panic literature to note that the phenomenon occurs 
during social upheaval, economic crisis or political upset – those ‘troubled times’ where 
society is more anxious and on guard.
59
 With tensions running high, moral panics are 
characterized by an especially rapid process of meaning-making during which the mass 
media reflect and disseminate information and images that are both bred from and fertilize 
the social imagination. As Goode and Ben-Yehuda have asserted, ‘[a]lthough myth-making 
characterizes all societies at all times, during times of the moral panic, the process is 
especially rapid and a given myth is especially likely to be believed on relatively little 
evidence.’
60
 The aforementioned processes of symbolization, convergence, and amplification 
are equally telling of the rapid nature of this moralization discourse – alluding to the volatile 
nature of the moral panic phenomenon. The concept of convergence, for example, appears to 
imply that public anxiety ‘boils over’ after a number of concerns are combined and amplified, 
typified in the panicked response and call for overt action. Essentially the ‘moral’ half of the 
term ‘moral panic’ informs as to the very specific subject matter or content of the 
phenomenon, dislocating it from broader social anxiety and scares which are not necessarily 
moral in content. Similarly the word ‘panic’ alludes as to the nature of the moral panic and 
differentiates the phenomenon from moral discourse in general, as well as from other forms 
of collective behaviour.
61
  
 
There are several indicators that reveal the social process as markedly different from other 
periods and identify it as a moral panic. These are particularly important in establishing the 
analytical boundaries of the moral panic and the need to distinguish between media 
sensationalism, the public reaction to a threat, and a moral panic. Whilst measurement 
remains the most overt problem in moral panic analysis, the indicators of consensus, concern, 
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 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 32.  
60
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 25. 
61
 Hier has made a similar suggestion in noting that ‘volatility of moralization’ during a moral panic in contrast 
to ‘moralization’ in general. Pearson has noted how similar anxieties regarding children, immorality, and weak 
parenthood have occurred together with a nostalgic discourse regarding an idealized past throughout history and 
are not as novel as they appear. See Hier, ‘Thinking Beyond Moral Panic’, 173 – 190 and Petersen, Hooligans 
(1983). 
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hostility, volatility, and disproportion do much to distinguish the moral panic from scares, 
crusades, and sheer media hype. The process of defining and responding to the folk devil and 
the threats it represents is on-going, but whilst moral panics are characterized by debate their 
reality depends on some degree of consensus. In order for a moral panic to occur there must 
be broad agreement among members of a society, or a section of society, that the folk devil is 
a threat that must be addressed. Unsurprisingly this consensus depends on an intensified 
concern in the public, given that the amplification of concern spurs the machinations of 
symbolization and convergence further.
62
 With this concern comes increased anxiety and 
hostility toward the folk devil, growing with the folk devil which comes to represent a host of 
social ills. This tends to result in the perception of society as out of control, afflicted with 
rampant moral decay, and in dire need of immediate action to prevent the destruction of all 
that a society values. Given the accumulative nature and rapid shift of moral anxiety into 
moral panic, the phenomenon is characterized by volatility. This can be observed in the 
tendency of moral panics to appear and diminish relatively quickly, the heightened concern 
over a problem often dissipating even if the problem does not.
63
   
 
The moral panic is also characterised by disproportion. If disproportion is not shown as an 
element of the moral panic phenomenon the analysis may well implode.
64
 Disproportion, 
then, is the premise upon which the moral panic rests. The element of disproportion places on 
the moral panic analysis the onus of showing that the reaction to a perceived threat is out of 
proportion to the objective condition, or that ‘objective molehills have been made into 
subjective mountains.’
65
 However, measuring disproportion can be a murky task. As Stabile, 
                                                 
62
 There is the assumption here that the media publicity of a threat reflects opinion and popularity, and certainly 
Stabile’s argument that the public are not ‘passive dupes who blindly consume information’ is warranted. Again 
this points to the need avoid conflating media sensationalism with public opinion. The analysis of various media 
and public participation through letters to the editor, blogs, creation of societies, and popular discussion reported 
by the press aid in establishing the public reaction during the period. See C. A. Stabile, ‘Conspiracy or 
Consensus? Reconsidering the Moral Panic’, Journal of Communication Inquiry, 25, 3 (2001), 258 – 278. 
63
 Thompson, Moral Panics, 9.  
64
 In Policing the Crisis, Hall and his colleagues emphasize disproportion in their definition of the moral panic: 
‘When the official reaction to a person, group of persons or series of events is out of all proportion to the actual 
threat offered, when “experts”, in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and editors perceive the 
threat in all but identical forms, and appear to talk “with one voice” of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions, 
when the media representations universally stress “sudden and dramatic” increases (in numbers involved or 
events) and ‘novelty’, above and beyond what a sober, realistic appraisal could sustain, then we believe it is 
appropriate to speak of the beginnings of a moral panic.’ S. Hall et al, Policing the Crisis, 16. 
65
 B. Jones, N. J. Gallagher and J. A. McFalls, ‘Toward a unified models for social problems theory’, Journal 
for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 19, (1989), 4. Quoted in Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 36. 
Essentially, disproportion is used to counter claims that moral panic analysis is value-laden as the notion that a 
reaction is out of proportion is not the same as saying that a reaction is irrational. This is encapsulated by 
Walker who writes, ‘[a]t such moments, panic is indeed the appropriate word: a crushing, contagious fear that 
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among others, has noted ‘fear is a notoriously difficult emotion to pin down or measure. Like 
dreams, to a large degree, fear is subject to condensation and displacement.’
66
 However, what 
makes measurement particularly difficult is that often data about the objective threat, so 
required for a ‘sober, realistic appraisal’, is untenable.
67
 Nonetheless, when navigating the 
terrain where the objective and subjective overlap, the moral panic scholar needs to 
demonstrate that the dramatic social reaction to the perceived threat was not supported by the 
available evidence, rather than dismissing the objective dimension of the threat altogether.
68
  
 
Disproportion is measurable. Goode and Ben-Yehuda provide four indicators: the 
exaggeration of figures, the fabrication of figures, the existence of other harmful conditions, 
and change over time. A great deal of the language employed during moral panics includes 
the statistics of the crimes, deaths, pain, or costs suffered at the hands of the folk devil – and 
such claims are almost always exaggerated. Often the statistics projected during moral panics 
are disproportionate to those found elsewhere, or have no supporting data whatsoever. In 
each case, Goode and Ben-Yehuda note, disproportion is measurable between what is 
claimed and what is verifiable. Disproportion is also indicated when the heightened concern 
and hostility toward a folk devil does not run parallel to the attention paid to other conditions 
which may prove just as threatening. Perhaps the most telling indicator of disproportion, 
however, lies in the ‘discovery’ or ‘rediscovery’ of social problems whose existence before or 
after the moral panic does not garner the same concern or hostility. Essentially disproportion 
points to the dislocation between the perception and the actuality of an event, person, or 
group of persons as harbingers of social decay.
69
 
  
                                                                                                                                                        
prompts people to behave hysterically. The issue isn't whether we're right to be afraid. It's whether we're 
responding rationally to our perfectly justified fear.’ J. Walker, ‘Panic Attacks: Drawing the Thin Line Between 
Caution and Hysteria after September 11
th
’, Reason Magazine, March 2002, 
http://www.reason.com/news/show/28345.html, available: 3 May 2011. 
66
 Stabile, ‘Conspiracy or Consensus?’, 260. Also see Bourke, ‘Fear and Anxiety’, 111 – 133.  
67
 This is the main critique of moral panic analysis by scholars like Waddington and Ungar. See S. Ungar, 
‘Moral Panic versus risk society: the implications of the changing sites of social anxiety’, British Journal of 
Sociology, 52, 2 (2001), 271 – 291. Goode and Ben-Yehuda outline the critique made by Waddinton of Hall et 
al’s Policing the Crisis. Goode and Ben-Yehuda negate this critique in noting that disproportion can be 
measured. See Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 42 – 43. 
68
 Denham, ‘Folk Devils, News Icons and the construction of Moral Panics’, 946 and Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 
Moral Panics, 36 – 38. Certainly scholars have had moments of treading carefully, as Garland has pointed out 
with reference to the way in which a number of ‘moral panic’ sociologists (including Goode and Jenkins) 
avoided ascribing the term ‘moral panic’ to the somewhat hysterical and overtly moralized reaction to the events 
of 9/11 by both the press and public. Garland suggests that the reason for this is an ethical one, and this certainly 
betrays the inevitable rhetorical aspect of analysis. See Garland, ‘On the concept of moral panic’, 24 and 
Walker, ‘Panic Attacks’, http://www.reason.com/news/show/28345.html, available: 3 May 2011 
69
 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 43 – 45.  
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Neither the moral discourse nor the activities of moral entrepreneurs are specific to moral 
panics. Essentially the indicators of the moral panic – the folk devil, processes of 
symbolization, convergence and amplification, consensus, concern, hostility, volatility, and 
disproportion – work to separate the moral panic phenomenon from other forms of moral 
discourse and collective behaviour. Moral panics are characterized by a rapid process of 
meaning-making and debate surrounding the moral fibre of a society. The particular 
inflections of this discursive practice together with the heightened and dramatic public 
response to the folk devil are identifiably anomalous: they can be recognized as a separate 
phenomenon, a moral panic. The moral panic cannot be divorced from its historical context 
but can be identified from the day-to-day flow of moral discourse and social change, the term 
‘moral panic’ draws to our attention this necessary dislocation.  
 
The ‘Moral Panic’ as a Mode of Analysis  
 
The moral panic is an integral facet of social problems. Indeed the moral panic often 
characterizes a specific moment on the arc of a social problem’s development. Like social 
problems, moral panics are generated by the way in which a society defines a condition or 
form of behaviour as undesirable, and is characterized by waves of public sentiment and calls 
to remedy the problem. The moral panic is unique, however, in that is possesses a folk devil 
and is characteristically volatile – the problem and panic discovered and ensued by an almost 
feverish alarm which then subsides.
70
 Whilst the moral panic is an identifiable social 
phenomenon, with a clear moral discourse and indicators, using the term ‘moral panic’ 
implies that it is also a mode of analysis predicated upon certain approaches and assumptions. 
Whilst the indicators of a moral panic are relatively clear, like all historical subject matter the 
interpretations and emphases of moral panic analyses in themselves are less so. Moral panic 
analysis is ‘self-reflexive’ insofar as the analysis enacts on the phenomenon.
71
 It is based on 
the approach of social constructionism, discussed below, which draws attention to the nature 
of social and moral boundaries to blur and change. Indeed it is this shifting of boundaries 
with which moral panics are preoccupied, and which adds to the value that this avenue of 
study offers for deeper insight into the underlying fears and desires of a society. 
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 Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 98 – 99. 
71
 Garland, among others, has alluded to the self-reflexive nature of moral panic analysis. Garland, ‘On the 
concept of moral panic’, 12. Such a notion is relatively well established in historical research which notes, if 
somewhat uncomfortably, the difference between the past and history. 
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Moral Panic Analysis and Social Constructionism  
 
Cohen’s work is built on the transactional approach to deviance, which holds that deviance is 
not an inherent quality but a socially constructed one. Closely connected with the notion of 
the moral entrepreneur, Becker explained,  
Deviance is created by society…social groups create deviance by making the 
rules whose infraction constitutes deviance and by applying those rules to 
particular persons and labelling them as outsiders. From this point of view, 
deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a 
consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an 
‘offender’. The deviant is one to whom the label has successfully been applied; 
deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label.
72
 
 
However, as Cohen was quick to remind that this transactional approach does not imply that 
the label of ‘deviant’ is arbitrarily applied to unsuspecting persons who have committed no 
wrong, that so-called ‘deviants’ quietly accept this social demarcation, or ‘that harmless 
conditions are wilfully inflated into social problems.’
73
 What it does offer is the ability to 
look at change over time, particularly in the way in which a society perceives itself.  
 
In this way, moral panic study fits into the broader field of anxiety analysis, which rests on 
the notion that certain public responses are manifestations of deep-seated and often 
unacknowledged fears.
74
 As noted, whilst the moral panic centres on the folk devil, it does 
not spring from the folk devil. Instead, underlying fears of a society are coded into the folk 
devil and what it represents. As Ingebretsen notes of the monster,  
Boundaries between representation and reality are always permeable; hence, the 
anxiety over what is seen and what may be looked at: the one who shapes the 
imagination controls the heart. Understood in this light, monsters themselves, or 
their bodies, are texts of contested meaning since to ‘write’ the civic monster 
means spelling out, quite literally, what a populace fears.
75
  
 
In Folk Devils and Moral Panics, the public concern about, and hostility towards the mods 
and rockers expressed deeper concerns about youth culture, promiscuity and post-war 
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 Quoted in Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 12 – 13. According to Cohen this approach, defined by 
Becker, had gained ‘canonical’ status in the sociological approach to deviance. Subsequent writers n deviance 
have emphasized Kai Erikson’s formulation: ‘Deviance is not a property inherent in certain forms of behaviour; 
it is a property conferred upon those forms by audiences which directly or indirectly witness them.’ Quoted in 
R. D. Perrin, ‘When Religion becomes Deviance: Introducing Religion in Deviance and Social Problems 
Courses’, Teaching Sociology, 29, 2 (2001), 135. 
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 Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 14. 
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 See Hunt, ‘Anxiety and Social Explanation’, 516.  
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 E. J. Ingebretsen, ‘Staking the Monster: A Politics of Remonstrance’, Religion and America Journal: A 
Journal of Interpretation, 8, 1 (1998), 108 – 109. 
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affluence of British society. For Cohen the cause of the moral panic was the ‘cultural strain 
and ambiguity’ of social change which manifested in the articulation of the mods and rockers 
as folk devils. Similarly, of their analysis of moral panics, Goode and Ben-Yehuda note that 
‘in each case, the fear and concern had a social foundation, a dynamic that revealed the inner 
workings of the society in which it took place.’
76
 Essentially, in the moral panic the processes 
of symbolization and convergence draw to the fore the undercurrents of social change, the 
shifting of moral boundaries, and the expressions of cultural insecurities which occur in the 
subjective arena of discourse.  
 
This analytical stance is predicated upon the constructionist approach or, as Goode and Ben-
Yehuda suggest, the more moderate position of the contextual constructionist approach. A 
product of the avant-garde, the ‘constructionist’, ‘relativist’, or ‘subjectivist’ position argues 
that social problems are the product of social definition. That is, social problems are socially 
constructed rather than necessarily tangible and obviously real. Contrarily, the objectivist 
argues that social problems are defined by the existence of a concrete, objectively presented 
threat or harmful condition. From the constructionist position,  
A social problem is a condition which is defined by a considerable number of 
persons as a deviation from some social norm which they cherish. Every 
social problem thus consists of an objective condition and a subjective 
definition. The objective condition is a verifiable situation which can be 
checked as to the existence and magnitude (proportions) by impartial and 
trained observers. The subjective definition is the awareness of a certain 
individual that the condition is a threat to certain cherished values.
77
  
 
This is certainly an aspect of the moral panic, which sees a threat discovered (or 
rediscovered) and subsequently defined as a social problem. The charge of being value-laden 
has much to do with this position in moral panic analysis; at least insofar as it differs from the 
view of the moral entrepreneur whose advocacy of reform is predicated on the objectivist 
interpretation of social problems. However, the constructionist position enables the 
understanding of the folk devil as located within both the subjective and objective arenas, and 
understands that the subjective definition is not dependent or parallel to the objective 
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 Goode and Ben-Yehuda studied an assortment of moral panics from the European witch craze to drug abuse 
in Israel during the 1980s. Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 11. 
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 Quoted in Jenkins, Intimate Enemies, 1. Essentially the constructionist position asserts that the ‘objective 
existence of a harmful condition does not, by itself or in and of itself, constitute a social problem.’ Goode and 
Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 88. 
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condition.
78
 Neither the strict constructionist nor the objectivist position is tenable for moral 
panic analysis because the moral panic is neither wholly objective nor wholly discursive.
79
 As 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda argue, the strict constructionist position is untenable in moral panic 
analysis because it dismisses the relevance of objective data in understanding social 
problems. The more moderate position of the contextual construction, however, grounds the 
moral panic in its objective reality whilst gauging more accurately the social reaction to the 
folk devil.
80
 The measurement of disproportion and volatility relies to some extent on this 
overlap between objective and subjective experience, particularly insofar as the moral panic 
centres on the creation of a single folk devil that symbolizes multiple threats and does not 
necessarily parallel its objective or verifiable existence.  
 
Moral Panics, Context and Boundaries 
 
The moral panic, as already noted in this chapter, is a facet of social problems – representing, 
perhaps, a moment when social problems intersect or converge. Such moments are 
particularly fruitful for historical study, offering a lens into change over time, although moral 
panics are complicated by the fact that are formed by both long historical processes and 
discourses, and immediate concerns and changes. There is a need to place the moral panic 
within its broader historical context – particularly insofar as they manifest underlying 
concerns and urge the transition of social views to run parallel with social change. In the 
second edition of Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1980), Cohen noted that contextualization 
was a necessary aspect of moral panic analysis that was too easily overlooked. With 
retrospect Cohen stated that ‘indeed a defect of the book was the impression it sometimes 
might have conveyed of a certain timelessness, an unveiling of a certain set of consequences 
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 For example, child or drug abuse have very real objective dimensions and are not new problems in society, 
however they are not always the subjects of serious moral debate or at the forefront of public concern. Similarly, 
as Goode and Ben-Yehuda point out, disease may cause a great deal of objective harm in a society but does not 
necessarily constitute a social problem. See Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 88. 
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 This brings to the fore a further distinction between ‘strict’ or ‘hard’ constructionism and ‘moderate’ or 
‘contextual’ constructionism. The former the objective reality is unnecessary and irrelevant, whilst the 
contextual constructionist does not and does take into account the objective condition in understanding the way 
in which a social problem is defined. See Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics, 88 – 96 and Jenkins, Intimate 
Enemies, 1 – 3. 
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 Goode and Ben-Yehuda assert that ‘If we were to focus on the conditions themselves and the threat they pose 
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podge. While we do not deny the existence of the objective dimension, we do not believe that the objective 
seriousness of a given condition, not that alone, determines the public’s reaction to it.’ Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 
Moral Panics, 96. 
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insulated from history and politics.’
81
 As such, moral panic analysis offers the contemporary 
observer a means of evaluating current society – the changes and acceptances, the old 
grievances, and forgotten qualms. Certainly, the process of convergence, in which new 
anxieties are placed on a social patsy who seemingly imbibes all social evil, can only be 
understood by placing the panic in its socio-historical context. 
 
The moral panic is a complex social phenomenon that operates on a number of levels in both 
the discursive and objective arenas, and this complexity is reflected either overtly or 
implicitly in the moral panic analysis. Garland, for example, has emphasized the need for 
moral panic study to operate on the levels of symbolic meaning, social relations, and 
historical temporality.
82
 In navigating this complex terrain – which shifts between the 
discursive and the objective, the seemingly timeless and the historically immediate – this 
thesis uses the notion of ‘boundaries’. Social, temporal, geographic boundaries pervade the 
moral panic, which tends to recede when moral boundaries have been redrawn, either anew or 
as they were, and often without a society being conscious of the slight alterations the 
phenomenon has left on normative contours. Echoing through moral panic analyses is their 
intimacy with boundary negotiation, as Goode and Ben-Yehuda explain,  
[I]t is entirely likely that moral panics serve as a mechanism for 
simultaneously strengthening and redrawing a society’s moral boundaries – 
that line between morality and immorality, just where one leaves the territory 
of good and enters that of evil. When a society’s moral boundaries are sharp, 
clear and secure and the central norms and values are strongly held by nearly 
everyone, moral panics rarely grip its members – nor do they need to. 
However, when the moral boundaries are fuzzy and shifting and seem to be 
contested, moral panics are far more likely to seize the members of a 
society.
83
 
 
It is in the realm of the social that moral discourse proliferates, where cultural strain becomes 
apparent, and where the moral panic itself occurs. Most significant then are social boundaries 
– those values and norms that are threatened, thrown into contrast, and either strengthened or 
subverted through the course of a moral panic. As noted, moral panics see the drawing of 
discursive borders between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and permeated in the nostalgia of ‘then’ and 
‘now’. As folk devils are solidified, this discourse drags into it the oldest boundaries whose 
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 Garland asserts that ‘[t]ypically, a fully developed diagnosis explanation will operate at the levels of symbolic 
meaning (why this folk devil, construed as this kind of monster, with these specific connotations and 
associations?), social relations (why this group, with these interests, in this place?) and historical temporality 
(why at this moment, after these events, in this period?).’ Garland, ‘On the concept of moral panic’, 21. 
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thresholds are better left uncrossed. The heightened concern and hostility towards the folk 
devil, which reflects deeper lying concerns in society, result in debate, action, and catharsis – 
the volatile moral panic serving to enact both social change and stability.
84
 Whilst attention to 
social boundaries bring to the fore the dynamics of the moral panic as a phenomenon, this 
chapter holds that attention to temporal and geographic boundaries serves to illuminate the 
broader context of the moral panic whilst clarifying some its analytical difficulties.
85
  
 
Temporal boundaries draw attention to the self-reflexive nature of the moral panic, or rather 
the way in which temporal borders are drawn around the phenomenon when it is analysed as 
a ‘moral panic’. Importantly for historians, awareness of such borders draws to the fore the 
dislocation between the moral panic as a historically located phenomenon on the one hand 
and as a mode of analysis on the other. Such a dislocation, however, also presents an 
inevitable overlap wherein the moral panic phenomenon is invariably understood through, 
and shaped by, the rhetoric of analysis. Nonetheless, by denoting something as a moral panic, 
the period in question is demarcated as discursively and objectively anomalous from the 
periods before and after it. Certainly one benefit of this is that it requires the student of the 
moral panic to verify that the phenomenon satisfies the conditions of a ‘moral panic’, 
particularly insofar as measuring disproportion is concerned. However, whilst all the 
indicators should be present, they are not always present to the same degree and moral panics 
do not always share a common character. To the contrary, the degrees to which the indicators 
of a moral panic are present – both discursively and objectively – are determined by the 
context of the moral panic and not the moral panic concept itself.
86
 
 
Attention to temporal boundaries also requires that the moral panic be placed within its 
broader historical context. This is particularly pertinent given the fact that diachronic moral 
discourses and their motifs have a longer and more complex history than is immediately 
apparent.
87
 This begs the question of what is located within and beyond the realm of the 
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moral panic, requiring it to be placed in the context of both older social problems and 
immediate social change. Analytically, bearing such a question in mind may well clarify the 
moments of convergence from the general currents of ideas surrounding deviance, taboo, and 
social vice. Certainly, in understanding the folk devil and what it symbolizes, the historian of 
moral panics is required to sift between those features of a folk devil that are bred out of 
contemporary concern and those which are imported from the stockpile of the human 
imagination. Essentially then, an awareness of temporal boundaries in moral panics requires a 
fuller understanding of both the moral panic and the historical context in which it erupts, and 
to which it can be compared, thereby creating a valuable lens in studying change over time.  
 
Equally beneficial in illuminating the processes through which social boundaries are 
negotiated, is an attention to the geographic dimension of moral panics. Geographically moral 
panics are more complicated than they appear, particularly insofar as they can appear larger 
and more widespread than they actually are. Cohen referred to this as ‘diffusion’ in 
describing the tendency of the moral panic to conflate the local with the national, as relatively 
dispersed concerns are often presented as widespread and the subject of national (if not 
global) discussion. Moral panic analyses also have a tendency to gaze inwards and seldom 
take into account similar moral panics elsewhere, seemingly viewing the moral panic as a 
singular incidence rather than tracing its temporal and geographic dimensions. This has 
begun to change relatively recently with cognizance of moral panics as symptomatic of 
broader social trends and developments, rather than as single, unrelated incidents of 
collective behaviour.
88
 Of course, whilst concrete geographic borders may define the 
objective arena of a moral panic, the climate of social anxiety is subject to much broader and 
more permeable discursive borders. Some anxieties – and the vocabulary through which they 
are articulated – are transported through the media, and it is important to bear in mind the 
three overlapping levels of local, national, and global media.
89 
An attention to geographic 
borders brings to the fore both the actual context in which the moral panic occurs as well as 
the discursive landscape in which it expresses itself. Thus, as this thesis will show, moral 
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panics are often national or international in character and discourse but manifest local 
anxieties.
90
 Whilst these anxieties may import familiar tropes, successful moral panic – 
dependent on convergence and the presence of social anxiety – reflect local concerns. By 
bearing these borders in mind, the moral panic scholar is encouraged to question which 
anxieties are local and which are localized, as well as which anxieties are historical and 
which are immediate to the society in which the moral panic occurs.  
 
Conclusions  
 
As this chapter has shown, the ‘moral panic’ straddles both a distinct social phenomenon and 
the means by which it is analysed. In approaching the moral panic as a mode of study, 
analytical emphases impact on how the moral panic phenomenon is understood. This is 
particularly evident when the analysis attempts to explain the political motivations underlying 
the rhetoric of a moral panic. Certainly a great deal of research has placed emphasis on the 
function rather than the content of the phenomenon, and much energy has been poured into 
identifying the culprit – the instigator-come-inquisitor – who sets the moral panic in motion.
91
 
As Hier asserts, ‘the central focus is not on the contents of particular ideological formations 
which find points of resonance within the wider discursive community, but rather on the 
“function”, “intention” or “purpose” of the discourse.’
92
 However, bearing in mind that the 
moral panic is a phenomenon proper opens up a broader range of possible insights into 
particular moments of social change. Thus, moral panic analysis offers the historian lenses 
into political and moral rhetoric in a society as fears and anxieties are heightened and 
clarified during the moral panic phenomenon itself. Such moments of collective anxiety may 
serve as rich and concentrated deposits for the study of change over time, particularly insofar 
as the language of morality interweaves the boundaries of class, gender and race with social 
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taboos, ideals and desires. While the study of moral panics has long fallen under that of 
collective anxiety and social problems, the ‘moral panic’ concept draws important attention 
to the dynamics of the phenomenon. As this chapter has argued, placing the phenomenon and 
concept within its broader nexus of social, temporal and geographic borders serves to clarify 
these dynamics.   
 
This thesis uses this understanding of the moral panic to clarify particular moments of 
collective anxiety in white South Africa as exploratory of cultural change. The analytical 
stance of moral panic study is at times uncomfortable, but an awareness of the moral panic as 
both a phenomenon and a mode of analysis draws useful attention to the complexities 
involved in the study of public morality, collective panic and perception. As shown in this 
chapter, this thesis views moral panics as engendered by social change, underlying anxiety 
and the agency of various interest groups. Using the concept to clarify these moments of 
collective anxiety over the morality of white South Africans, this thesis looks at the media 
representations of various folk devils in mainly white South Africa from the late 1970s – a 
point from which cultural unity and perceptions of a single, stable white culture were 
increasingly challenged and eroded.  
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Chapter Three:  
The Devil Rejoiced:  
Politics and Pessimism in White South Africa, 1976 – 1982 
 
 
Pandora’s Box 
 
The Devil rejoiced because it was the beginning of the end for the Republic.
1
 
 
For many white South Africans the anti-apartheid struggle started in pixels. It started in the 
year that television made its belated arrival in South Africa and which would be, as one 
British journalist remarked, ‘like the opening of Pandora’s Box.’
2
 It started it 1976 with the 
images of violence spewing from the Soweto Uprising. It started in the pictures of fists raised 
in protest, of streets filled with the smog of tear gas and burning cars, of fleeing 
schoolchildren and Hector Petersen’s limp and bloodied body. It started in the year that black 
consciousness became black defiance and when the chimera of stability in South Africa was 
shattered. Whilst television would not mean ‘the end of the white man in South Africa’ as 
some conservative politicians had predicted, it did coincide with the slackening grip of white 
political domination in the country.
3
 Newly legalised television sets, now available from 
South African retailers and tended by the quasi-governmental South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC), ‘brought the world into the home.’
4
 However, it was a world that was 
increasingly critical of the country’s apartheid system and its National Party government, 
particularly after the potent images of the Soweto Uprising captured the growing anger of 
young black South Africans. Together, political unrest and television would serve to erode 
the relative isolation of white South Africans, challenging both the geographic and social 
borders of the apartheid state and white identity.
5
    
 
                                                 
1
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2
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4
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The tumult of the Soweto Uprising spread across the country, initiating an attack on the 
symbols of apartheid power whilst becoming a symbolic moment in which black resistance in 
South Africa was reborn. Facing harsh criticism from abroad and at home as well as 
economic instability, the National Party entered a period of crisis from which it never wholly 
recovered. Moving ever further from its ideological roots, P. W. Botha’s government 
announced that ‘apartheid is dead’ as it began the process of dismantling the country’s racial 
policy.
6
 Although such a diagnosis was premature, 1976 marked the rise of black militant 
nationalism and the decline of the white apartheid state. This decline brought with it a 
growing introspection among white South Africans: of the moral costs of apartheid policy on 
the one hand, and the security of white values on the other. As this chapter shows, while 
Botha was seen to ‘sup with the devil, [and] also with the devil’s disciples’ in the political 
sphere, fear that Satan himself was undermining the morality of white South Africans was 
also widespread. This chapter explores the political and cultural fragmentation that occurred 
during the decline of apartheid and Botha’s early socio-political reforms. In doing so, it traces 
the broad debate regarding ‘liberalism’ and morality during this period and how this 
manifested in a moral panic over Satanism between 1978 and 1982.  
 
South Africa’s ‘Traumatic Years’  
 
Coming to power in 1948, Afrikaner nationalism occupied an ideological line that became 
increasingly taut with time. Having advanced a white Afrikaner unity built on class solidarity 
and patriotic morality, Afrikaner nationalism was gradually reshaped by its economic and 
political successes.
7
 Within the international milieu of decolonisation and the Cold War, 
South Africa experienced increasing moral fracas with Western countries – nationalist fears 
of domination by English imperialists, the black majority and Communists driving the 
repressive measures of apartheid.
8
 With the birth of the Republic in 1961, the success of 
which the National Party had longed for, Afrikaner nationalism became increasingly fraught 
with internal ideological and political tensions. Certainly, as O’Meara has argued, whilst the 
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traditional foe of British imperialism was slain by the achievement of the Republic, the ‘myth 
of a classless volk’ was consigned to socio-political fantasy by the extraordinary economic 
growth of the 1960s. In the shadow of 1961, the National Party under Hendrik Verwoerd 
abandoned white Afrikaner values for those of South African whites in general. However, it 
was only with the assassination of Verwoerd in September 1966 that the once relatively 
submerged discontent surfaced within the ruling party.
9
  
 
Whilst the nationalist wariness towards the divisive power of capitalism became increasingly 
diluted under B. J. Vorster, his early premiership was marked by extraordinary economic 
growth and the suppression of anti-apartheid resistance within South Africa.
10
 Under Vorster, 
however, political grumblings became political infighting and divisions were soon 
demarcated between the verkrampte (conservative) and verligte (enlightened) Afrikaner 
nationalists.
11
 The former were steadfastly against change and clung to the traditions of ‘anti-
capitalist’, Afrikaner-first nationalism of the 1940s and 1950s. Emerging from this 
nationalism and its success in creating a wealthy and successful Afrikaner capitalist class, the 
verligte sought to adapt the ideology and politics of Afrikaner nationalism to a modern 
world.
12
 The widespread verkrampte chagrin with Vorster’s government, which sought white 
votes beyond the ethnic boundary of Afrikanerdom, led to the prime minister’s furious 
initiatives to hold the party and its allies together.
13
 It also resulted in schism in 1969 with the 
founding of the Herstigte National Party (HNP), the breakaway verkrampte group which 
advocated itself as the guardian of lower class Afrikaners.
14
 The National Party did not 
welcome the opposition from within Afrikaner ranks and utilised the full power of the pro-
National Party press against Albert Hertzog’s HNP in an early election. Determined not to 
allow Hertzog’s party any significant inroads into their electorate the National Party’s 
campaign was more conservative than usual, resulting in some loss of support from verligte 
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Afrikaners, immigrants and English-speaking constituents.
15
 The verkrampte HNP won no 
seats in the 1970 election, having gained just 3.5 per cent of votes. However, whilst the 
National Party enjoyed its victory and Vorster a favourable spotlight in the pro-government 
press, that the HNP had managed just less than ten per cent of Afrikaner votes signalled 
broader class divergences in Afrikaner ranks.
16
  
 
The erosion of the homogenising forces of earlier Afrikaner nationalism intensified in the 
1970s. This attrition resulted as much from the ‘successes’ of apartheid policy as from its 
failures. Following the country’s economic boom during the 1960s, in which economic 
growth crested over five per cent per annum, white poverty was eradicated.
17
 By the 
following decade eighty per cent of Afrikaners were urbanised, with sixty-five per cent 
employed in white-collar positions.
18
 However, the very successes of Afrikaner nationalism 
in levelling the economic playing field among white South Africans increasingly necessitated 
changes to apartheid labour policy. There simply were not enough whites to satisfy the thirst 
for skilled labour. Whilst the State was increasingly unable to prevent the urbanization of 
blacks in towns and cities outside of their designated ‘homelands’, the old antagonisms 
between English-speaking and Afrikaners diminished as ethnic boundaries were overwritten 
by class and capitalism.
19
 These changes would continue to reverberate on the shifting 
verkrampte/verligte spectrum in white South Africa. This ideological splintering, to which 
Vorster was forced to devote his attention in the waning years of his premiership, was 
aggravated by the ferment of South Africa’s ‘traumatic years’.
20
  
 
Historian of religion, Sydney Ahlstrom used the term ‘traumatic years’ to describe the 
‘momentous and unresolved’ upheaval of culture, spirituality and politics in the 1960s 
counterculture.
21
 Similar tensions resounded in the crumbling of apartheid in white South 
Africa, although it would only witness its own politicised white youth in the late 1980s with 
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the emergence of the Voëlvry movement. As Welsh and others have argued, ‘the internal 
divisions among white South Africans, especially Afrikaners, grew sharper as the pressures 
on apartheid mounted.’
22
 As such, the first section of this chapter explores the political and 
cultural schisms that occurred in the first death throes of apartheid and Afrikaner nationalism 
between 1976 and 1982. As the monolithic state machinery grew evermore clumsy in a 
modernizing South Africa, so the gulf between left and right, verligte and verkrampte, 
widened. This divergence both engendered and fed off the ambiguity of P. W. Botha’s early 
racial reforms between 1978 and 1982, and – as this chapter argues – spilled well beyond the 
political realm and into the social arena of an introspective white South Africa.  
 
 ‘The bumbling politicians’:
23
 The National Party in crisis, 1976 – 1978  
 
The winter sun bore down on some twenty thousand black schoolchildren on the morning of 
16 June 1976. Their march began peacefully, the children armed with placards announcing 
that ‘We are not the Boers!’ and ‘If we must do Afrikaans, Vorster must do Zulu!’ in reaction 
to the new language rule which enforced Afrikaans in black classrooms.
24
 The police arrived, 
stones were thrown, shots fired, several demonstrators killed and a wave of violence spilled 
through the streets of Soweto within a day, across the Reef in a week, and then throughout 
the country. State repression was swift and police action severe, with 575 dead and 2389 
wounded by the end of 1976.
25
 Despite anxiety regarding the decolonization of African 
states, which left South Africa and Rhodesia the only white-ruled countries on the continent, 
the Soweto Uprising occurred at a time of considerable confidence in white South Africa. 
Anti-apartheid resistance had been suppressed in the 1960s, with what little was left of the 
African National Congress in exile. Meanwhile, economic prosperity greatly bolstered the 
confidence of its ruling elite that it had achieved a modern South Africa.
26
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Having largely ignored the rumblings of black consciousness and reports of discontent in 
Soweto, the events of 1976 appeared to take the apartheid government by surprise.
27
 With 
reports of the raids, arrests, detentions and deaths in the apartheid state’s attempts to quash 
resistance, the considerable media attention to the Soweto Uprisings unleashed a stream of 
international criticism towards white South Africa. Thus, whilst the government struggled to 
regain political stability and international condemnation grew, South Africa’s economy was 
also in the precarious position of being dependent upon foreign investment. Bolstering the 
growing anti-apartheid lobby was the death of black consciousness leader Steve Biko, who 
died in police custody on 11 September 1977. Banning eighteen black consciousness and 
anti-apartheid organizations a month after Biko’s death, the South African government now 
faced the official international rejection of its policies. The United Nations proceeded to place 
an arms-embargo on South Africa and demanded that anti-apartheid organizations be 
unbanned and detainees released, whilst US president Jimmy Carter pledged to bring about 
majority rule by peaceful means.
28
  
 
Worsening South Africa’s reputation still further were the comments of its Minister of 
Justice, Jimmy ‘the Mouth’ Kruger.
29
 Infamously callous, Kruger had justified the use of 
live-ammunition in the Soweto Uprisings as teaching blacks to become ‘tame to the gun’
30
 
and remarked that Biko’s death had ‘left him cold’.
31
 Kruger soon attempted to backtrack: 
asserting that he had made the comment under the impression that the charismatic black 
consciousness leader had died from a hunger strike,
32
 and that Biko had been a communist.
33
 
However, despite such attempts, the Minister’s later statements, like: ‘I have met a 
tremendous amount of black people and also young black people involved in the rioting of 
1976. They have been to my office for a cup of tea and I had discussions with them’, only 
sounded ominous.
34
 Essentially, the National Party government faced a public relations crisis. 
Vorster, meanwhile, lost his drive in the political arena. No longer the charming leader 
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known for his ‘witty after-dinner speeches’,
35
 a leader who ‘acted as a man ready to retire’ 
compounded the economic crisis and increasingly obvious stumbling of apartheid policies.
36
  
 
The deteriorating image of South Africa abroad and the crisis of its government were further 
intensified, perhaps ironically, by bungled attempts at propaganda. Backed by Vorster’s ‘heir-
apparent’ Connie Mulder, the head of the Information Department, a number of secret state-
funded projects were launched in an ill-fated attempt to burnish South Africa’s tarnished 
reputation. In addition to the attempted purchase of several leading newspapers in South 
Africa, Britain, France and America, such projects also included the bribery of international 
and local public figures and reporters who spoke positively of South Africa’s antics.
37
 These 
bribes included procuring luxurious accommodation and sexual favours for these defenders 
of South Africa’s honour. Secret funds were also poured into convincing officials in Zaire, 
Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Israel to entertain Vorster’s highly publicised visits, as well as 
lobbyists and foreign political candidates who were less hostile than their opposing 
candidates come election time.
38
 In an attempt to neutralise the criticism levelled at the 
National Party government by the English-speaking press in South Africa, the Information 
Department illicitly funded and launched the pro-government English newspaper, The 
Citizen.
39
 Fudging the newspaper’s circulation figures from the start, Mulder’s department 
also made several unsuccessful attempts to purchase an English newspaper chain through one 
of their front men, Louis Luyt, a successful Afrikaner businessman. In addition to public 
suspicion of the lavish holidays enjoyed by senior members of the Information Department, 
rumours of illegal projects, blackmail and even murder were endemic by the time the scandal 
broke in 1978.
40
 With over R 80 million wasted on illegal and largely ineffective propaganda 
projects,
41
 the ‘Information Scandal’ implicated Vorster and his ‘crown-prince’ Connie 
Mulder just before the election. Suspicions of Mulder’s complicity were greatly encouraged 
by the Minister of Defence P. W. Botha, who pushed for a Commission of Inquiry into the 
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rumours. The Commission caught Mulder in a public lie and confirmed the Information 
Minister’s involvement in what was soon dubbed ‘Muldergate’ by the press. A disgraced 
Mulder, having lost to Botha in a second ballot of 98 votes to 74,
42
 was forced to resign 
whilst Vorster chose to retire – the two soon remembered as ‘the bumbling politicians’ by the 
South African press.
43
  
 
 ‘The breeze of change’:
44
 Botha, reform and schism, 1978 – 1982 
 
The scandalous intrigue of Muldergate effectively accelerated both reform and the eventual 
rupture of Afrikaner Nationalism with the election of P. W. Botha as prime minister in 
September 1978.
45
 By this time the apartheid state had managed to restore internal order, its 
economy was beginning to recover, and the international threat of sanctions had been 
realigned to a policy of ‘constructive engagement’.
46
 But the period of crisis resulting from 
1976 had paralysed Vorster, accelerated intra-party tensions and made the failures of 
apartheid abundantly clear.
47
 A National Party man from the age of twenty, now sixty-two 
year old Botha was perhaps a surprising source of reform.
48
 An unyielding, efficient 
politician and thoroughgoing ‘difficult man’ nicknamed ‘Pete Weapons’ and ‘Pangaman’ by 
his own party
49
 – Botha promised a ‘clean, honest administration’.
50
  Like his predecessor, 
however, it was an administration increasingly undermined by dissent from within. As Welsh 
argues, the ad hoc changes to apartheid policy under Vorster were ‘won against the 
entrenched ranks of the verkramptes, who regarded each change, however trifling, as setting a 
precedent and creating cumulative momentum for further change.’
51
 With the verkrampte 
position firmly against adapting apartheid policy but reform urgently needed, Botha’s early 
administration was marked by political infighting and opacity. Whilst Botha’s sceptics would 
refer to him as the rather underwhelming ‘breeze of change’,
52
 one foreign newspaper would 
comment: ‘South African policy now amounts to little more than trying to postpone on every 
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issue the inevitable consequences of apartheid in practice.’
53
  In the wake of the Soweto 
Uprising, the internal divisions within the National Party were both exacerbated and betrayed 
to the public. Although Botha would push reform, it came at the cost of cementing the 
verkrampte position, splitting the National Party and ‘Afrikanerdom’.
54
  
 
Broadly speaking, whilst Botha attempted to ward off international castigation, he also had to 
calm internal opposition and his critics. Whilst maintaining the apartheid policy of excluding 
black South Africans from the political arena, Botha also urged socio-economic reform as 
vital to the continued survival of white South Africa.
55
  Whilst Botha was not a liberal, he 
continued the process of relaxing petty apartheid laws, which Vorster had found ‘hurtful 
discrimination’.
56
 Political infighting between the verligte and verkrampte spilled into the 
congregations of the Susterkerke (Sister Churches) of Afrikaner Nationalism who had long 
provided ideological justification for apartheid policies. The churches would experience 
increasing tension both within their halls and in their relationship with the National Party, at 
first in the 1960s and increasingly after 1982. From 1979 Botha would test this relationship 
further in repealing laws against interracial relationships on the basis that none of the biblical 
authority on which such legislation was passed could be found.
57
 Averting the charge of 
outright deviation, Botha predicated his administration of the threat of ‘total onslaught’ and 
the need for white South Africa to ‘adapt or die’. Certainly by the mid-1970s, the political 
rhetoric of its generals favoured the notion that white South Africa faced a ‘total onslaught’ 
that sought to conquer ‘the hearts and minds of men.’
58
 As Barber has noted, this translated 
into the entrenched view that South Africa stood against the encroachment on the one hand 
and the ANC on the other, the latter of which Botha viewed as ‘the next best thing to the 
devil.’
59
 With these strategies Botha pushed a massive overhaul of the apartheid state 
machinery, effectively strengthening the seat of his power and centralizing the government. 
Whilst Botha’s management style further alienated the verkrampte ranks,
60
 his early reforms 
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could be justified as necessary to the survival of white society under the concept of ‘adapt or 
die.
61
  
 
The Soweto Uprisings had struck a resounding blow to white confidence. After a decade of 
silence, the Uprisings saw some three thousand politically militant youths revitalise the ANC 
and usher in a new phase of militant resistance.
62
 The South African government responded 
by seeking allies outside of the white constituency, and under the urgency of ‘adapt or die’, 
Botha began the process of granting political representation to Indian and Coloured South 
Africans. A reform aimed at reinforcing white dominance in the country, the result would be 
to the contrary: Afrikaner nationalism would implode, whilst the exclusion of blacks from the 
Tricameral Parliament of 1983 further revitalized anti-apartheid resistance.
63
 The verkrampte 
Andries Treurnicht, nicknamed ‘Dr No’ by the press due to his stance on racial integration, 
became one of Botha’s strongest opponents.
64
 Criticizing the adaptations of apartheid policy, 
and underscoring the verkrampte allegiance to grand apartheid, Treurnicht argued that ‘if 
petty apartheid is completely eliminated…big apartheid becomes stupid, superfluous and 
unnecessary…You can’t make apartheid big, if you kill it little by little.’
65
 Botha’s reforms – 
‘cosmetic’ and otherwise – exacerbated, if not verified, verkrampte concerns. However, it 
was the decision to include Indian and Coloured representation in white parliament that 
cleaved an irreparable rift in the National Party. In February 1982, eighteen members of the 
National Party followed Treurnicht out of parliament to form the Conservative Party, scoffing 
at Botha’s proposals of power-sharing as ‘treasonous to nationalism.’
66
  
 
Whilst signalling that the unity that had been carved out and lauded by Afrikaner nationalists 
for several decades had come to an end, the split also freed Botha from the battle of intra-
party dissent. Botha’s government, its verkrampte ranks considerably diluted, was now better 
positioned to push labour and franchise reform. Botha’s administration was far more 
favourably disposed towards capitalism and the business sector than his predecessors, an 
alliance cemented in the Carlton (1979) and Good Hope (1981) conferences.
67
 However, the 
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Conservative Party came to represent far greater opposition to the National Party than earlier 
splinter groups like the HNP, the right-wing increasing in strength since the late 1970s. 
Reflecting growing unease with the government’s reforms, the 1981 national elections 
revealed growing support for the right – the HNP receiving an unprecedented 14.1 per cent of 
votes.
68
 This support soon flowed to the Conservative Party, which subsumed smaller splinter 
parties like Connie Mulder’s National Conservative Party and won the allegiance of cultural 
organisations like the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) from the National 
Party.
69
  
 
Whilst the decolonisation of African states fertilised a resurgence of the ‘centuries old fear of 
being dominated’, the fear-campaign of ‘total onslaught’ and growing anti-apartheid violence 
facilitated the growth of the right-wing. Between December 1981 and November 1982, the 
military wing of the ANC – Umkhonto we Sizwe – was responsible for some twenty-six 
sabotage attacks on South African soil.
70
 In white South Africa, the growth of the right-wing 
was aggravated by a tumultuous economy. The average income of whites in the public sector 
decline twenty-three per cent between 1979 and 1981, white unemployment skyrocketed at 
the onset of the 1980s, increasing from 6000 to 32 000 between 1981 and 1985.
71
 As the 
decade progressed, the return of the ‘poor white’ problem, its former demise the success of a 
unified Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid policy, became a rallying cry for the likes of the 
Conservative Party.
72
 As Swart has argued, economic insecurities only strengthened the 
persuasive power of right-wing groups like the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) who 
‘promised a return to the sanctuary of male privilege.’
73
 These insecurities were only stoked 
further by Botha, whose labour reforms allowed for greater black mobility. As Van Rooyen 
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argued, ‘many white workers saw the new labour system as a direct threat to their own 
economic security.’
74
 Whilst white unemployment soared, black apprenticeships increased 
eightfold and black trade unions had been legalised following the recommendations of the 
Wiehahn Commission in 1979 as well as several other reports.
75
 Essentially, the high drama 
of political schism would resound beyond its sphere to reverberate in the anxieties and 
insecurities of its white constituency. Like the political turn in the solidifying of verkrampte 
concerns in the growth of the right-wing in the early 1980s, cultural politics and the 
campaigns of moral guardians would reach new heights as the decade progressed.  
 
The men who blame droughts on miniskirts:
76
 The growth of moral pessimism in 
South Africa, 1973 – 1982 
 
Plagued by infighting, scandal, incompetence and corruption, the National Party had been in 
crisis – publically and administratively – since 1976. The Soweto Uprisings and international 
castigation brought a resounding end to the white confidence born in the 1960s, the heyday of 
grand apartheid which now lay beyond recovery. With an overwhelming ‘sense of impending 
catastrophe’,
77
 the militancy and subsequent repression of re-emergent anti-apartheid 
resistance from the mid-1970s fostered anxieties about majority rule. This shattered 
confidence was accompanied by a crisis of conscience in many white South Africans, and 
further aggravated by the political infighting and scandal of the ruling party. As one 
Afrikaner newspaper cried out in reaction to the Soweto Uprising, ‘We do not want blood on 
our language.’
78
 Compounding a loss of faith in the nationalist government, and shining a 
spotlight on its internal division, the Muldergate scandal ‘rocked white South Africa, 
undermining the Afrikaners’ self-image of puritan righteousness and volk unity.’
79
 Against 
this bruised confidence in the National Party, ‘Afrikanerdom’ and white values in general – 
the election of Botha inspired hope beyond the country’s black population. As one South 
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African daily commented, Botha ‘may yet save South Africa’s white nation from destroying 
itself through greed and the desire to maintain privilege at the expense of our great people’s 
dignity.’
80
 Maintaining its creed as the white party of patriotic South Africans, Botha’s 
administration clearly supported big business.
81
 Whilst this saw him repeal the apartheid 
policies cumbersome to that end, the urgency of reform was shaped by the need to appease 
the increasingly diverse opinions of his party and constituency and by the desire to maintain 
white privilege. Essentially, in the twilight of the 1970s, and indeed of Verwoerdian 
apartheid, intra-party politicking and reform were accompanied by moral introspection in 
many white South Africans. Such moralising paralleled the growing contradictions within the 
political arena, opening a platform where a diverse range of fears were voiced – from the 
distaste for apartheid policies and fears of international isolation, to anxieties surrounding the 
long held fears of cultural-miscegenation and the deterioration of white values. This platform 
was hardly new but drew particular attention from the mid-1970s and even the muckraking of 
the Muldergate scandal, as O’Meara has argued, incurred a public reaction and moral 
introspection that was relatively disproportionate to the other political scandals that dotted the 
National Party’s history.
82
 Mirroring political schism and the growth of the right-wing, the 
demise of apartheid saw the concomitant rise and radicalisation of moral movements and 
campaigns regarding the sanctity of ‘white values’ in South Africa.  
 
Alarmist rhetoric about social decadence and moral corruption had long silvered the tongue 
of political rhetoric in white South Africa, but became particularly virulent with the economic 
boom of the 1960s. With prosperous whites seen as becoming ‘worshippers of Mammon’, for 
moral guardians the trappings of wealth and prestige had become the altars upon which 
traditional white values and volk unity were sacrificed.
83
 These fears were not entirely 
unfounded, as Du Pisani and Grundlingh have shown, the economic prosperity of white 
Afrikaners saw a gradual shift in their worldview and, like their English-speaking 
counterparts, white Afrikaners became increasingly materialistic in their perceptions of 
success.
84
 It was in the vein of protecting white values that the arrival of television had been 
warded off, the subject having been debated in Parliament for several decades before its 
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introduction in 1976.
85
 Although South Africa had the technological and economic 
capabilities for television, it was an advance deemed the tool of ‘leftists and communists’ and 
sure to corrupt the moral integrity of South Africans.
86
 Such views are captured, perhaps 
stereotypically, by the verkrampte Albert Hertzog whose arguments against ‘that evil black 
box’
87
 drudged to the fore old phantoms of the black peril’:  
It is afternoon and the Bantu house-boy is in the living room cleaning the carpet. 
Someone has left the television set on. The house-boy looks up at the screen, 
sees a chorus line of white girls in scanty costumes. Suddenly, seized by lust, he 
runs upstairs and rapes the madam.
88
 
 
However, as Krabill and Nixon have asserted, the National Party’s wariness towards the 
medium of television stemmed more from the threat it posed towards ethnic nationalism and 
cultural miscegenation than to morality itself.
89
 Television threatened to end the relative 
isolation of white South Africans, as one British journalist commented, ‘people will not go 
out so often, and the near-Victorian, somewhat Calvinistic formality which is such a 
remarkable feature of white South African home life… will experience long delayed 
erosion.’
90
 As mentioned, the eroding power of capitalism added credence to these fears, as 
economic growth and the rise of an educated white middle class corroding the dream of a 
‘single-minded, abstemious “volk” prepared to make considerable sacrifices on behalf of a 
greater ideal.’
91
 However, fears of cultural swamping and moral wavering in lieu of 
modernisation would continue to hold weight as the decades progressed. The rebellious youth 
born of the 1960s counterculture – with its civil rights movement, student revolt, hippiedom, 
and rock and roll – cut a threatening figure in the eyes of cultural guardians, replacing to 
some extent the traditional foe of the British imperialist. Anxiety over the ‘counterculture’ – 
captured in the image of the disruptive and non-conformist teenager – taking root in white 
South Africa persisted from the 1960s but became particularly virulent in the late 1970s, as 
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did the campaigns of strident moral movements like the Action Moral Standards group 
(AMS). 
 
Taking up the cause in 1973, the AMS was a grassroots organisation which proclaimed itself 
a movement and boasted to have had some 800 000 members by 1982.
92
 Concerning itself 
with the health of South African society and ‘white values’ in particular, the AMS 
condemned the ‘pornography’ of pop music and fought for stricter censorship to prevent the 
‘seeds of communism and other immoral ideas’ from taking root. Both the AMS and the 
paramilitary AWB were founded in 1973, but where the latter would threaten to infect the 
pools of interracial holiday resorts like Sun City with syphilis,
93
 the Action Moral Standards 
fought from the local soapbox and letter columns of the press. In the 1970s, a little noticed 
AMS enjoyed sporadic and modest success. In 1974, for example, the AMS prevented the 
display of women’s underwear in shop windows, although only in the small town of Vryheid. 
That same year, their Ventersdorp branch, which was also the base of the AWB, caused a 
small media sensation when it made a bonfire of all literature it considered ‘objectionable’ 
and responsible for spreading communism and Satanism. The group condemned in particular 
the slippery slope of ‘modernisation’ and popular culture, which in the 1970s included 
modern bathing costumes, unisexual clothing, shorts, flip-flops, and statues of naked 
women.
94
 Although echoing the verkrampte rhetoric of the 1960s, the group rebuked the idea 
that they were themselves verkrampte. They gained little sympathy with the verligte members 
of the press, however, who increasingly condemned all things they considered verkrampte in 
the political and cultural spheres.
95
 Certainly, in their denial of the verkrampte-label the AMS 
implied that such a label would undermine the validity and the overall credibility of their 
concerns. However, such a rebuke was in vain after the group’s leader blamed a nudist 
colony for a drought in the region – a claim reminiscent of the schoolteacher who blamed 
South Africa’s losses in the rugby on the miniskirt in 1970.
96
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By the turn of the decade the AMS had gained a space in the media spotlight and, like the 
right-wing, became more radicalised as they grew in strength and size.
97
 Under the leadership 
of Eddie van Zyl, who gained the epithet as ‘South Africa’s moral man’ in the press, the 
AMS increasingly tackled what it saw as a corrupt and debauched society. Taking their 
campaign ‘underground’, the AMS employed guerrilla tactics in their stringent letter writing 
campaigns. With little success as a group, the AMS co-ordinated each member to write a 
letter as an individual and thus created the perception of spontaneous public outcry.
98
 This 
tactic affected more substantial successes for the group, including the banning of several 
editions of Scope magazine and later the Hollywood blockbuster Mad Max Two (1981).
99
 By 
1978, the group also had branches on several university campuses – Morele Aksie Tuts 
(MAT), for example, made headlines when a particularly graphic anti-abortion video 
traumatised several unsuspecting first year students during orientation.
100
 That same year, the 
countrywide movement declared war against immorality – a declaration that carried with it a 
significant change in their view of South Africa and its leadership. In the early 1970s, for 
example, the AMS asserted that the international condemnation of South Africa stemmed not 
from its racial policies, but because it was a Christian society who recognised the Bible.
101
 
Such a view was reminiscent, perhaps, of Dr Piet Meyer – the staunch opponent to the 
introduction of television, head of the SABC and one-time member of the Ossewa Brandwag. 
In 1965, Meyer adamantly suggested that Afrikaner nationalism assume custody of Western 
values in light of America’s negligent cultural degeneration.
102
 The AMS also condemned 
outright those writers who criticised the National Party government and apartheid, denoting 
them the ‘spiritual terrorists’ and ‘cancer cells’ eating away at the ‘healthy body of 
society’.
103
 Although they remained wary of foreign influences and imported popular culture, 
by the end of the decade the ‘healthy body of society’ had degenerated into a ‘sick 
community’ who had ‘the cheek to call itself a Christian society’.
104
 In 1980, Van Zyl 
declared that the AMS would stand against the ‘satanic evils that are overcoming our 
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country’ in unveiling a two-year campaign to restore the sanctity of family-life and God in 
the daily lives of South Africans.
105
 In tackling the social problems of prostitution, drug abuse 
and gambling, the AMS targeted massage parlours, pinball machines and most commonly the 
SABC for the ‘degradation and destruction of the people of South Africa’s morals and 
values.’
106
  
 
It reflected pessimism at the state of South Africa and condemned the modern society now 
bedevilled by homosexuality, prostitution, drug addiction, divorce and suicide.
107
 By 1982, 
the alarmist rhetoric of the radical moral group asserted that South Africa was on the verge of 
total disintegration – the moral and spiritual health of white South Africans deteriorated and 
traumatised.
108
 As Van Zyl stated:  
We are on the brink of cataclysm because of our complacency – sitting in a land 
of plenty, with too much money and too much time to find things for idle hands to 
do…We are like a man sitting in a luxurious pool, drowning happily without even 
realising it.
109
 
 
Moral introspection, shrouded in pessimism and nostalgia, was fertilised by a climate of 
political and economic instability. Facing a recession, the resurgence of African nationalism 
and a militant anti-apartheid struggle supported in the international arena, white South 
Africa’s government, press and cultural arenas were plagued by internal bickering. Whilst 
this would facilitate the growth of a radicalised right-wing in the 1980s, it also strengthened 
increasingly radical moral movements like the AMS which grew in strength and size between 
1978 and 1982. In this same period, white South Africa experienced a moral panic over 
Satanism – during which the concerns and campaigns of groups like the AMS and other 
cultural organisations intersected, expressing a sense of foreboding, pessimism and 
ideological floundering in white South Africa.  
 
 
                                                 
105
 K. Abendroth, ‘Morals fighter will launch SA campaign’, The Citizen, 23 August 1980, 8 and ‘Morals man 
here to “plug leaks in cesspool”’, The Citizen, 18 September 1980, 10.  
106
 Eddie Van Zyl quoted in ‘They said it…’, The Star, 27 November 1981, 30. Also see ‘The Pinball Professor: 
Academic defends the game critics say is “gambling”’, Sunday Tribune, 16 November 1980, 19 and C. Steyn, 
‘Morals man Eddie uptight about “blasphemous movie”’, Sunday Tribune, 5 July 1981, 8. 
107
 ‘PE is S Africa’s city of sin, says morals “action” man’, Evening Post, 14 May 1980, 1; F. Henny, ‘“Like 
man who blamed drought on miniskirts’, Weekend Post, 17 May 1980, 11; ‘Friendly P. E. simmers over “sin 
city” claim’, Sunday Tribune, 18 May 1980, 10 and K. Abendroth, ‘Morals fighter will launch SA campaign’, 
The Citizen, 23 August 1980, 8.  
108
 ‘Morals declining – report’, Pretoria News, 23 April 1982, 7.  
109
 ‘Moral man here to “plug leaks in cesspool”’, The Citizen, 18 September 1980, 10.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 56
The Devil sits in the Lotus position: Nostalgia, pessimism and moral panic, 1978 – 1982 
 
With the dust still to settle following the political scandal and resignation of an embittered 
Vorster, the pragmatic P. W. Botha was elected as prime minister in September 1978.
110
 
However, just two weeks after the surprising election of the Cape leader known for his 
temper and single-minded resolve, South Africa’s newspapers turned their attention to the 
devil and his minions. According to a leaked report undertaken by the Dutch Reformed 
Church, the moral fibre of white South Africa was being systematically attacked by the 
agents of Satan. In the shadow of the moon, white Satanists were reportedly gathering in 
derelict areas to worship the devil, kneeling before a black draped altar constructed by their 
charismatic high priest. Beneath the sign of the ‘Baphomet’,
111
 initiates were claimed to 
recite mangled versions of the Lord’s Prayer and lap up the blood of slaughtered cats to 
symbolize the rejection of Christ. Induced by drugs and alcohol, perverse sexual acts 
requiring male and female prostitutes were then performed in rituals to evoke Satan. 
Summoned by their chanting and sexual frenzy, ‘the spirit which overshadows the temple’ 
would then appear before the Satanists: Buddha, sitting serene in the lotus position.
112
  
 
Soon heralded as ‘the anti-Christian age’,
113
 the press announced dramatically increasing 
numbers of Satanists active in South Africa. The Church estimate of 40 000 Satanists in 1978 
was found too modest by observers, and was adjusted to 100 000 in 1979 and then at least 
250 000 in 1982.
114
 The Church was adamant that Satanism was a very real and growing 
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threat and that the devil’s servants knew how to manipulate the weak and the naïve. Having 
trained for at least ten years, satanic high priests had studied the effect of music on the mind, 
the effect of modern art and modern dancing on the soul, and were adept at concocting 
addictive substances to affect the body.
115
 Presented at a general synod meeting of the Dutch 
Reformed Church in October 1978, the report claimed that pop and rock music from abroad 
was laced with ‘in-depth advertising’ for Satanism. Such music, it maintained, derived its 
beat from the sexual techniques of the Kama Sutra and was specifically designed to sexually 
stimulate its young listeners beyond their normal moral reasoning.
116
 The hostile castigation 
of popular culture was bolstered by cultural groups like the Afrikaner Christelike Vroue 
Vereeniging (ACVV) who decried the ‘era of permissiveness’ that allowed horror comics, 
nudity and violence to reign unattended in modern popular culture.
117
 South Africa’s ‘moral 
man’ Eddie Van Zyl also joined the fray, asserting that ‘if these rumours are true, then our 
greatest fears – that the flood of permissive materials in the form of books, films and LPs that 
has swept across this country is taking its toll on our youth – have been realised.’
118
 As such, 
the moral campaign of the AMS intersected with the moral panic surrounding this literal folk 
devil, particularly their condemnation of ‘revolutionary and soul destroying’ pop music as 
part of the Marxist ploy to use literature, music and drugs to sexually stimulate and therefore 
corrupt the Western youth.
119
  
 
Against the backdrop of ‘total onslaught’ and ‘adapt or die’, this moral panic fomented the 
notion that white South Africans were particularly vulnerable to a ‘moral onslaught’ from 
beyond its cultural borders. The moral panic, and the literal folk devil of the ‘satanic 
menace’, emerged in waves of sensational news stories between 1978 and 1982. Following 
the discussion generated by the leaked report of the Dutch Reformed Church, particularly 
strident voices from the white tower of theology fuelled hostility towards the ‘Satanic threat’ 
by denying any validity to Eastern religions and damning their newfound influence among 
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white Afrikaners.
120
 Of particular upset was the popularity of yoga and kung-fu whose origins 
were found to lie in Zen Buddhism,
121
 as well as the ‘Satanic temples’ of Hindu and Buddhist 
places of worship.
122
 Young South Africans were reportedly being lured to such places with 
the ‘promises of exotic sex and free liquor’ and were soon trapped in a nightmare of 
blackmail to ensure their compliance.
123
 Taking almost immediate action, the AMS charged 
several groups as devil worshipping cults, including the ‘New Age’ societies like the 
Association of Creative Thought, The Emissaries of Divine Light, and the Friends of the 
Open Way.
124
 Whilst the validity of these claims was debated in the press,
125
 the Transvaal 
Congress of the National Party received a public request that all occult literature be banned 
from South African bookshelves.
126
 In addition to the timely publication of P. J. Haasbrook’s 
bestseller Die Duiwel is Los (1978), which discussed similar social changes as the onslaught 
of Satanism, the moral panic was sustained by several bizarre and sensational stories in the 
press.
127
  
 
This included the story of a French school headmistress in, perhaps ironically, the small town 
of Parys. It was rumoured that ‘Mademoiselle Jeanne’ had been a prolific hunter of black 
cats, which she had sacrificed to Satan in midnight rituals. It was perhaps for this reason, the 
reports continue, that the foreboding woman had died friendless and alone in her hospital bed 
at the age of eighty-four.
128
 Such stories came in lieu of a particularly scandalous affair 
surrounding the church, homosexual intimacy and a self-confessed satanic high priest, Phil 
Botha. In ‘an evil voodoo ceremony’ performed in a seedy Durban hotel, Botha claimed to 
have ‘swopped souls’ with a pregnant eighteen-year-old runaway named Madeleine. Having 
killed herself with poison, Botha claimed that Madeleine’s soul was now trapped within him. 
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Igniting debate among church officials and congregations, Botha’s story caused particular 
hostility when it became known that a confused young deacon had fallen in love with the 
woman in Botha.
129
 Causing a month long media frenzy, the testimony of the ex-Satanist also 
fostered debate about homosexuality, the notion that one could be both homosexual and 
Christian damned in particular by the former moderator of the Dutch Reformed Church, Dr 
Koot Vorster.
130
 The affair soon prompted the resignation of Vorster, who asserted ‘I am fed 
up with [the Church’s] ignorance of spiritual matters.’
131
 
 
Stories of ‘blood-swigging’ Satanists luring innocents with sex and liquor continued in the 
media, as did claims that the problem was only worsening, the synod of the Dutch Reformed 
Church reporting: ‘We’ve not been able to collect any specific evidence of their practices but 
these people are on the increase in the country as a whole’.
132
 Despite reminders of official 
police investigations into Satanism in 1976 and such confessions that no actual proof of 
satanic activity had yet been found, claims that Satanism was a festering problem in South 
Africa continued unabated.
133
 As one reverend worried that ‘the stage is being prepared for 
the appearance of the Anti-Christ whoever he may be.’
134
 Cities and towns throughout South 
Africa were ‘riddled’ with satanic cells, including Stellenbosch University the ‘seat of 
Afrikaner learning’.
135
 The sudden thriving of devil worship was deemed to stem partly from 
the hubris of the Afrikaner volk,
136
 and because Satanism was ‘big-money’.
137
 In early 1982, 
papers announced that an official police investigation had been launched into the Satanic 
threat in South Africa, now thought to involve at least 250 000 white South Africans from ‘all 
walks of society – academics, business executives and politicians.’
138
 By this point Satanists 
had become completely reprehensible, having been accused of stealing the small corpses of 
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babies from mortuaries,
139
 large-scale drug-trafficking and pornography,
140
 as well as 
corrupting ‘innocent young girls’ on a regular basis.
141
 In addition to their resolution to 
‘destroy the religion of the Afrikaner volk’,
142
 Satanists were punishing good white South 
Africans. Indeed, 1981 was the year of divorce and 1982 the year of heart attacks.
143
  
 
The moral panic came to a rather crashing halt in May 1982 after a Paarl clergyman was 
publically castigated for repeating the rumour that members of the National Party might be 
working for Satan. A recording of the sermon was scrutinised amidst a storm of resentment 
towards the idea that cabinet ministers of the ruling party were Satanists,
144
 despite the earlier 
allegations in the press that ‘household names’ were working for the Devil and that many 
South Africans ‘had sold their souls to the devil’.
145
 Claiming that he had been 
misinterpreted, the reverend asserted that whilst he did not believe such rumours, he did see 
them as a threat to the government and that ‘when our own people start spreading stories such 
as this, then it is time to take stock.’
146
 Although his defenders noted that the entire situation 
had been ‘blown out of proportion’, the reverend of the Dutch Reformed Church was forced 
to make an official apology to calm the storm of protest that had erupted throughout the 
country in reaction to the comment. 
 
 South Africa’s ‘Grave New World’ 
 
Whilst the AMS continued to fight the devil, both literal and figurative, in their crusade 
against pop music, that ‘sensational glorification of the flesh’, the moral panic over Satanism 
had petered out by mid-1982.
147
 Where centred on the threat of ‘foreign’ influences and the 
‘contagions’ of the 1960s counterculture, the moral panic attempted to locate popular culture 
in the realm of volksvreemd (literally ‘foreign to the people’). The literal folk devil or, in this 
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case, volk devil amplified fears that the counterculture might erupt in South Africa. Emerging 
from the ‘sense of impending catastrophe’
148
 that white society was on ‘the brink of 
cataclysm’,
149
 the moral panic voiced fears for the future of South Africa as well as a 
nostalgia for a time of moral certainty and safety. Anxieties regarding the upheaval of the 
1960s counterculture were not new, and certainly the import of its products had caused 
considerable foreboding among conservative South Africans. Along with Elvis Presley and 
the Beatles in the 1960s, Satanism was another seed planted by the ‘decadent West’.
150
 
Certainly the infamous American Anton LaVey, who founded the Church of Satan, had 
claimed that the sexual freedom and death of God in the 1960s had ushered in the ‘Satanic 
Age’.
151
 Whilst the moral panic, 1978 – 1982, opened a space for concerns regarding the 
influence of Eastern religions and reflected their growth in white society, such fears had 
relatively little effect in prohibiting these activities.
152
 Whilst some church congregations 
chose to ban yoga and karate, these activities inevitably became entrenched as favourite 
pastimes as the decade progressed.
153
 Rather the moral panic subsumed the hippie-menace 
and devil-worshipper in voicing fears over control, morality and dissent from within. 
Arguably, that these concerns were particularly amplified between 1978 and 1982 conveys 
the general anxieties regarding the power of white South Africans over their own future as 
well as a sense of persecution and punishment against a backdrop of ‘total onslaught’ and 
worsening economic recession.  
 
Occurring in the heyday of Botha’s ‘total onslaught’ rhetoric, the moral panic engendered the 
phantom of total ‘moral onslaught’. Certainly this created a situation in which the Dutch 
Reformed Church, increasingly conflicted in its ties to the National Party and apartheid, 
could reassert its dominance on moral issues. It also opened a space for radicalising 
movements like the AMS to bolster their crusade against all deviant popular culture, or rather 
all things ‘countercultural’. Arguably, such rhetoric revealed the growing contradictions of 
Afrikaner nationalism as both coveting their role as guardians of the West in Africa, but 
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rebuking modern Western culture as increasingly immoral.
154
 The moral panic did not escape 
the notice of the National Party or Botha, the latter of who joined the fray in a timely moment 
of intra-party politicking. In August 1981, the prime minister officially condemned the ‘white 
devils’ in the country in reaffirming the promise of his government to protect South Africa. 
‘In the name of Christianity and freedom’, Botha stated, ‘Satan walks around in the guise of 
whites to seduce other population groups and idealistic youth groups to devil’s work.’ In 
declaring the National Party against such devilry, Botha conflated and decried communism, 
radicalism and liberalism in asserting that the Afrikaner nationalist government was the only 
feasible choice in protecting family life and a constitution of multiculturalism in South 
Africa. Essentially, in Botha’s view the satanic threat lay in the ‘desire of saboteurs’ to 
undermine his administration and the reform that was so urgently needed.
155
 
 
Although it castigated a broad range of cultural phenomena from pop music and yoga, to drug 
abuse and modern art, the moral panic effected no change in the realm of public policy or 
even public opinion. Converged into the threatening phantom of the power-hungry 
communist, drug-taking, cat-killing, blood-swigging, hippie – the folk devil of the Satanist 
was portrayed as hostile to the Republic and determined to destroy the Afrikaner volk in 
particular. As such, although the moral panic had little lasting effect on public policy or 
public sentiment, it did serve to funnel anxieties regarding political reform and cultural 
change in white South Africa. Tellingly, the moral panic occurred in the first four years of 
Botha’s administration – a social and political milieu characterised by infighting, hubris and 
the alarmist rhetoric of ‘total onslaught’. Moreover, the panic came to an end in 1982, 
following the split of Afrikaner nationalism and the rallying of public sentiment against the 
notion that members of the National Party cabinet were satanic. The expulsion of the 
verkrampte Treurnichtites from the ruling party and the subsequent formation of the 
Conservative Party was a certainly a traumatic sundering of Afrikaner national unity. 
Arguably, however, this split also alleviated some of the anxiety that marked the early years 
of Botha’s administration and which expressed itself in the moral panic over Satanism 
between 1978 and 1982. Whilst the support base of the right-wing had grown considerably in 
the late 1970s, the formation of the Conservative Party – which sought the support of the 
entire white right – provided a far more cohesive and politically adept voice for conservative 
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white South Africans. As such, the moral panic can be seen as manifesting the ideological 
backlash and uncertainty of a particular historical moment in South Africa wherein the divide 
between verkrampte and verligte, right and left, reactionary and reformer, widened and 
solidified.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the cultural and political fissures that occurred along the fault lines 
of the fracturing homogeneity of social norms at a key moment under apartheid. Catalysed by 
the Soweto Uprisings of 1976, anti-apartheid resistance within and beyond the geographic 
and racial borders of white South Africa intensified during the 1980s. As the United 
Democratic Front and the ANC launched the ‘people’s war’, the white right wing also grew 
in strength and size – with the Conservative Party leading the opposition against the National 
Party by the end of the decade. Whilst moral crusades and verkrampte rebukes of youth 
culture erupted sporadically during the decade, the moral panic buttressed by white moral 
introspection, as well as economic and social anxiety, had a limited shelf life. Indeed, interest 
groups like the Action Moral Standards – who had enjoyed the public spotlight because their 
concerns matched those of the moral panic – faded away with the satanic panic outlined in 
this chapter. However, the discursive space opened by this satanic panic allowed for more 
than declarations against immorality. Subsuming a variety of fears under a single folk devil, 
the moral panic also enabled the expression of feelings of persecution, pessimism and cultural 
stagnation in white South Africa.  
 
The folk devil, or rather volk devil, also expressed intertwined fears that persisted throughout 
the decade and re-emerged in 1989. Concern over the (belated) arrival of the ‘counterculture’ 
in white South Africa reflected deeper concerns about the power of cultural unity and 
tradition, as well as generational power. A politicised white youth emerged in the late 1980s 
in the form of the Voëlvry movement.
156
 Arguably, however, the fears over the arrival of this 
‘counterculture’ during the moral panic explored in this chapter, point to gradual changes in 
youth culture in modern white South Africa. Submerged within the broader movements of a 
politicised youth, sexual liberation and civil rights, the 1960s Cultural Revolution saw the 
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emergence of a youth consciousness that became embedded in both the social fabric and 
cultural products of the global West. Contraception and the miniskirt, the rebellion of rock 
music, spiritual questing and the growth of new religious movements – the ‘Traumatic Era’ 
entrenched a youth culture that sought to counter that of their elders. Although in many ways 
the ‘personal’ only became ‘political’ with the satirical songs of the Voëlvry movement in the 
late 1980s, countercultural changes had been seeping into a modern South Africa long before. 
As white South Africa succeeded in creating a modern and Western society in Africa, fears 
over the counterculture in the moral panic explored in this chapter, responded to a growing 
generational divide as ‘Afrikanerdom’ and, indeed, the very idea of white supremacy began 
to fragment. As the 1980s progressed, the Dutch Reformed Church increasingly questioned 
its loyalty to the National Party and its role in apartheid, whilst charismatic Christianity 
flourished. Meanwhile, inspired by the reports of satanic activity between 1978 and 1982, a 
Port Elizabeth based police officer took up the hunt for Satan in his spare time.
157
 This hobby 
bore fruit a decade later when South Africa – mired in transition to democracy and the fall of 
the National Party – experienced another moral panic over Satanism that saw the creation of 
an ‘elite’ occult task force dedicated to the war against Satan. 
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Chapter Four: 
The Devil’s Decade: 
Satanism and the Trans-nationalism of a Scare, c. 1983 – 1990 
 
 
The lion, the witch and the lawyer 
 
‘You must come. There is a man roaring like a lion.’ 
1
  
 
In September 1985, a werewolf was shot and wounded in Bloemfontein. Having lurched 
through the night time streets with his arms outstretched, the ‘werewolf’ of Bloemfontein 
roared ‘like a lion’ and howled ‘like a banshee’.
2
 Terrified suburbanites ‘huddled in fear’ 
until the fearsome creature was shot twice in the leg and collapsed under a streetlamp – his 
‘bloodcurdling’ cries of ‘God take me, God take me’ reduced to piteous moaning.
3
 Hemmed 
in by a crowd of alarmed residents and police officers, the ‘werewolf’ was soon identified as 
a local teenage boy. According to competing eyewitness reports, the confused teenager 
‘growled like an animal’ or mewled for help.
4
 By all accounts, however, the situation was 
otherworldly. As one bystander remarked, ‘[t]he child was on something. But it was not 
drugs or alcohol, the effect wore off too quickly. And he spoke normally.’
5
 The shooting was 
quickly linked to a local attorney whom rumour suspected of being a satanic high priest and 
ensnarer of children. According to rumour, the crazed boy had collapsed suspiciously close to 
the attorney’s house, upon which the attorney had rushed to the injured boy’s aid and touched 
him on the forehead. This was an act deemed all the more sinister by his ordering the police 
to ‘Put him down. Put him down.’
6
 It was soon reported that the boy had attended a party at 
the satanic attorney’s house on the night of his flight from sanity, as had another local 
teenager involved in a ‘Satanic-like shooting’ earlier that year. It was claimed that beneath 
the full moon, a ‘red haired, freckle-faced’ teenager had dressed as a witch in black robes and 
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long red-lacquered artificial nails when she shot and wounded her sleeping family.
7
 Such was 
the initial story of the lion, the witch and the lawyer: two local teenagers beset by madness, 
one feral the other bewitched, and the mysterious older resident who may have influenced 
them both.  
 
Amid calls to find those ‘cunning adults’ who use children as ‘an instrument of the Devil’,
8
 
police investigations revealed the events to be a lot less sinister than first speculated. The boy 
who wailed ‘like a banshee’ as if possessed was, police confirmed, simply intoxicated and 
grief stricken – his girlfriend having been killed just two weeks before. Whilst the teenage 
‘witch’ had indeed suffered a bout of apparent madness, it was due to a severe epileptic fit 
rather than the hand of Satan. Moreover, the teenager’s purported satanic inclinations and 
witches’ apparel proved to be entirely the creation of rumour – her ‘witch costume’ 
amounting to a red t-shirt and pair of black trousers.
9
 The mysterious lawyer was never 
named nor charged. Indeed, the character of the ‘Satanic attorney’ disappeared altogether 
from later versions of the events. 
  
Whilst the tenacity of rumour and speculation reveals that there was general apprehension 
regarding Satanism and ‘satanic scandal’ in the sleepy Free State capital, the story of the lion, 
the witch and the lawyer did not develop into a widespread panic, moral or otherwise. Rather, 
it is illustrative of the manner in which the public and press participate in the process of 
myth-making, the ease with which rumour is spread and events distorted, and the ability of 
sensationalism to open spaces in the media for further speculation. Police officials refuted the 
notion that ‘satanic scandals’ were occurring in the city and that the so-called ‘Satanic 
shootings’ were linked to the occult.
10
 Similarly, enquiries into possible satanic activity in 
local schools revealed that they ‘were not the breeding place for Satanism.’
11
 However, press 
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investigations continued to maintain otherwise. Echoing several elements of the satanic panic 
of the late 1970s, ‘Pepe’ – a local marijuana dealer and self-confessed ex-Satanist – obliged 
the press with information on cult activity in Bloemfontein. Claiming to have been lured into 
a satanic cult by a beautiful client who was also a witch, ‘Pepe’ asserted that the gang of 
satanic youths met in abandoned warehouses and parking garages. Before settling down to 
watch pornography and initiate an orgy of their own, they would drink the blood of 
slaughtered cats and listen to rock and roll music. The ex-Satanist alleged that on one such 
occasion, his beautiful recruiter had lopped off her pet cat’s head, showered the group in its 
blood, and kept the dead animal’s paws to sell to black ‘witchdoctors’ as ‘muti’. He and his 
gang of corrupted youths did this, the ex-Satanist confessed, ‘because it felt lekker. It felt 
good.’
12
  
 
The decade of the 1980s had seen a number of satanic related debates ranging from the ‘bob’ 
hairstyle, vegetarianism and reggae music
13
 to the condemnation of certain university student 
magazines as advocating homosexuality, communism and Satanism.
14
 Maintaining a general 
apprehension about satanic influences in youth culture, the mid-1980s saw worried 
clergymen and moral entrepreneurs increasingly fixate on the image of a corrupted youth 
enjoying wicked parties that involved alcohol, drugs and rock and roll music laced with 
homosexuality, ‘eastern mysticism and Satanism’.
15
 Against resurgent anxiety that the white 
youth were susceptible to the countercultural devils of sex, drugs and rock and roll, the gaze 
of public morality fell on sites of youth leisure and learning. White high schools, university 
campuses and army camps, where South African males fulfilled their mandatory military 
service, were increasingly perceived as vulnerable to corrupting satanic influences. Whilst 
these fears were at the forefront of moral crusades which sought to protect children from 
certain influences, such as campaigns for stricter censorship, apprehension regarding 
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Satanism did not develop into a fully-fledged panic until 1989. By this point, attention was 
focused almost entirely on the youth and sensationalist claims centred on grotesque rituals of 
cannibalism, bestiality and coprophagia.
16
 Thus, increasingly restricted to South Africa’s 
white youth, the 1980s saw a gradual shift in the nature of fears surrounding Satanism in the 
country. With this narrowing focus, the fear-narrative of Satanism – its deviant activities and 
associations – became more violent and macabre. This chapter argues that this shift in focus 
and narrative, subtle though it was, was catalysed by both local and global trends. A decade 
already fraught with successive States of Emergency and the anti-apartheid struggle, the latter 
half of the 1980s also saw the emergence of a countercultural white youth under the banner of 
the Voëlvry movement. At the same time that South Africa moved haltingly towards 
democracy, the global West witnessed a modern ‘witch hunt’ to root out satanic paedophiles. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s, millions of people across North America, Europe and Australia 
became convinced that clandestine satanic cults were preying on children to torture, rape, 
dismember and consume in grotesque rituals to Satan.
17
 South Africa endured its own moral 
panic over Satanism between 1989 and 1993, but while it would imitate many of the elements 
of the satanic panics beyond its border, the moral panic in South Africa different in many 
respects. Essentially, these global fears would become localized, reflecting the anxieties of 
many white South Africans during the country’s transition to democracy. This chapter looks 
at the infamous satanic ritual abuse scares that originated in the United States in the early 
1980s, the shift in the nature of fears surrounding Satanism during this scare, and its spread 
across the global West. In so doing, this chapter establishes the context in which South Africa 
would endure its own vicious satanic panic by exploring the international Satanism scare that 
made the 1980s the devil’s decade. 
 
The Nightmare Nurseries: The Satanic Ritual Abuse Scare in America, c. 1983 – 1990   
 
‘Those people aren’t people…People who do things like that are monsters.’
18
 
 
The decade of the 1980s saw satanic panics occur across the global West. Half-truths, 
rumour, and fantasy fuelled garish reports that devil worshipping hordes of lecherous, vile 
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creatures with a taste for infant flesh and a lust for prepubescent children had infiltrated every 
level of society. In allegations reminiscent of the European witch hunts of the sixteenth 
century, Satanists were said to rape and torture their young victims, force them to drink blood 
and urine, eat faeces and partake in feasts of dismembered and boiled infants, foetuses and 
animals sacrificed in unholy rituals. In countries across the global West, the decade was privy 
to allegations of lust, torture and murder on an unprecedented scale by a secret organization 
of Satanists.  
 
Emerging in a climate of escalating concern over the safety of children and sexual abuse,
19
 
investigations into bizarre claims of ‘satanic’ sexual abuse first emerged in the United States 
in 1983.
20
 Over the decade allegations of obscene sexual abuse in day-care centres, 
neighbourhoods and small towns exploded across the United States and its borders. At its 
epicentre lay the small, family-run McMartin preschool in Manhattan Beach, California. Judy 
Johnson levelled the first accusations against McMartin in 1983. The mentally unstable 
mother of a two-year-old pupil, Johnson claimed that her child had been stabbed with scissors 
and staples, sodomized with an air tube, forced to sup on the blood of a murdered baby, ride 
naked on a horse and stick his finger into the anus of a goat. Johnson was adamant that these 
acts had been perpetrated by Raymond Buckey, the only male employee at McMartin and 
grandson of its founder, as well as cloaked figures that followed her home at night and the 
male models in advertisements.
21
 Whilst Johnson would later be diagnosed and hospitalized 
with schizophrenia, by mid-1984 scores of similar allegations were brought against the 
school after worried parents, psychologists and police questioned the McMartin pre-
schoolers. With bizarre stories of animal sacrifice, church-like rituals and graveyard corpses, 
McMartin was quickly dubbed the ‘Nightmare Nursery’ by the press.
22
 Outraged and 
panicked McMartin parents began using the appellation of ‘satanic’ sexual abuse, whilst 
others saw the problem as extending well beyond the devilish pre-school’s walls. One such 
parent was sure that some twelve hundred children had been sexually molested in Manhattan 
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Beach alone, making it ‘the child molestation capital of the world.’
23
 Kee MacFarlane, the 
social worker who interviewed the McMartin pre-schoolers, told Congress, ‘we’re dealing 
with an organized operation of child predators designed to prevent detection. The preschool, 
in such a case, serves as a ruse for a larger, unthinkable network of crimes against children.’
24
 
Facing over three hundred allegations of sexual abuse, Raymond Buckey, his sixty-two year 
old mother and several other employees of the ‘Nightmare Nursery’ were arrested in 1984, 
while the emergence of similar cases skyrocketed across the country.
25
  
 
Such nightmare nurseries appeared across the United States, and between 1983 and 1988 over 
a hundred communities had initiated investigations into the satanic molestation and torment 
of their children.
26
 Indeed, by 1985, a new category of crime and sexual abuse was defined in 
the term ‘ritual abuse’ to describe sexual crimes occurring in ‘a context linked to some 
symbols or group that have a religious, magical or supernatural connotation, and where 
invocation of these symbols or activities, repeated over time, is used to frighten or intimidate 
the children.’
27
 As DeYoung has argued, the allegations of the McMartin case provided a 
‘master narrative’ for the ensuing cases over the decade. This ‘archetypically familiar plot’ 
championed the need to rescue and protect the innocent victims of such obscene abuse, and 
effectively recruited social workers and others into combating this newly identified form of 
child abuse.
28
 Thus, the ‘Nightmare Nursery’ galvanised child protection activists, parents 
and other moral entrepreneurs into action – the problem of ‘ritual abuse’ effectively raising 
awareness of the physical and psychological vulnerability of children to new heights. Such a 
coalition manifested in the founding of groups like Believe The Children,
29
 but also in the 
proliferation of seminars, workshops and conferences on ritual abuse and satanic cult crimes. 
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Hosted by self-proclaimed experts like a new form of law enforcer – the ‘cult cop’ or ‘Satan 
hunter’ – as well as health care professionals, these conferences attracted worried parents, 
therapists, prosecutors, police and Christian fundamentalists.
30
  
 
Moral crusades against child abuse had grown considerably since the cultural revolution of 
the 1960s. Whilst the growth of the media strengthened charismatic Christianity and saw the 
emergence of televangelism, the 1960s also saw a flourishing the occult in popular media as 
well as highly publicised pagan wedding ceremonies and rituals of new age witches dancing 
‘sky-clad’ for the press. Although the power of the tabloid media was integral to the revival 
and romance of witchcraft in the emergence of the neo-paganism, the media also opened a 
space to publically condemn such movements through a stream of devil-worship 
allegations.
31
 New religious movements like neo-paganism fought such a label, whilst others 
relished it – particularly the ex-circus performer and all-round showman, Anton LaVey who 
harnessed the power of media (rather than Satan) with ‘a formula of nine parts social 
respectability to one part outrage’,
32
 in founding the infamous Church of Satan in 1965.
33
 
However, whilst various forms of the ‘occult’ had become commonplace in popular culture 
by the 1980s, the demonology of the satanic ritual abuse panics engendered fears of a secret 
satanic cult whose influence and crimes were far-reaching. Best has noted that social 
reformers had cultivated considerable public concern over problems of child abuse, incest, 
child pornography and missing children during the 1970s and 1980s.
34
 As Richardson and La 
Fontaine have argued, the convergence of several interest groups with the social problem of 
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child abuse fuelled the satanic panic of the 1980s and 1990s, both within and beyond the 
United States. Christian fundamentalists, the anti-cult movement and growing campaigns for 
child protection found common in ground in their concern for the vulnerability of children 
and the state of modern society.
35
 These groups had communication and support networks 
that crossed the United States, as well as international borders, and were instrumental in 
spreading anti-Satanist claims and ritual abuse information.
36
 To this end, the media played 
an integral part.  
 
One of the first television shows to bring the satanic threat to living rooms across the United 
States aired on 16 May 1985, in a segment entitled ‘The Devil Worshippers’. Satanism was 
reported as a widespread and serious threat, as the host of the popular show, 20/20, warned of 
the ‘perverse, hideous acts that defy belief. Suicides, murders, and ritualistic slaughter of 
children and animals.’
37
 In 1987, lawyer and journalist turned talk show host, Geraldo Rivera 
proclaimed,  
Estimates are there are one million Satanists in [the United States]. The 
majority of them are linked in a highly organized, very secret network. From 
small towns to large cities, they’ve attracted police and FBI attention to their 
Satanist ritual child abuse, child pornography, and grisly satanic murder. The 
odds are this is happening in your town.
38
 
 
Flamed by such sensational and usually unsubstantiated claims in the media,
39
 rumour panics 
sparked in localities across the country with reported midnight sightings of hooded figures 
and the discoveries of ‘satanic altars’ and sacrificial remains.
40
 Victor provides the example 
of a particularly virulent reaction to satanic rumours across the rural areas of New York, 
eastern Ohio and north-western Pennsylvania. Asserting that satanic meetings and animal 
sacrifices had occurred throughout the area, widespread rumour claimed that the satanic cult 
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required a blonde, blue-eyed virgin for their next sacrifice. Compounded by local economic 
stress and widespread anxiety about satanic cultism, the rumours gained momentum to the 
point where police were inundated by phone calls claiming to have seen robed figures on the 
streets and animals hanging from streetlamps. School attendance was drastically lower than 
usual, while youths patrolled the streets armed with baseball bats. Suspected ‘Satanists’ 
received harassing phone calls and death threats, whilst buildings suspected as ‘satanic’ 
locations were vandalized. At one point, suspected areas of ‘satanic ritual’ had to be 
surrounded by police barricades to prevent the onslaught of over a hundred vehicles in which 
hunting knives, guns and clubs were found.
41
 As such, whilst satanic panic was not limited 
entirely to satanic ritual abuse scares, this was by far the most prevalent and rigorously 
spread aspect. With the McMartin case, allegations of ritual abuse shifted from ‘survivor’ 
accounts of adults who ‘remembered’ their abuse, to the testimonies of children. As La 
Fontaine points out, this meant that alleged perpetrators could be rooted out and charged, 
essentially ‘the child victims brought the ideas out of the realm of belief into the world of 
action.’
42
  
 
By 1989, over fifty people had been formally charged and subjected to criminal trial on 
charges of ‘ritual abuse’ – half receiving prison sentences. In the majority of these cases the 
only direct evidence came from the testimonies of children aged between two and six and 
whose tales spoke of chanting, orgies, ritual sacrifice, the drinking of ‘magical’ concoctions, 
and often of being kidnapped in planes, boats and vans.
43
 Initially, prosecutors were reluctant 
to try such cases due to a substantial lack of admissible evidence, but many states responded 
by adapting their legal framework to make it easier to try sexual abuse cases. These legal 
changes included the expansion of hearsay admissibility and the elimination of a minimum 
age of competency.
44
 The claims of children ranged from the tenable to the bizarre. Dale 
Akiki, a thirty six year Sunday school babysitter, spent two and a half years on prison on 
charges of ritually abusing nine children aged between three and four years in 1988 and 1989. 
Akiki was charged with scalding the children with boiling water, forcing them to eat 
excrement, sacrificing an infant, as well as rabbits, an elephant and a giraffe.
45
 Although 
defence attorneys pointed out the substantial holes in prosecutorial cases, including the lack 
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of direct evidence and the fact that children only spoke of these fantastical occurrences of 
abuse after being pressed by investigators and police, cases often incurred draconian 
sentencing.
46
 In 1985, for example, the so-called ‘Bakersfield Seven’ received a total of 2619 
years in prison on allegations of child abuse and conspiracy, a sentence wholly repealed in 
1990 when gross prosecutorial misconduct was uncovered and several of the children 
recanted their testimonies.
47
 Successful appeals increased as public interest in satanic ritual 
abuse began to falter against the ‘escalating chorus of criticism’ that emerged from studies 
into the role of investigators in coercing testimonies.
48
 Whilst the interview-come-
interrogation of hundreds of children in the rooting out of ritual abusers was traumatic to 
many, disturbing evidence has since emerged on the effects of these allegations on the 
accused. Richard Ofshe, an American cult expert, was asked to consult on the case of a 
fundamentalist policeman accused of ritually abusing his daughters after one of them 
‘recovered’ her memories during a Christian church camp in 1988. The accused Paul Ingram 
initially denied the allegations, but also refused to believe that his daughters would lie. 
During his interrogation by fellow police officers, who suggested he might have ‘a devil in 
him’ or suffer from multiple personality disorder, Ingram began inducing trance-like periods 
in an attempt to uncover memories. He soon did, and confessed to the charges. Ofshe, 
however, was not convinced and asked this confessed ritual abuser to remember a ‘new’ 
allegation by the Ingram children. Using his memory technique, Ingram was able to 
remember the incident Ofshe wanted him to – except that Ofshe had fabricated the incident 
entirely. However, Ingram had been convicted and imprisoned by the time Ofshe could 
present his report, and despite recanting his testimony in its entirety he was refused appeal 
and only released in 2003.
49
 These studies in addition to the regular recanting of testimonies 
by children undermined the dogma of the satanic panic and its crusaders that ‘children do not 
lie.’
50
 It soon became clear that they did.  
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The devil’s decade belonged to the phantasmal children of Lucifer – that network of devil 
worshipping miscreants who gleefully corrupt the emotional, physical and spiritual innocence 
of youths with their perverse rituals. Widely publicized insistence that there was a real and 
growing threat of Satanism coupled with growing concerns over child and sexual abuse, the 
devil’s decade saw hundreds of people tried by court and media fire for crimes ranging from 
paedophilia, murder, cannibalism and animal cruelty on claims that often amounted to little 
more than hearsay. It was a panic that destroyed families and lives, having traumatized 
children and sent many so-called Satanists to prison on unproven allegations.
51
 In the United 
States, a survey conducted by the National Centre on Child Abuse and Neglect of more than 
eleven thousand police departments, district attorney offices, social service departments, 
psychologists and psychiatrists across the country uncovered over twelve thousand allegations 
of satanic ritual abuse, none of which could be substantiated.
52
 Certainly, more than a decade 
of police investigation into satanic ritual activities found no evidence to support claims of 
ritual abuse or the alleged satanic crimes.
53
 Similarly, over a hundred investigations by 
Kenneth Lanning, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, revealed no evidence of satanic 
murder which ‘survivor’ testimonies allege occur frequently.
54
 In 1990, the notorious 
McMartin case ended in deadlocked juries, mistrial and acquittal for its two remaining 
defendants, Raymond and Peggy Buckey who had spent five years in prison enduring what 
had become the longest and most expensive criminal trial in United States history.
55
 Although 
believed innocent by many, in 1995 fifty-nine people in the United States were still 
incarcerated or had died in prison on allegations of ritual abuse, and others remain on the sex 
offenders list.
56
  
 
The ‘Kiss of Shame’ and Shameful Kisses: The Demonization of Satanism   
 
The ungainly, death and the void, the horrendous, the vacuous, the sickening, the 
felonious, the spectral, the demoniac, the witchlike…the satanic.
57
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Unsurprisingly, this Satanism scare has garnered comparison to the European witch hunts of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – both because it saw swathes of the public root out 
the devils in their midst, and because it merged old fears and contemporary grievances into a 
‘single terrifying image’.
58
 Essentially, the decade of the 1980s saw Satanism denoted a threat 
infinitely more grotesque and widespread. A demonization myth, as Stevens explains, ‘can be 
an awful, powerful thing, snowballing and engulfing people far beyond its cultural source. It 
generates rage, which wedges its way into culturally prescribed norms of reasonable 
behaviour, [and] obscures whatever was considered due process.’
59
 While there had been 
isolated cases of rumour panic regarding Satanism in the preceding decade,
60
 the satanic ritual 
abuse scares subsumed social anxieties and garnered widespread panic through an intensely 
violent and lurid fear-narrative in the early 1980s. Essentially, this emergent fear-narrative 
both fuelled and fed on the panic, whilst sanctioning draconian action against the accused.  
 
Satanic panic was not unique to the devil’s decade. In the United States, the Midwest was 
plagued by hysteria over bizarre cattle mutilations that were widely believed to be the work of 
satanic cults or, perhaps even more widely believed, space aliens. Certainly the state-assigned 
investigator, Donald E. Flickenger, was willing to believe the claims of two imprisoned 
convicts that the cattle mutilations were linked to a gang of ‘hell oriented’ bikers also 
involved in blood ritual, human sacrifice, and plutonium theft. Claiming that they feared 
repercussion by the biker cult, the prisoners secured transfer to smaller prisons. From which 
they managed to escape, whilst Flickenger’s investigation of the alleged satanic bikers 
garnered no evidence.
61
 These opportunistic claims-makers aside, the hysteric speculation and 
rumour surrounding the cattle mutilation produced a rife and widely publicised panic over 
Satanism, government conspiracy and Unidentified Flying Objects (UFOs).
62
 Having grown 
in strength and size since the 1960s, fundamentalist churches had long preached against the 
satanic ‘evils’ of rock music, which increasingly made reference to the devil and the occult, as 
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well as spiritualism, astrology and fantasy in popular culture. These groups also regularly 
demonised institutions they considered ‘satanic’, including the World Wild Life Fund 
(WWLF) which was deemed pagan nature worship.
63
 Perhaps the most famous of such 
crusades is that levelled at the American toy company, Proctor and Gamble, since 1980. 
Maintaining that its owner had made a pact with the devil and that the Proctor and Gamble 
logo (thirteen stars and a crescent moon) was satanic, fundamentalist Christians distributed 
warning flyers, boycotted their products, and even sabotaged some of the Company’s vans. 
Illustrative of the power of these claims, and of the fundamentalist networks, by 1982 Proctor 
and Gamble had to hire four staff members for the sole purpose of handling the daily mail 
regarding the company’s satanic connections – receiving over five hundred letters a day.
64
 
These incidents reflect the persistence of satanic fears in both isolated panics and moral 
crusades, and that the satanic threat emerges as rumour and legend, as well as a pejorative 
label to castigate social behaviour. However, the emergence of survivor ‘testimonies’, 
allegations of sexual abuse and torture in a ritual context, media hype and rumour engendered 
a far more violent and alarming spectre of Satanism than these earlier panics and campaigns. 
The claims made by interest groups combined with social anxieties to produce a nightmarish 
threat to modern society. This saw the threat of satanic cults move from animal mutilation and 
the music studio to the playground and home where young children were helpless against 
their sexual appetites and murderous proclivities.  
 
According to ritual abuse survivors, psychologists, cult cops and Christian fundamentalists, 
the modern ‘Satanic Mass’ is practiced regularly by Satanists who appear normal to the 
outside world. On such an occasion, the area is cleansed of Christ’s influence through wicked 
chanting, and tarpaulin sheets are laid down to collect the blood and filth of the evening’s 
debaucheries. Fires are lit as the Satanists gather at night, each bringing with them the 
ceremonial items that they are charged with protecting. These items include the satanic lore, a 
sword, a dagger or the stuffed head of a goat. As it is a religious ceremony to Satan, the high 
priest reads and unholy sermon and the Satanists chant and pray to him. They then proceed to 
sacrifice a cockerel or a small animal, perhaps a human, often a child. According to 
testimonies, the Satanists regularly feast on the flesh of babies and small children. They also 
have a taste for foetuses, and often only the small bones remain. It is believed that satanic 
doctors and nurses procure aborted foetuses from clinics, or that pregnant cult members are 
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given a ‘criminal abortion’ to feed the cult’s members. To the outside world, the mother will 
‘simply announce that the baby was stillborn.’ Satanic parents are thought to hide the 
sacrifice of their older children by moving to a different house or getting a divorce. At these 
gatherings, it is claimed that Satanists sometimes murder runaway children, vagrants, or 
disobedient members of the cult by stabbing them in the heart, slitting their throats and 
draining them of their blood. Following the sermon, sacrifice and feasting, the Satanists 
smear their bodies, as well as those of the naked children, with bodily fluids and partake in a 
frenzied orgy, regularly penetrating the women and children with a crucifix.
65
 It is at this 
‘Satanic Mass’ that they induct the children into the cult. As one ‘survivor’ recalled, 
I was carried to the toolbench where gibberish was spoken by the four adults 
around me. Rather than water sprinkled, a small, black, wriggling cocker spaniel 
was held over me and disembowelled with a dagger-like instrument…The long 
white taper was lit…It was then inserted, still lit, into my vagina. In this way I 
was welcomed into the faith.
66
  
 
Satanists are believed to take sadistic pleasure in terrorizing the children. Various claims 
include the tendency of satanic parents to give their children a puppy or kitten as a gift, watch 
as the child grows to love it, and force them to watch it slaughtered at the Satanic Mass. 
Other claims assert that sometimes cult members dress as clowns, entertain the children and 
promise them delicious food. Instead, the children are forced to eat excrement and rotting 
flesh and watch the adults enjoy a ‘mouth-watering’ feast in front of them. The satanic 
clowns, and sometimes Santa Claus, then rape the children.
67
 Often the youngsters are 
intoxicated with drugs,
68
 sometimes they are shocked with electrical currents, and 
occasionally their devil-worshipping parents prostitute them to paedophiles outside the cult. 
At the Satanic Mass they are taught that the Devil is all-powerful and that he will triumph 
over all,
69
 and sometimes Satan even appears.
70
  
 
The scene has increasingly been consigned to phantasmagoria by the media, the public and 
academics alike. Children’s claims were often recanted and believed coerced, testimonies 
often belonged to mentally unstable adults suffering from schizoaffective disorders, whilst 
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other ‘survivor’ accounts have been proven utterly fallacious.
71
 Nonetheless, these claims 
shaped a powerful fear-narrative of modern Satanism in which current concerns and fears 
were attached to a ‘blood ritual myth’ – the fear-imbued lore of a secret group of conspirators 
who gather to feast on the blood and flesh of the innocent and invert all that a society 
believes.
72
 To a large extent, this fear-narrative is built upon tales of the infamous ‘black 
mass’ whose notoriety stems from the witch killings it inspired, as well as the acts it 
describes. In early modern Europe, the tale of the ‘black mass’ wove together the tenet of the 
‘feast of the conspirators’ with folk fears of witches that held them responsible for disease 
and storms, causing nightmares and stealing the milk from cows by milking the corners of 
their tablecloths.
73
 It was believed that witches – the wretched servants of Satan – would 
sneak out of their houses to attend the midnight ritual of the Black Mass They would steal out 
through the chimney and fly on a bewitched household item, or they would turn themselves 
into an animal to cover the distance to the meeting place. At their unholy ceremony the 
witches would feast on murdered children and relish in orgies, pulling to them strangers, 
family members, the young and old. When Satan appeared, sometimes as a great black 
animal, the witch would swear allegiance to him in exchange for power. Such a promise was 
sealed with a kiss – the ‘Kiss of Shame’ (osculum infame) in which the witch kneels to kiss 
the anus of the Devil in a gross inversion of the Christian ceremony of kissing the Pope’s 
ring.
74
 Evoking tropes of evil including child murder, cannibalism, blood ritual and sexual 
perversity – the legend of the Black Mass inspired fear and hostility towards witches and 
fuelled the witch-hunts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
 
These fear narratives are weighted by the image of feral carnality and the abandonment of 
reason, as well as the conspiratorial desires of those demonised to subvert and pervert the rest 
of society. In these scenes – the Black Mass and the modern Satanic Mass – the conspirators 
are shown to flout what is morally acceptable in a particular society and relish in perversity: 
bestiality, anal intercourse, incest, homosexuality, the thirst for bodily fluids, the gluttony for 
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human flesh and their ill-begotten power. These intense fear-narratives, or demonization 
myths, serve to isolate a certain group, or behaviour as unacceptable and threatening to a 
society.
75
 Thus, the modern ‘Satanic Mass’ interweaves several threads – modern, historical 
and mythical – in a fear-narrative wherein social problems and social anxieties intersect. 
Whilst ‘survivor’ testimonies and the claims of children often mention supernatural scenes – 
including the appearance of the devil, levitation and the ability of Satanists to change into 
animals – these have generally been ignored by secular therapists, social workers and police 
who believe in ritual abuse but not Satan. Fears that satanic cults abuse children does not rest 
on religious belief – not in the wake of the Jonestown tragedy of 1978 in which over nine 
hundred people committed mass suicide under the guidance of Reverend Jim Jones, or the 
Manson ‘family’ murders, and the Matamoros killings.
76
 Essentially, as Oldridge has argued, 
‘the theory of satanic abuse is a secularized version of the sabbat: the secret gathering of the 
Satanists to perform obscene acts of worship, indulge in unlawful sexual acts and murder 
young children.’
77
 Whilst the fear-narrative of modern Satanism is secular, or rather 
secularized by its adherents, it is not simply the drudging to the present an old fear-narrative. 
The whirring and stutter of the satanic paedophile’s camera or the blinking red light of the 
pornographer’s video camera are recent additions. As is the image of the Baphomet – the 
inverted pentagram superimposed by a goat’s head has become the ‘most ominous of all 
satanic emblems and graffiti’, but was only popularised by the Church of Satan since the late 
1960s.
78
 However, the newest element of this demonization myth is that children are at the 
forefront as victims of sexual abuse. The sexual abuse of children became the common 
feature, whilst other forms of abuse were less consistent in allegations.
79
 Thus, in addition to 
emotional and physical abuse, concerns about abortion, child pornography, prostitution, child 
slavery, incest, and drug addiction threaded through the allegations and the Satanism scare.  
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The Devil haunts the Global Village: The Transnational Spread of the Satanism Scare   
 
These fears surrounding the exploits of groups of satanic sexual predators were not contained 
by the borders of the United States, and emerged throughout the global West by the late 
1990s. Gaining momentum in the wake of the original ‘Nightmare Nursery’ of McMartin by 
mid-1984, similar allegations appeared in Canada in 1985.
80
 Crossing the Atlantic, 
allegations arose in Britain in 1987 where they steadily caught public attention. By 1988, the 
founder of a British charity declared that some four thousand infants were sacrificed to Satan 
each year.
81
 Fledgling apprehension had grown into panic by 1989, with widespread tales of 
secret ceremonies involving blood drinking, cannibalistic feasting on babies cooked in 
microwaves, and sexual abuse in hidden tunnels beneath cemeteries.
82
 Certainly, ‘American-
inspired guidelines’ to identify victims of ritual abuse were disseminated throughout the 
social services, and conferences on the subject quickly arose.
83
 Suspicions of ritual abuse and 
devil abuse resulted in scores of children taken into protective custody throughout the United 
Kingdom, including the removal of twenty children from their parents in a working-class area 
of Manchester because authorities suspected their parents of devil worship.
84
 The United 
Kingdom’s panic peaked with the media frenzy surrounding the removal of children from 
two families in Orkney Island, Scotland, and their subsequent return to their homes by court 
order. In so ruling, the judge reprimanded the social service workers for being ‘obsessed with 
the belief’ in satanic cults, and questioning children in a manner that actually prompted a 
‘great deal of fantasy’.
85
 As a result, the government initiated an official enquiry, but the 
investigation into the forty-eight cases of alleged ritual abuse fostered no evidence to support 
the claims of a widespread satanic conspiracy.
86
 Similar scares regarding Satanism and 
alleged ritual abuse surfaces in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland, 
Australia and New Zealand by the late 1990s.
87
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Dispersed trans-nationally by religious and professional networks, including those of 
psychologists and social workers, as well as the media, these scares were bound by their 
focus on satanic crimes against children. Best argues that these panics accentuated two 
intertwined threats – the abuse of children on the one hand, and the corruption of the children 
on the other.
88
 These threats reflected the interests of the moral crusaders involved, as well as 
the intersection of social problems. Child abuse – and by extension rape, paedophilia and 
emotional trauma – were of particular concern to child protectionists and feminists, as well as 
growing arenas in the fields of psychology and medical health. Meanwhile, the corruption of 
the youth by popular culture had been a persistent concern of moral crusades whose ranks 
included Christian fundamentalists, the anti-cult movement and organisations of parents who 
sought to protect children from perceptibly harmful aspects of modern society. In addition to 
rooting out satanic paedophiles, the satanic panics of the 1980s and early 1990s fostered 
opportunities for agents of public morality to condemn rock music and fantasy role-playing 
games like ‘Dungeons and Dragons’ in the same vein that it did child pornography and drug 
addiction.
89
 Binding heterogeneous concerns under alarm for the safety of children and the 
phantom of a satanic conspiracy, Satanism emerged as a social problem in the late twentieth 
century. Perceived as a threat to the moral foundations of a society, such a threat is also 
protean – variously linked to the perceptibly vulnerable aspects of a society and subsuming 
particular anxieties of the society in which it is ‘discovered’.  
 
As such, modern Satanism was explicitly linked to the abuse of children and the corrupting 
effects of popular culture. Whilst this fear-narrative served to bind the concerns of crusaders 
and activists across the social sphere – from the secular to the religious, professional to parent 
– increasingly taboo-laden stories engendered a subversion narrative. This demonization of 
Satanism served to fuel the panic whilst reflecting social fears and desires. Whilst this 
demonization served to castigate certain forms of behaviour by linking them to the anti-social 
and anti-societal, the very manifestations of the fear-narrative and its power to grip 
widespread public attention reflected some underlying social anxieties. Here, Bromley has 
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made a convincing argument in noting that the demonization of day-care during the 1980s 
revealed the discomfort of parents in having to depend on strangers to look after and raise 
their children while they worked. Certainly, the 1980s witnessed particular unease regarding 
changes in society as women increasingly moved into the workforce, divorce rates became 
acceptable and sexual mores continued to loosen in comparison to previous decades.
90
 
Arguably, Bromley’s work implicitly draws attention to an important aspect in interpreting 
demonologies: an awareness of the geographical area of the panic itself, but also the 
geography of its fear-narrative.  
 
Whilst the Satanism scare and its mythology spread across the global West, national variation 
did occur. For example, where the scares in the United States, Australia and New Zealand 
focused on very young children as potentially victimized in pre-schools and day-care centres, 
the glare of the British panic fell on the issue of parental abuse. In fact, there were only two 
cases involving alleged ritual abuse in British pre-schools, and these appeared as late as 1994. 
Similarly, the fear-narrative of the modern ‘Satanic Mass’ varied from country to country. 
Ritual abuse allegations in America, the United Kingdom and New Zealand had investigators 
searching for hidden tunnels beneath day-care centres and cemeteries.
91
 Stories of satanic 
clowns and nursery rhymes were common in America, Australia and Holland, but none of the 
cases in the United Kingdom or Scandinavia involved these elements. In explaining the 
transnational spread of the Satanism scare and its variations, La Fontaine asserts, 
The international spread of allegations is not an indication that the same 
organization is operating in all the places where allegations are made; rather, the 
transmission of the mythology from place to place reflects the 
interconnectedness of societies whose cultures have a good deal in common. In 
particular, they share definitions of evil and a determination to eradicate it.
92
 
 
South Africa experienced some publicity around the issue of sexual abuse in a satanic context 
as early as 1986. Here the story of a young, white military conscript whose ‘soul had been 
offered to the “prince of darkness” at a very early age, and who had to witness animals being 
slaughtered and drink their blood at Satanist rituals’ became the concern of psychologists, 
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clergyman and the press.
93
 Aggressive, addicted to drugs and suffering from borderline 
personality disorder – the alleged ‘lifelong Satanist’ was found to be ‘the loneliest and most 
frightened human being in the world.’
94
 Such concern was confined to the ranks of the clergy 
and psychology, however, and South Africa only endured a moral panic over Satanism 
several years later. Breaking out in 1989, the satanic panic in South Africa echoed trends 
abroad in that it engendered an intensely violent and destructive fear-narrative of Satanism. 
However, white South Africa never experienced a satanic ritual abuse scare. Although the 
moral panic over Satanism in South Africa, 1989 – 1993, fed off the transnational Satanism 
scare and shared the same concern over the vulnerability of children, these global concerns 
assumed a vernacular cast, shaped by the specific cultural and political changes in white 
South Africa.
95
 In establishing the context in which a satanic panic emerged South Africa in 
1989, explored in the next chapter, this chapter turns briefly to the change in the ontological 
nature of fears surrounding Satanism and youth culture in South Africa during the late 1980s. 
 
Satan Crosses the Rubicon  
 
While the tremors of the nightmare nurseries started reverberating across the United States, 
the mid-1980s saw many white South Africans acknowledge that white supremacy and 
apartheid policy were neither tenable nor beneficial. The divide between the verligte and 
verkrampte continued to erode the coherency of National Party strategy and white nationalist 
idealism. During the devil’s decade, the ruling National Party was increasingly forced to 
devote attention to crisis management in reaction to the escalating ‘people’s war’ against 
apartheid. In 1985, over forty magisterial districts were placed under state of emergency as 
anti-apartheid resistance met the repressive power of the state’s security forces.
96
 Fulfilling 
their mandatory service to the apartheid state, young white males were confronted by the 
‘people’s war’ in their patrols of black townships. Meanwhile, an aging P. W. Botha, his 
health failing, appeared increasingly indecisive and repeatedly fell to familiar rhetorical 
territory of ‘total strategy’. Whilst Botha and his supporters clung to the belief that they 
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fought against the evils of communism in defending Christian civilization in Africa, the 
decade was marked by increasing defection from hegemonic ‘Afrikanerdom’.
97
   
 
Division and defection marked the decade of the 1980s as cultural and religious institutions 
turned away from the tenets of apartheid, whilst the long feared counterculture finally took 
flight among South Africa’s white youth. Having grappled with internal tensions since 1982, 
the Dutch Reformed Church broke ties with the National Party government and apartheid 
policy in 1986. In adopting the controversial theological document entitled ‘Church and 
Society’, the bastion of Afrikaner religion began to condemn the separation of people on 
racial lines as sinful. This new path of the Dutch Reformed Church brought scathing critique 
from verkrampte political elements, including Andries Treurnicht of the Conservative Party.
98
 
Whilst hallmarks of Afrikaner nationalism like the Church and the Broederbond (‘Afrikaner 
Brotherhood’) went left, the verkrampte Conservative Party and ultra-right-wing 
organizations like the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) had grown in strength and size. 
By 1987, the Conservative Party had become the National Party’s official opposition in white 
politics – a threat with which the caucus of the ruling party became increasingly concerned, 
to the chagrin of its younger members who urgently sought reform.
99
  
 
These changes in the ideological institutions of Afrikaner nationalism were echoed in the 
younger generation of white Afrikaners who began to swim against the cultural tides of their 
elders. Following the rapid success of the Afrikaner intellectual review Die Suid-Afrikaan, a 
soapbox wherein topics that would have been censored were rigorously debated, Die Vrye 
Weekblad issued weekly critique of the ruling regime. It critiqued in particular the Border 
War (1968 – 1989) that saw young, conscripted white males sent to fight the communist 
threat in Namibia and Angola.
100
 The Border War increasingly became a bone of contention 
and resentment as the decade wore on. It was an unpopular war, particularly amongst the 
young soldiers forced to enter the army by state law, and many of who returned with post-
traumatic stress disorder.
101
 Whilst this saw the emergence of the End Conscription 
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Campaign, a disaffected youth were also heard over the airwaves in the growth of a 
politicized Afrikaner music movement. The Voëlvry (‘Fly Free’) movement openly relished 
their own rebellion against the strictures of tradition, and attacked the nation’s politicians, 
churches, media and symbols of Afrikaner culture through their music.
102
 As Welsh and other 
have noted, these developments exposed the moral fallacies of the apartheid regime.
103
 
Arguably, however, they were more significant – striking a chord with a questioning youth, 
and underscoring the movement of internal critique of white and particularly Afrikaner 
politics and identity from the periphery to the mainstream. These changes were not wholly 
welcomed, particularly by moral guardians who saw changing cultural norms as a threat to 
the health of white society.  
 
Certainly, by the mid-1980s, a more vocal alarm over the influence of foreign rock music and 
drug culture began to be voiced from the pulpit. Echoing the concerns of the earlier satanic 
moral panic between 1978 and 1982, discussed in the previous chapter, warnings were issued 
against the ‘satanic’ influences of foreign rock groups like Black Sabbath and Queen. Such 
sentiments matched those of Christian fundamentalists in the United States, but also reflected 
the general distrust of foreign and countercultural elements.
104
 With the growth of the 
Voëlvry movement, however, the gaze of such moral guardians shifted inwards – no longer 
fearing only the influence of ‘foreign’ culture. This newly inward-looking concern was also 
reflected in the report of the President’s Council, a sixty-two member advisory committee, in 
1987, which sounded alarm over the future of South Africa’s youth – particularly with 
regards to the influences of popular culture transmitted television and radio.  The report 
advocated the need for stricter censorship in order to halt the apparent increase of ‘social 
deviation’ and immorality, exemplified by homosexuality and heterosexual cohabitation.
105
 
As in other Western countries, these concerns were matched by the rise in awareness of the 
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sexual abuse of children and paedophilia as a social problem.
106
 Essentially, the second half 
of the decade witnessed increasing public debate regarding the influences on – indeed, the 
very future of – the white youth of South Africa. At times, these fears reverberated in alarm 
that the devil had gained a foothold in South African society.  
 
Although real satanic panic only broke out in 1989, fears over the ‘grotesque’ desecration of 
white morality sounded in 1988 with reports of midnight orgies and animal sacrifices in 
hallowed cemeteries and on deserted beaches.
107
  In Bloemfontein – ‘the Satanist capital of 
the country’ – the desecration of over thirty gravestones was deemed the work of ‘hooligans, 
or Satanists’ and stirred rebuke and rumour. Whilst it was noted that such acts were 
perpetrated ‘in God’s most holy sight’, rumour believed that the ‘tomb-wreckers’ were part of 
a coven of witches and warlocks who met to curse the area.
108
 Meanwhile, a small scandal 
had erupted in the South African Defence Force when three young conscripts had drunkenly 
slaughtered a cat. Grisly photographs of the cat being skinned and decapitated, as well as 
posed shots of the animal’s head balanced on a whisky bottle and used as a finger puppet, 
caused outrage. The ‘senseless, merciless slaughter’ by these ‘crazed young men’ was 
quickly deemed a satanic ritual, it was alleged that the devilish conscripts had drunk the cat’s 
blood and sold its tail to African locals as ‘muti’.
109
  
 
A few months later, a Durban newspaper produced a series of articles which claimed that 
sadistic sacrifices and bizarre sex rituals were occurring throughout the city. Slashed and 
scratched, a local child was believed to have been recruited into a satanic cult, whilst  ‘devil 
dabblers’ in a Pinetown school had ‘sacrificed a rat to the prince of darkness.’
110
 Two self-
confessed ex-Satanists claimed they had attended Black Mass ceremonies in cemeteries 
across the country. During these rituals, black-clad youths ‘freaked out on drugs’ fell into 
bisexual orgies after chanting, dancing, talking in tongues and sacrificing animals like goats, 
chickens and cats to Lucifer.
111
 Sometimes they purportedly sacrificed humans – particularly 
runaway teenagers who first fell prey to the lure of the disco, and then the drugs of Satanists 
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who then delivered them into the hands of their robed high priest. When they were not 
kidnapped for sacrifice and sex, youngsters were recruited from beach parties and discos and 
embroiled in Satan’s web of sex, drugs, and rock 'n roll. Newspaper reports also alleged that 
voodoo dolls and the charred remains of inverted crosses had been discovered, as had 
sightings of the satanic symbol ‘666’ on city walls.  
 
Determined to eradicate the ‘epidemic’ of Satanism ‘in the playground’, these claims by the 
press initiated only small-scale enquiry into the possibility of satanic activity in schools by 
some educators.
112
 These fears remained restricted to ecclesiastical circles and press 
sensationalism. Indeed, in the letter columns of the same Durban newspaper, students 
contested the charge that their reading material, Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart, was 
satanic.
113
 Similarly, when anti-Satanist pamphlets urging students to ‘burn their karate 
outfits’ were disseminated at a Greyton school, parents responded in anger – dismissing the 
claims that linked yoga, karate, transcendental meditation and Buddhism to Satanism as fear-
mongering religious intolerance.
114
 This scepticism shifted in early 1989, when parents, 
educators, government official, police and children themselves became convinced that a 
satanic threat conspired to cripple white South Africa.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Essentially, with international sanctions intensifying, the National Party government had 
fallen into confusion by 1988 – the once shrewd and seemingly indomitable Botha paralysed 
with indecision appeared to be losing the support of his party.
115
 As O’Meara has noted, by 
this time ‘a powerful sense of déjà vu hung over white politics’ for Botha now found himself 
in a position similar to that of his predecessor – the aged and embittered Vorster who had 
been ousted after an acrimonious battle for succession.
116
 In the waning years of the devil’s 
decade, Botha’s ailing health saw him dismissed from presidency in 1989: significantly both 
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the beginning and end of his term of office were marked by a satanic panic. Echoing trends 
abroad, Satanism had come to be perceived as a social problem in South Africa by the late 
1980s.  
 
Within the milieu of tumultuous politics and rapid social change, fears of Satanism were 
revitalised by a violent fear-narrative that fed off such social anxieties and fuelled a satanic 
moral panic between 1989 and 1993. Corresponding with patterns in the international arena, 
white South African employed ‘cult cops’, manifested kidnap panics, rallies and government 
response and enquiry to the perceived threat of a clandestine cult of devil worshippers 
preying on children. However, whilst this panic occurred within the international Satanism 
scare explored in this chapter, as well as a broader climate of concern over the sexual abuse 
of children, South Africa never experienced a satanic ritual abuse scare. Interacting with the 
political and social climate in South Africa, global fears were localised and the satanic threat 
was largely located to high schools, university campuses and military camps – the frontiers of 
popular culture and popular dissent in white South Africa in the late 1980s. As South Africa 
moved towards democratic unity, a fraying political climate and fractured white society was 
met with the resurgence of volk devils.
117
 As the next chapter will show, long held fears of 
black rapists and communists – the iconic ‘black’ and ‘red’ perils – were combined with fears 
that a disgruntled youth posed a threat to white society, as well as the emergence of the 
‘holism peril’
118
 in the moral panic over Satanism between 1989 and 1993.  
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Chapter Five:  
The Path of Total Destruction:   
The Devil, Democracy and Moral Panic in White South Africa, 1989 – 1993
1
 
 
 
The ‘Satanic Era’  
 
Satanism, devil worship, ‘Wit Wolwe’ thuggery…This is what the children…are 
facing. And it is no use hiding our heads, ostrich-like in the sand, pretending this is 
‘all just rumours’.
2
  
 
As if we didn’t already have enough problems in this country, we have had our 
attention drawn in recent times to a new one: a substantial assault on the morals of 
our youth emanating from no less a foe than Satan himself.
3
 
  
As apartheid died, the Devil made a bid for the control of white South Africa. In 1989, an 
aged P. W. Botha, blunted by bluster and failing health, exited the political arena. Botha’s 
successor, Frederick Willem de Klerk, held the reputation of being a ‘cautious pragmatist’
4
 
and a political loyalty that had garnered him the nickname ‘Mr National Party’.
5
 However, it 
was this verkrampte National Party man who initiated the revision of South Africa’s political 
and social borders. On 2 February 1990, de Klerk announced the start of all-party 
negotiations for a South African constitution without preconditions.
6
 Moments before he 
announced the unbanning of communism and political parties, including the African National 
Congress and the Pan African Congress, as well as the release of Nelson Mandela, de Klerk 
noted that ‘after today South Africa will never again be the same.’
7
 Committing the country 
to the eventuality of ‘one person, one vote’, the scale of reform initiated by de Klerk was 
unexpected – even by the caucus of the National Party, who had not been made privy to their 
relatively green leader’s decision.
8
 Whilst a ‘New South Africa’ was imminent, the 
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atmosphere was fraught with uncertainty. Between 1990 and 1994, civil unrest and barely 
civil politicking intensified. On all sides, political hubris was aggravated by rogue elements 
determined to undermine negotiations or shift the balance of power. Talks repeatedly broke 
down and the death toll rose drastically.
9
 However, during this period of political unrest and 
change, many white South Africans became fixated on an entirely different black mass. ‘An 
era of evil, exploited by devil worshippers’, as one newspaper reported, ‘is spreading its 
tentacles into every strata of society.’
10
 In a milieu where the only certainty was that the era 
of white privilege had come to an end, it became feared that the children of Lucifer were 
paving the way to the ‘Satanic era’ in South Africa.  
 
Across the country, newspapers reported that white youths were being led ‘down the path of 
total destruction.’
11
 High on drugs and ensnared by lust, children were reportedly bound to 
Satanism and secrecy by shame, perverted pleasure and the promise of power.
12
 Across South 
Africa, white children were reportedly being lured to the satanic ritual of the Black Mass 
where they made pacts with the devil as they supped on drug-laced wine and human flesh. 
Under the thrall of satanic adults, these children of Lucifer scrawled blasphemous insults in 
human excrement and blood, summoned demons and partook in frenzied orgies with males 
and females, the young and old, animals and demons.
13
 Warning reports of devil worship 
became increasingly widespread and virulent in 1989. By 1990, fears of the Satanic menace 
had spread across South Africa with reports of Satanism in Cape Town, the Peninsula, Paarl, 
Somerset West, Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Pretoria, 
Johannesburg, the East Rand, the West Rand, Oudtshoorn, Richards Bay, Dundee, Newcastle 
as well as several other small Karoo towns.
14
 Diabolic graffiti had been drawn, graveyards 
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had been desecrated, children were missing and divorce rates were increasing.
15
 Tales of 
blood smeared walls and burnt excrement – ‘typical of their perversions’ – were rife,
16
 as 
were rumours of black-clad people who ‘looked like spooks’.
17
 Numerous warning reports 
claimed that satanic prowlers were searching for sacrificial victims, that white cars were 
trailing children around school districts,
18
 and that Satanists were recruiting children through 
drug-laced soft drinks, sweets and stickers.
19
 Caught in the devil’s trap, children were raped 
and abused, placed in graves with dead bodies and forced to slaughter animals.
20
 In Cape 
Town, a policeman claimed to know of at least eleven white babies sacrificed to Satan – their 
throats slit and hearts eaten by devil worshippers.
21
 It was claimed that satanic parents laid 
their own children upon the altar and that unwed mothers were enticed to hand over their 
newborns.
22
 Other reports claimed that the doomed infants were bred especially for the grisly 
satanic rituals by ‘warlocks’, and that body parts and foetuses were regularly stolen from 
hospitals.
 23
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Whilst bringing horrific allegations of satanic activity in South Africa to the forefront of the 
public imagination, anti-satanic crusaders grudgingly admitted that ‘getting hold of a real 
Satanist proved as easy as catching the wind.’
24
 For claims-makers the lack of evidence did 
not deter from the reality of Satanism. Indeed, it underscored the very power of these 
‘masters of deception [who] are able to disguise their activities to such an extent that no trace 
can be found.’
25
 To some, however, such reports spoke of little more than the imaginary 
spectres in the minds of conservative Christians and self-appointed moral watchdogs. Despite 
lack of proof and the repeated cautions of both police and church officials not to act on 
hearsay,
26
 widespread rumour facilitated the growth of anxiety and hostility towards the 
perceived satanic menace.
27
 These fears were intensified by the repeated allegations that 
white community leaders, public figures and professionals were secretly working for 
Lucifer.
28
 The sentiment produced was simple but widespread: Satanism was ‘a putrid scar on 
an otherwise decent society’
29
 and ‘in a civilized society there is just no place for these 
depraved people.’
30
 It seemed apparent that there existed a malignant web of Satanists whose 
sole ambition was to cripple the South African nation, and that ‘the softest target for 
corruption’ was the country’s white youth.
31
 
 
Capping a decade of political and economic tumult in the death throes of apartheid, the period 
between the end of the apartheid-era and the birth of the ‘new South Africa’ was marked by 
widespread unrest and uncertainty. Indeed, as one columnist noted in the waning months of 
1989, the notion of ‘managing change’ in South Africa had become untenable – the country 
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was now ‘floating with chaos’.
32
 With apartheid in rigor mortis and the Rainbow Nation in 
gestation, South Africa occupied a tense liminal space between 1989 and 1994. ‘The old is 
dying, and the new cannot be born,’ wrote Antonio Gramsci, ‘in this interregnum a great 
variety of morbid symptoms appear.’
33
 This chapter explores one such ‘morbid symptom’ in 
South Africa’s transition to democracy, as fears of the Devil and his minions evolved into a 
moral panic between 1989 and 1993. In white South African society, the horror of devil 
worship was systematically merged with a host of socially undesirable behaviours including 
drug abuse and homosexuality, as well as with the influences of popular culture and the ‘New 
Age’. As this chapter shows, the threat of Satanism also became a scapegoat. As a vehicle of 
expression, this particular folk devil manifested underlying anxieties regarding white 
hegemony and cultural unity as South Africa’s political and social borders were transformed.   
 
Morbid Symptoms, the Devil and Democracy: Moral Panic, 1989 – 1993  
 
By the time the political tide turned in February 1990, white South Africans were anxiously 
aware that the status quo could not continue. The country needed, as de Klerk asserted, ‘to 
escape from a corner where everything had stagnated in confrontation.’
34
 During the 1980s, 
policing the geographic and social boundaries of the apartheid state had become increasingly 
costly, both to the economy and morale of white South Africa. Between 1985 and 1988, 
white conscripts were deployed to Namibia to defend against the communist threat, whilst 
others policed the racial unrest of the ‘people’s war’ within South Africa.
35
 Although the 
‘seizure of power’ desired by black resistance was prevented by the State’s security forces, 
on-going internal conflict together with international sanctions worked to nullify the 
ideological cohesion of apartheid. With the economy suffering, unemployment and inflation 
increased and the average standard of living dropped, whilst an increasingly torpid 
government appeared paralysed with indecision.
36
 On the cultural terrain, bastions of 
Afrikaner nationalism began to turn with the tide against apartheid. In what many called 
‘conversion without repentance’, the Dutch Reformed Church broke ties with apartheid 
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ideology and the National Party in its 1986 and 1990 synod meetings.
37
 In the same period, a 
dissenting Afrikaner youth began to grumble over the airwaves and on university campuses, 
as the younger generation increasingly chafed under apartheid ‘Afrikanerdom’.
38
 Under 
diverging class and generational desires, the cultural solidarity and ideological cohesion of 
Afrikaners became increasingly fractured as the 1980s progressed. 
 
By 1988, the National Party was bleeding support to the political left and right. As faith in P. 
W. Botha declined after his ill-fated Rubicon speech in 1985, the white right-wing and the 
Conservative Party steadily encroached on the constituency of the ailing National Party.
39
 
The weakening political hold of the ruling party was exacerbated by the collapse of 
communism, the legitimacy of the rhetorical menace falling with the Berlin wall in 
November 1989. Simultaneously, however, the African National Congress and the liberation 
struggle lost communist support.
40
 While the white elite generally favoured reform, 
grassroots concern for the protection of white security and white privilege remained 
prominent among the rank and file of white South Africans. Indeed, surveys conducted in the 
late 1980s showed that the majority of whites – including university students – were not in 
favour of a government led by the African National Congress. The majority of white South 
Africans, both English and Afrikaans, reflected fear that the physical and cultural safety of 
whites would be threatened by black majority rule, whilst the standards of living would drop, 
crime would increase and white women would be sexually and physically molested by black 
men.
41
 However, even here the realisation that the status quo could not continue was clear. In 
noting the necessity of reform, the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, warned: ‘a 
maelstrom of increasing isolation, boycotts, sanctions and violence can only lead to poverty 
and endless misery for the entire population.’
42
 Facing only continued economic, political and 
civil difficulties, by 1989 the National Party had, as Pik Botha noted, ‘run out of 
alternatives.’
43
 White reform and black resistance met in deadlock, and whilst the democratic 
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era was imminent, the period of change was imbued with uncertainty and unrest.
44
  However, 
while February 1990 became the hallmark of democratic change in South Africa, it also 
marked the transition between two interregna in South African politics.  
 
The first interregnum occurred in the intra-party politicking of the National Party. 
Aggravated by the perceptible failure of apartheid, the caucus of the National Party became 
increasingly frustrated with Botha’s ‘deadend politics’ and increasingly arbitrary behaviour.
45
 
On 18 January 1989, Botha suffered a mild stroke and, in a move that shocked the caucus, 
resigned as leader of the National Party.
46
 He decided to remain, however, as the State 
President – splitting the role from the traditional grasp of the party leader – so as to act as ‘a 
special force for cohesion in our country.’
47
 In the resulting squabble for succession, the 
conservative leader of the Transvaal National Party, F. W. de Klerk, scraped a win against the 
verligte Barend du Plessis with 69 votes to 61.
48
 Welsh and Spence have argued that the 
narrow loss of a verligte member was indicative of the general desire for reform.
49
 O’Meara, 
on the other hand, has decried it the result of a ‘poverty of choice’ – du Plessis having been 
regarded as one of South Africa’s worst Ministers of Finance and a ‘veritable Prince of 
Mediocrity’.
50
 Nonetheless, taking on the mantle of National Party leader, de Klerk – who 
had unwaveringly toed the party line, but never been admitted into Botha’s inner circle – 
announced that it was ‘time for a great leap forward.’
51
  
 
The caucus leapt, albeit unwittingly, a year later in February 1990. However, it first endured 
several months of diarchy between the frustrated leader of the National Party, F. W. de Klerk, 
and the volatile State President, P. W. Botha.
52
 The lingering Botha and his grip of the State 
presidency only exacerbated the National Party’s problems. With the September 1989 
election fast approaching and newspapers calling for his resignation, Botha had, as one 
commentator noted, made the extraordinary zoomorphic transformation from the shrewd ‘old 
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crocodile’ into a political ‘albatross’. With the National Party already straining under 
diverging ideas of reform, Botha was ejected from the political arena during a tense cabinet 
meeting on 14 August 1989.
53
 As each of his ministers admitted him unfit for office, Botha’s 
temper flared, insults flew and Botha a resigned embittered.
54
 Although de Klerk was now 
able to consolidate his control, the National Party still faced a number of problems – 
including the political left and right. Although not a cohesive movement, the ‘white right’ 
was bound by racial concern for the preservation and protection of white power and white 
identity.
55
 By the late 1980s, the political right had also made a great leap forward – in the 
polls – garnering the support of nearly half the Afrikaner constituency.
56
 Moreover, by 1990 
more than twenty right-wing paramilitary groups and thirty fundamentalist organisations 
were operating in the country.
57
 The September 1989 election underscored the weakened 
National Party and its fractured constituency, which increasingly seeped into the political 
right and left. Indeed, for the first time since 1958, the once indomitable National Party 
received less than half the votes and lost twenty-seven seats in parliament. The representation 
of the Conservative Party, on the other hand, increased from twenty-two seats to thirty-nine, 
whilst the liberal Democratic Party received twenty per cent of the votes.
58
  
 
The strength of the ‘white right’ continued to vex the National Party during South Africa’s 
tense period of negotiation and transition initiated in February 1990. Indeed, Andries 
Treurnicht’s Conservative Party declared de Klerk’s landmark speech the start of the 
Afrikaners’ ‘Third War of Liberation’. While the Conservative Party turned to politicking 
and decried the National Party as betraying its people and legalising terrorism and 
communism, other paramilitary right-wing groups turned to acts of violence.
59
 In this vein, 
the South African police and military were also a cause of concern for the National Party 
reformists.
60
 Certainly, before 1990 de Klerk had removed much of the institutional power 
that the security forces had enjoyed under P. W. Botha, particularly when it became clear that 
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some highly ranked officials would not hesitate to subvert political change.
61
 Black politics 
were also plagued by difficulties of consensus and control. The African National Congress, 
for example, had long operated as a ‘broad church’ of resistance, and now faced the task of 
integrating the political exiles with the ‘inziles’ who had fought from within the country’s 
borders, as well as the opposing views of its members, which included Stalinists, democratic 
socialists and ‘Christian liberals’.
62
 Meanwhile, having made the promised leap forward, De 
Klerk’s 1990 speech reaped several rewards for the National Party, including the removal of 
sanctions against South Africa which was soon welcomed back into the fold of the global 
West.
63
 
 
In 1990, South Africa moved into the interregnum of ‘talks about talks’. While this period of 
negotiations and conventions eventually resulted in an interim constitution and democratic 
election in April 1994, it was marked by the intensification of both intra- and inter- white and 
black politicking and violence. In May 1990, ‘talks about talks’ between the government and 
the African National Congress commenced, and the Groote Schuur and Pretoria Minutes 
ostensibly committed both parties to a transition marked by peace rather than violence.
64
 
However, change progressed haltingly over the next three years. In 1991, de Klerk opened 
parliament by announcing the dissolution of the last remaining apartheid laws, including the 
Land Act and the Population Registration Act.
65
 Violence, however, was widespread. Some 
elements of the reactionary ‘white right’ turned to terrorism – committing over fifty terrorist 
acts in 1990, while allegations that a ‘Third Force’ in the military-ranks were attempting to 
subvert peace were endemic.
66
 In black townships, Natal and the midlands seethed with the 
violence of ‘people’s courts’ and ‘necklacing’.
67
 Although formal negotiations commenced in 
December 1991, with the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), on-going 
civil unrest strained the harmony between Mandela and de Klerk. Early in the negotiations, 
de Klerk accused the African National Congress of failing to comply with earlier accords and 
end their armed struggle. Mandela rebutted by charging de Klerk as complicit with ‘Third 
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Force’ violence and attempting to undermine the power of the African National Congress.
68
 
Crumbling negotiations were hastened by the Boipotong massacre on 17 June 1992, when a 
crowd of African National Congress supporters were shot in the township of Boipotong.
69
 
The African National Congress suspected the ‘Third Force’, alleging that a network of ‘men 
at the highest levels of the security forces’ were the real culprits behind the widespread black-
on-black violence in South Africa. However no evidence of an organised group has ever been 
uncovered.
70
 Meanwhile, having knocked heads in the deadlocked negotiation, the African 
National Congress sounded a call to action with ‘Mandela’s referendum’, which saw mass 
campaigns and demonstrations ‘to show the government that the real power lay with it on the 
streets.’
71
 
 
Together with an economy struggling under the weight of violence, democratic pressure 
pushed the government to make several concessions. Although de Klerk was regarded as 
having lost this particular battle of wills,
72
 the concessions reinvigorated the negotiation 
process and on 26 September 1992, de Klerk and Mandela signed the Record of 
Understanding.
73
 This, as O’Meara notes, signified the end of the National Party’s attempts to 
outmanoeuvre the African National Congress, and the start of real negotiations.
74
 Meanwhile, 
rising crime rates and violence gave rise to the perception ‘that the government had lost 
control of the country and that the growing anarchy had endangered the future of the white 
community.’
75
 In April 1993, Chris Hani, the secretary-general of the Communist Party was 
assassinated – the group of perpetrators including a former member of the Conservative 
Party. Then in June, negotiators were forced to flee when the some three thousand members 
of the AWB stormed the venue with the rallying cry that ‘we don’t want Kaffirs in here. 
Kaffirs, we are going to shoot you dead today.’
76
 Whilst these events exacerbated tensions, 
this in turn helped the African National Congress attain the agreement that the first 
democratic election be held on 27 April 1994, thereby imposing a rapidly approaching 
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deadline on the negotiations.
77
 Essentially, by November 1993 negotiations had reached 
agreement and the interregnum segued into an interim constitution and peaceful democratic 
election in April 1994.
78
  
 
Essentially, South Africa’s democratic transition was marked by violence and a high level of 
anxiety over the potential outbreak of a bloody civil war. During these two interregna – the 
intra-politicking of the weakening National Party in 1989 and the inter-politicking of the 
negotiation process – white South Africa endured a satanic panic between 1989 and 1993, to 
which this chapter now turns. The moral panic, as this chapter will show, articulated a myriad 
concerns from the dissolution of the communist threat to the decline of white hegemony in 
South Africa. Although, as explored in the previous chapter, there was a global climate of 
fear surrounding the satanic menace, during this period in white South Africa the threat of 
Satanism was articulated almost exclusively in terms of anarchy, rebellion and corruption. 
Indeed, it was alleged that all Satanists endeavoured ‘to bring about complete chaos and 
anarchy’ in South Africa.
79
 The moral panic itself focussed around two closely intertwined 
threats: the ‘New Age’ and devil-worship. As this chapter will now demonstrate the focus 
rested on the white youth as vulnerable yet dangerous and, tellingly, as both victims and 
culprits.  
 
‘The seed of complete anarchy’:
80
 The Devil, the New Age and the Boere Blues  
 
As fears of the satanic menace began to surface in the early months of 1989, so did anxiety 
over the Devil’s modern familiar – that ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’ – the New Age 
movement.
81
 Amidst the growing popularity of the politicised rock music of the Voëlvry 
movement, it appeared that Eastern mysticism, transcendentalism and neo-paganism had 
swept over the geographic and cultural boundaries of white South Africa.
82
 New Age ranks 
were said to range from Satanists to yogis, witches, environmentalists, alien enthusiasts, 
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scientologists, human secularists, Buddhists and Hindus. Whilst its emergence went 
unnoticed by many South Africans,
83
 warning reports sounded from the pages of Church 
newspapers, including those of the Dutch Reformed Church, Die Kerkbode.
84
 Declared a 
danger to children and Christians, particularly the weak and the wavering, the New Age ‘cult’ 
was described as luring the naïve ‘hook, line and karma!’
85
 As the threat of communism 
dissipated, many clergy and laymen believed that South Africa faced a new moral and 
spiritual onslaught in the form of the New Ager, whose aims matched those of the ‘anti-
Christ’: a single world government, economy, culture and religion.
86
 Indeed, the ‘partially 
satanic’ and ‘anti-Christian’ movement was being dispersed around the globe through 
popular culture and a network of ‘front organisations’ which included Greenpeace, The 
Hunger Project, the United Nations’ Unity and Diversity Council, and Amnesty 
International.
87
 In South Africa, New Age organisations were reported to include the 
countercultural End Conscription Campaign and the Voëlvry movement.
88
   
 
Symbolised as much by the rainbow and the yin-yang as by the pentagram and the swastika, 
the New Age had infiltrated popular culture – from the Star Wars movies and Steven 
Spielberg’s ET (1982) to The Smurfs, The Care Bears and Rainbow Bright.
89
 Decried as 
purveyors of the ‘anti-Christ’ by Christians, conservative and charismatic, 1989 saw the New 
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Age ‘heresy’ bemoaned with increasing hostility as a ‘curse’ on white South Africa.
90
 Indeed, 
several companies fell under the suspicion of these moral watchdogs, including Volkskas 
bank and the South African Broadcasting Corporation whose logos were found to smack of 
‘New Age’ influences.
91
 By late 1989, the popular culture enjoyed by South Africa’s white 
youth had come under heavy scrutiny: church ministers played Voëlvry records backwards on 
the premise that they were encoded with satanic messages,
92
 the SABC removed Rainbow 
Bright from its schedule,
93
 and a science fiction society at Stellenbosch University was 
branded guilty of ‘dabbling in the occult.’
94
 While public anxiety intensified with reports of 
devil worship among the youth, hostility towards the New Age resounded in several highly 
publicised campaigns against the occult in South Africa.  
 
On account of widespread public concern, the Publications Board undertook a special 
investigation into the infiltration of occult and New Age symbols on television, particularly 
the entertainment directed towards children. Indeed, some church officials declared that 
‘witches’ and ‘Satan’s forces’ had created these television programmes as part of the 
‘massive onslaught’ on white society.
95
 Consequently, by 1990, popular culture was literally 
undergoing a trial-by-fire. In the Eastern Cape, for example, a child plagued by nightmares 
was cured when his minister burned his possessed toys.
96
 A more public trial was undertaken 
in 1990, with the planned burning of the ‘un-Christian, un-Godly, demonic’ Ninja Turtle toys 
in the small, seaside town of Hermanus.
97
 Decried as ‘Satan’s turtles’,
98
 the public bonfire 
was explained as an initiative to ‘keep South Africa clean.’
99
 The attempt failed, however, 
when the local municipality stepped in at the last moment and insisted that a permit was 
required. The offending toys were buried in cement a few days later.
100
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Meanwhile, the long castigated elements of ‘eastern mysticism and Satanism’
101
 in foreign 
rock music were located in the homespun music of the Voëlvry movement. Overtly anti-
apartheid and anti-establishment, the Voëlvry tour – whose headline act was the 
Gereformeerde Blues Band – was besmirched by several members of the Dutch Reformed 
Church as disseminating ‘satanic and anti-Christian messages.’
102
 Inserting Voëlvry into the 
‘musical onslaught of evil’ initiated by the Beatles and Pink Floyd, an article in Die Kerkbode 
condemned the alternative Afrikaans music as shamelessly attacking ‘the religion and 
constitutional values as given in the word of God.’
103
 Indeed, one particularly adamant 
dominee, Jannie Malan, asserted that the Devil worked through these ‘evil satanic things as 
an assault on the human spirit.’
104
 Malan insisted that the Voëlvry records had been 
insidiously coded with ‘satanic messages’ – one need only play the record backwards. In the 
months that followed churchmen and record producers, and the more self-consciously 
“alternative” youth as well, huddled around record players in an attempt to hear the ‘devil 
inspired messages’.
105
 Charged with ‘blasphemy and undermining the youth of the country’, 
Voëlvry had already been banned from the campuses of several Afrikaans Universities, 
including Potchefstroom and Stellenbosch. Voëlvry tour manager and former journalist, 
Cathy Winter, noted that the official displeasure had actually fuelled the popularity of the 
concerts.
106
 However, the record company took particular umbrage to Malan’s assertions and 
pursued a highly publicised lawsuit against the church moderator and Die Kerkbode in 1989 – 
demanding that Malan prove his claims or apologise.
107
 Malan did neither, but by September 
1991 the case had been dropped.
108
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However, it was the planting of two aluminium ‘peace poles’ in South African soil that 
resulted in the religious showdown between conservative Christians and New Agers. An 
endeavour by the World Peace Through Prayer organisation, over sixty-one thousand ‘peace 
poles’ had been erected in cities across the world, including the Vatican City. Although the 
poles were inscribed with the words ‘may peace prevail’, conservative Christians were 
convinced that they were ‘demonic’ obelisks that sought to revive Babylonian sun worship.
109
 
Indeed, having already condemned the Voëlvry movement, Jannie Malan argued that the 
‘peace poles’ formed part of the misleading disguise employed by the un-Christian New Age 
movement.
110
 Although already denied in Pretoria and Johannesburg, large because of 
complaints by the Conservative Party, two ‘peace poles’ were erected in the Cape Town 
area.
111
 Declaring them an ‘evil’ imbued with the potential to bring ‘damnation down on the 
city’,
112
 over a thousand Christians, armed with prayer and gospel songs, marched against the 
‘demonic poles’.
113
 Soon the mayor of Cape Town, Gordon Oliver, became ensnared in the 
protest when he was accused of taking part both pagan sun worship and midnight rituals atop 
Table Mountain, where one of the ‘peace poles’ was planted.
114
 The protest gained Oliver the 
epithet of an eccentric, the ‘bridge-building’ mayor having asserted ‘the “Berlin Wall” is 
coming down in our hearts and in our city.’
115
 However, protesting Christian groups did not 
agree, and by early 1990 a petition against the ‘peace poles’ had attracted two thousand 
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signatures.
116
 More sinisterly, or perhaps ironically, some New Agers reportedly received 
death threats and another’s dog was killed.
117
 After petitions and lobbies failed to remove the 
poles,
118
 frustrated Christians hacked them down.
119
 
 
The peace poles debacle was highly publicised and garnered reactions ranging from 
incredulity to irritation, as well as a public rebuke by the archbishop Desmond Tutu.
120
 
However, as one columnist scoffed, ‘if there is one word that alerts the moral watchdogs of 
the nation, it is peace.’
121
 Occurring in an election year, the protest also gained the attention 
of the Conservative Party, who took the opportunity to lambaste the National Party for failing 
to combat the intrusion of the New Age. Indeed, the incident was used to declare that the 
National Party actually supported the ‘satanic sects’ of the New Age movement.
122
 Similar 
assessments were made in ‘veld schools’ – a school trip and ‘rite of passage for white youths’ 
during which they were taught to love nature and fear communists and the black majority.
123
 
In early 1989, a child recently returned from ‘veld school’ told the press that they had been 
taught about the encroaching threats of Satanism and Communism, that the African National 
Congress was un-Christian and that ‘the devil could take us over’. Moreover, the only 
political parties that stood in a positive light were the Conservative Party and the AWB.
124
 
More specifically, however, the ‘peace poles’ protest disseminated concerns about the New 
Age and its links with Satanism. Indeed, convinced that the New Age movement was 
encroaching on the moral territory of Christianity, alarmist reports asserted that modern 
South African society was regressing. Morally, the country was becoming Babylon – ‘a word 
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that has become synonymous with evil, corruption and sexual licentiousness.’
125
 If white 
society was returning to Babylon, the cause lay partly in the fact that its children worshipped 
at the altar of Mammon. Indeed, one Afrikaner columnist questioned whether the New Age 
was in fact preferable to the materialism of the modern Afrikaner.
126
  
 
Rising hostility, and media attention, towards the New Age also amplified fears of Satanism – 
the niche of devil worship into which the broad assortment of ‘New Age’ activities were 
inserted. Indeed, New Agers came ‘with satanic and demonic things’,
127
 including the 
promulgation of androgyny, mysticism, globalisation and holism.
128
 Anxieties over the New 
Age and devil worship were magnified by, and in turn accentuated, growing concern over 
white morality in general. Certainly, a survey conducted in 1990 showed that white attitudes 
towards morality had become more conservative than they had been ten years before.
129
 In 
1991, nearly a thousand churchmen gathered behind a document that warned of the 
‘catastrophic consequences’ that would result from the continued degeneration of white 
morality in South Africa. Immorality, high divorce rates, homosexuality and lesbianism, as 
well as the uncensored violence on South African television were denoted as ‘factors 
promoting the general decay of the moral fibre of our society.’
130
 While hostility towards the 
New Age movement was largely debated in the Afrikaans press and directed by conservative 
church officials, more widespread fears about the flourishing of Satanism erupted from 
rumour and sensationalist reports, both English and Afrikaans, across the country. 
 
A game called ‘anarchy’:
131
 The Devil and the corruption of South Africa 
 
Sensational and macabre, reports of the Devil and his children entered widespread circulation 
in 1989. Over the next four years, waves of reports across the country gravitated around 
similar elements of dark debauchery and sinful sedition by a clandestine cult of devil 
worshippers. Satanic conscripts in the South African Defence Force had been caught 
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‘committing obscene acts’, whilst a gang of drug-addicted teenage delinquents prone to 
spray-painting satanic graffiti (including a picture of the grim reaper) had reportedly named 
themselves the Kids in Satan’s Service (KISS).
132
 Dark rituals and perverse sexual orgies 
were rumoured to have occurred on beaches and in graveyards, attended by children and 
adults chained to the cult by drug addiction, fear, and blackmail.
133
 Satanists had reportedly 
threatened investigators and church officials with ‘coded letters’ of ‘filth’, the word ‘hell’ had 
been scratched into a churchgoer’s car, and a confused teenager had been found with a 
revolver they had no memory of.
134
 Tales became increasingly obscene as time passed: 
human sacrifice was common, cannibalism was rife, blood writ curses had been cast and 
demons summoned.
135
 The Devil demanded absolute subservience from his followers. One 
sect allegedly required that its members be homosexual, a Cape Town cell made regular use 
of a male teenage prostitute for anal sex, while another directed its attentions towards the 
desecration of churches. All Satanists busied themselves ‘preying on children,’
136
 indeed one 
outspoken police officer insisted that ‘Satanists don’t play gold on a Saturday. They kill 
children.’
137
 By the turn of the decade Satanism was declared the ‘crime of the 1990s’
138
 and 
was believed to have an intricate network of satanic cells hidden behind the ‘fanatical cover 
of secrecy.’
139
 Self-confessed Satanists, albeit from behind the cover of anonymity, stroked 
the curiosity of the press with tales of grisly rituals, coffin fetishes and blood drinking that 
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served to accentuate the dangers of the Satanic cult and its members. As one such Satanist 
admitted, ‘I have eaten the heart of a Christian many times – it’s like eating lamb. It gives us 
the power of the ultimate desecration.
140
 Articulated in terms of perversion and anarchy, 
Satanism was ‘spreading like a cancerous fire through our country.’
141
 Most vulnerable of all 
were South Africa’s white youth. Indeed, the first sign of the Devil’s grip was youthful 
rebellion.
142
  
  
Indeed, rumours of drug-doused parties dominated earlier reports of devil-worship, arousing 
debate over music and television as ‘tools of the devil’ rather than the reality of satanic 
worship itself.
143
 Satan’s influence, like that of the New Age, was perceived as festering in 
the materialism of modern South Africa and disseminated by popular culture.
144
 Such 
concern over a dissident youth and the deviant elements of popular culture merged in the 
trope of the ‘Satanic dabbler’ – the naive teenager teetering on the edge of the dangerous 
occult. These ‘dabblers’ tended to have posters of rock stars in their rooms, blaspheme with 
reckless abandon, have an obsession with the colour black, dye their hair, and were allegedly 
compelled to lose their virginity after watching occult films like The Exorcist (1973).
145
 By 
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1993, concern over ‘Satanic dabblers’ – or ‘CNA Satanists’ – had led to the condemnation of 
black clothing, Dungeons and Dragons, and Stephen King novels.
146
 This image of the white 
child corrupted by Satanism was typified by the oft repeated, and distorted, story of the ‘all-
black house’ in Eastern Province newspapers. Believed to be a satanic lair, the black-walled 
house’s devilish decor included a swastika, a pentagram, black candles and figurines of 
Egyptian gods. Raided by police, the lead detective and self-styled expert in the occult, 
Kobus Jonker, claimed to have discovered still more grisly evidence of the occult: a picture 
of a suicidal teenager in hospital after slashing her wrists, a cassette tape with the Lord’s 
Prayer written backwards, and a sixteen (or sometimes ten) year old girl who had ‘sold her 
soul to the devil’.
147
  
 
Lured into the devil’s grasp, children were forced to partake in bloody rituals, entice their 
friends into the cult, and distance themselves from those who might help. Speaking out 
against Satanism in the country, the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok deemed it ‘a 
crime against mankind.’ Indeed, Vlok continued, ‘[o]nce someone is entangled in this 
horrible web of agony, fear and violence, there is no escape.’
148
 Children embedded in 
Satan’s web were allegedly drugged, sexually assaulted and forced to take part in devilish 
rituals that included sodomy, bestiality and cannibalism. Corrupted and perverted, rebellious 
satanic children were themselves victims of Satanism. Indeed, ‘beautiful girls become pale, 
their eyes are sunken and they become filled with hate.’
149
 As one ‘saved’ Satanist admitted, 
‘[t]hey named me Sex Demon and the boys in the coven were allowed to do whatever they 
wanted with me. They did everything.’
150
 Consequently, suicide and Satanism were closely 
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associated. As one reverend of warned: ‘[m]any children are absolutely overcome with fear 
and are contemplating suicide because they are being brainwashed by Satanists into believing 
that once they are in, they can never turn around.’
151
  
 
Amplifying the general anxiety regarding the moral resolve of the youth, a key concern 
revolved around the type of social environment that was allowing Satanism to flourish. 
Pornography, paedophilia, drug addiction and venereal diseases were linked to Satanism, so 
were abortion were homosexuality, rock music and television. Already occupying the liminal 
space between the innocence of childhood and the culpability of adulthood, teenagers were 
perceived as particularly vulnerable to corruption.
152
 While children from broken homes were 
deemed especially vulnerable to satanic influences, it was those children prone to rebellion 
who were at particular risk to this social threat. As the head of the Police Child Protection 
Unit in Cape Town, Leonard Solms, claimed, it was children who played the ‘anarchy’ game 
that were the easiest targets for Satanists.
153
 However, ‘[w]hat is deeply disturbing,’ one 
reverend noted, ‘are the number of unscrupulous people who prey on the young and ritually 
abuse them.’
154
 Essentially, rebellious satanic children taking part in rituals and committing 
obscene acts were themselves victims of Satanism. Hostility towards Satanism thus gravitated 
around the image of vulnerable and corrupted children who now posed a threat to the health 
of white society on the one hand, and the manipulative satanic adults who perverted children 
and morality on the other. Indeed, according to reports, it was the adult high priest who led 
the sacrificial rituals, who slit the throats of squalling white babies, who blackmailed the 
young members, and who knelt upon bended knee to pray for the downfall of South Africa.
155
 
Furthermore, these adults allegedly occupied positions of power and influence. As the oft 
recited claim of one anonymous Satanist read: ‘[m]y high priest is a man of standing and is 
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known countrywide. If his identity was revealed it would shock the whole country. People 
from all professions – doctors, lawyers, teachers and housewives – are Satanists.’
156
   
 
Consequently, increasingly alarmed calls were made for the government to outlaw devil 
worship and tear away the ‘sinister veil of secrecy’.
157
 Such hostility became increasingly 
urgent as tales of the devil’s minions claimed that ‘schoolchildren have become the main 
target for Satanists who use various tactics to draw them into their net of evil.’
158
 As a result 
of demands for ‘this evil must be rooted out at any cost’,
159
 an official police investigation 
was launched into the ‘diabolical phenomenon’.
160
 Various organisations, societies, public 
figures and self-claimed experts had responded to, and shaped, this growing fear and hostility 
towards the satanic menace. In 1989, several organisations across South Africa, including the 
Transvaal Afrikaans Parents Association and the Concerned Christian Women in the Eastern 
Cape, became convinced that Satanism was rife in schools across the country – and the press 
followed suit.
161
 Indeed, by August that year, the Minister of Education and Culture, P. J. 
Clase, was prompted to reaffirm the department’s determination to protect children from 
‘anti-Christian behaviour’ and instil sound moral values in the youth.
162
 Similar sentiments 
about the welfare of the youth and South African morality were expressed by the Health and 
Welfare Minister, C. J. April, when he asserted that decadent values and sick sexual practices 
in South African society were undermining the development of the youth.
163
 Likewise, Rina 
Venter, the Minister of National Health, noted that the ascendance of Satanism was a cause of 
‘grave concern’ and closely associated with the problems of drug and alcohol abuse among 
teenagers.
164
 In response to widespread public concern, the Department of Education 
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launched an official investigation into the issues facing white South Africa’s youth, and the 
extent to which the occult had infiltrated children’s literature.
165
 A number of societies had 
also evolved to tackle the emergent social problem of Satanism, including the Concerned 
Christians Against Satanism, Folks Against Drug Abuse and the Parents of Rebellious 
Children Support Group.
166
 As the latter asserted, Satanism ‘is often regarded as a closet 
problem by parents enduring great anguish and heartache; there is no question that thousands 
are in a state of great trauma.’
167
 However, reports of satanic activities, indeed conspiracies, 
were dismissed as ‘pure speculation’ by official police investigations, which could yield 
nothing to substantiate claims of devil worship in the country.
168
 Likewise, an academic 
symposium on the subject noted that ‘on the available evidence, as opposed to hysteria, the 
current wave of concern with Satanism among certain schools and churches is out of all 
proportion to the problem.’
169
  
 
Fear and hostility towards Satanism climaxed, but did not dissipate, in 1991 with what was 
soon dubbed a case of ‘national hysteria’. As rumours and reports continued to circulate, 
hundreds of South African parents were moved to almost hysterical concern in the days 
leading up to the end of April 1991. With increasing intensity it was reported that the children 
of Lucifer were on the prowl, hunting for victims to place upon their sacrificial altars. 
Walpurgis Night – the Witches’ Sabbath – was approaching and come midnight, when April 
turned to May, the blood of their quarry would be spilled.
170
 By 1991, it was well established 
that the Devil and his ilk wanted children. He wanted to take them, pervert them, and 
consume them – and he was using white South Africans to do it. Children were purportedly 
receiving phone calls from strangers who invited them to deserted areas, a suspicious white 
                                                 
165
 See Administration: House of Assembly, Care For Our Youth 2000 (Pretoria: Department of Education and 
Culture, c. 1990); Administration: House of Assembly, Satanism and Occultism: section 1 – Guide for 
Principals and Teachers (Pretoria: Transvaal Education Department, 1992) and Administration: House of 
Assembly, Report of the Committee Investigating Satanism and Occultism in Children’s Literature – Guidelines 
for Language Teachers (Pretoria: Transvaal Education Department, 1992). 
166
 ‘War on Satan: Expose it! Stop it! Christians launch crusade to help those caught in devil’s web’, Sunday 
Tribune, 10 June 1990, 2; ‘Satan worship shock’, The Leader, 15 June 1990, 1; ‘Rina Venter hits out at drug 
abuse and Satanism’, The Daily News, 31 October 1990, 3 and C. King, ‘Parent help group goes nationwide’, 
The Cape Times, 6 October 1990, 20.  
167
 Quoted in C. King, ‘Parent help group goes nationwide’, The Cape Times, 6 October 1990, 20.  
168
 ‘Police dismiss talk of Satanism’, The Natal Witness, 9 August 1990, 3; ‘Police probe Satanism’, The Cape 
Times, 22 August 1990, 3 and C. Kotze and M. Nicolson, ‘Police can’t confirm “Satanist grave sites” report’, 
The Star, 22 August 1990, 2.   
169
 S. Coan, ‘Satanism: looking beyond the sensationalism and hysteria’, The Natal Witness, 1 November 1990, 
9. 
170
 Walpurgis Night (Walpurgisnacht), also known as the Witches Sabbath or the Satanic New Year, is believed 
to be a special night for witches on 30 April (the eve of May) on which they gather to dance, perform rituals and 
have orgiastic sex.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
 113
minivan had been spotted trolling the streets of various residential areas and school districts, 
and rumours of missing school children were rife.
171
  
 
Although newspapers had reported that Satanism was a predominantly white problem, in 
1991 racial lines limited neither the rumours nor the fear.
172
 In Port Elizabeth, a pupil of 
Malabar Primary School claimed to have been chased by a white minivan with the words 
‘happy birthday children’ printed on the side, as did two teenage girls from the white suburb 
of Forest Hill. A similar story was told by a Gelvandale student, who reported that he was 
lured to the bus by a white man and woman who then tried to abduct him. He explained that 
his school shirt had been torn when he managed to fight off his abductors, during which he 
also knocked the wig off the woman’s head to reveal a man in drag.
173
 Such stories also 
circulated in the Cape Town area. With the rumoured sightings of a white ‘bakkie’ and black 
car trailing children around the Bellville area rife, a number of parents requested that sport 
and after school activities be cancelled over the ‘Satanic Holiday’. By the end of April, police 
departments, newspaper offices, and school principals were inundated with phone calls 
seeking reassurance or confirmation of rumours, as well as purported sightings of Satanists 
kidnapping and abusing children at local malls.
174
 Heightened concern and anxiety became 
hysteria. In northern Port Elizabeth, parents – armed with knives and grim determination – 
stormed school halls and removed their children from their classrooms. In several areas, 
coalitions of parents and plainclothes police officers patrolled the streets, vigilant for any sign 
of suspicious behaviour.
175
 Several schools in the Western Cape kept students locked safely 
behind school gates and, like schools in East London, advised children to travel in large 
groups.
176
 Throughout the country schools reported exceptionally low attendance rates with 
hundreds of children kept at home.
177
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April ended, the first day of May passed and a ‘bemused calm’ replaced the anxiety.
178
 
Warnings from individual police and state officers grew silent. Action from police 
headquarters in Pretoria had been quick: a ‘gag order’ placed on police officers that had been 
speaking to the press and exacerbating concern over alleged satanic activities. Police 
spokesmen categorically stated that no evidence had been found to substantiate the claims of 
child abduction and satanic activity.
179
 Indeed, the Gelvandale kidnap proved particularly 
fallacious when it was discovered that the boy had torn his shirt stealing guavas from a 
nearby neighbourhood.
180
 As such, it was with some sober retrospect that newspapers could 
report only a curious incident of national hysteria in South Africa.
181
 
 
 ‘The Hound of God’: The Devil and the Detective  
 
Allegations of the children of Lucifer continued to flourish in newspapers across South 
Africa, although they were momentarily stilled by the gagging of outspoken ‘cult cops’ 
Leonard Solms in Cape Town and Kobus Jonker in the Eastern Cape. In lieu of this ‘gag 
order’, Solms nonchalantly rebutted that he would continue his investigation in his spare time 
where ‘no-one can point a finger at me.’
182
 However, while the gagging eclipsed the figure of 
Solms, and earmarked him as the Satanist ‘fundi’, it marked the ascendance of Jonker’s 
career as ‘God’s detective’.
183
 Several months after the anti-climactic Walpurgis Night of 
1991, Jonker and his officers finally found some evidence of Satanism in South Africa, albeit 
in the form of teenage satanic dabblers, a few condoms and a dagga pipe.
184
 More substantial 
proof came just a few months later when the ‘initiation headquarters of the Satanist 
movement in the Eastern Cape’ were found in the undercarriage of the Van Staden’s bridge 
near Port Elizabeth. In addition to a black wooden cross nailed to the wall and pentagram 
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painted on the floor, the satanic lair was announced by the words ‘Satan is lord’ and ‘Shut up 
and suffer’ spray-painted in red, to symbolise blood.
185
 Similar findings were soon reported 
elsewhere. A ‘Satanic den’ in Johannesburg was discovered in the skeleton of an old 
mansion, partially burnt and demolished, where handprints of red paint ‘had been dragged 
down the wall in a silent scream.’ The word ‘Natasha’ had also been spray painted which, 
Jonker explained, was ‘Satan’ written backwards.
186
 In Durban, a ‘filthy’ satanic hideout was 
found in a rundown house frequented by drug addicts. It too was besmeared with red satanic 
graffiti – a picture of a devil and a thorn-crowned Jesus, as well as the names of several 
heavy metal groups.
187
 The abilities of Jonker, or ‘Colonel Ghostbuster’, to combat Satanism 
were also signified, reports suggested, by the alleged endeavours of Satanists to curse the 
police detective. As a target he was ‘a real favourite’ for spells that required the beheading or 
skinning of animals, but had allegedly received numerous verbal death threats.
188
 Such 
publicised successes together with on-going concern over Satanism eventually led to the 
creation of the Occult Related Crimes Unit in the South African Police force, necessitating 
Jonker’s move from the Eastern Cape to Pretoria where he headed the small unit. From here, 
Jonker enjoyed a government-sanctioned platform from which to launch awareness 
campaigns involving public talks, educational seminars at schools, and the distribution of 
pamphlets regarding the dangers of Satanism.
189
  
 
Apprehension over the Devil’s purchase on white South Africa’s morality and children 
gradually subsided towards the end of 1993. In the miasma of public scrutiny for all signs of 
the devil, several companies tread carefully: the Shell petrol company removed ‘glider balls’ 
from their shelves when the promotional toy eyeball was deemed too satanic for children, 
while broadcasters were forced to monitor programmes for ‘satanic’ symbols like the yin-
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yang sign.
190
 Meanwhile, echoes of the same alarm over Satanism among school children 
continued to reverberate around the country, particularly the Cape and the Transvaal,
191
 while 
another Afrikaner music group was slammed for being lascivious and satanic.
192
 Having 
erupted in 1989, satanic-related panic had receded by the end of 1993. Although the church 
and moral entrepreneurs would continue to fight the Devil and his influences, they did so 
with considerably less attention from the South African public and the state.  
 
The Unholy Trinity: Interpreting the Moral Panic, 1989 – 1993 
 
Marking a period of moral panic in white South Africa, between 1989 and 1993 the Devil 
accrued a considerable amount of public attention and concern. Indeed, continued calls to 
guard against the intertwined threats of Satanism and the New Age movement saw many 
white South Africans declare war against the Devil and his followers. Although regularly 
disputed and denied,
193
 distorted and exaggerated tales of Devil’s influence in South Africa 
caused considerable agitation and debate which resulted in the creation of several societies, 
reports, protests and eventually a specialised police task force. Occurring in waves of reports 
and rumour, this moral panic also engendered a powerful folk devil in the threat of the white 
Satanist. A polymorphous figure, the Satanic deviant straddled the image of the teenager 
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trapped in drug addiction and sexual perversion, the vulnerable child twisted as much by the 
influences of popular culture as by the satanic predator, and the Satanic adult who silently 
directed the secret movement. Intertwined with this threat, particularly where the allegedly 
deviant qualities of popular culture were concerned, hostility towards the New Age 
movement was amplified by general alarm over Satanism and the perceived degeneration of 
social morality. Indeed, this folk devil subsumed a large portion of the blame for the shifting 
cultural terrain in drawing attention to immediate social problems like drug abuse, divorce 
and suicide. After all, in addition to undermining law and order in general, Satanists 
reportedly prayed for the financial ruin and breakdown of marriages of white South 
Africans.
194
 Here, journalist Arthur Goldstuck made an important point, albeit with some 
hindsight, when he noted that ‘backed by the flimsiest of evidence, the police and the media 
have transformed Satanists from a fringe group of occult dabblers and sexual perverts into a 
powerful threat to the white way of life.’
195
 This ‘powerful threat’ reflected more than the 
overt and tangible changes in youth culture and family structure. Heterogeneous and uneven, 
the moral panic explored in this chapter also articulated a myriad of concerns regarding the 
current and future health of white society and broadly reflected changes in the arena of 
political rhetoric. 
 
Anxiety over the threat potential of the New Age movement voiced concern over the 
initiative of ‘peace’, and more broadly the cost at which it came. Hostility towards New 
Agers – and all those linked to the depiction of the movement as insidious and ‘partially 
satanic’ – largely reflected fears of conservative and charismatic Christians regarding 
coalescing religious and cultural boundaries. However, the narrative of the New Age threat, 
often referred to as ‘NAM’, was raised predominantly by Afrikaners in Afrikaans newspapers 
and articulated various fears regarding cultural change. While raising long held concerns 
about the growing materialism of modern South African society and wariness towards the 
influences of modern culture, the vehemence with which the New Age was opposed also 
underscored concerns about fracturing cultural solidarity. While the Voëlvry movement and 
End Conscription Campaign signalled broadening generational and ideological cracks in the 
edifice of ‘Afrikanerdom’, this counterculture’s ‘NAM’ also served to funnel anxieties over 
these cultural shifts.  
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 Vlok and Volk 
 
More broadly, however, the New Age movement was repeatedly alleged to be working on 
behalf of the ‘anti-Christ’ to create a single world religion and culture. Ascending with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the evolution of the ‘holism peril’ in South Africa saw the 
characteristics of the dying volk devil of communism shifted onto the threat of the New Age 
and devil worship.
196
 Indeed, the calls to ban devil worship in South Africa were couched in 
terms of ‘destructive freedom’ and coincided with the legalisation of both communism and 
the African National Congress.
197
 In June 1990, the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan 
Vlok, successfully merged circulating fears when he asserted that the unholy trinity of drugs, 
Satanism and communism threatened South Africa’s children – the precious ‘building blocks 
of the new South Africa.’
198
 Here Vlok also typified some of the contradictions the arena of 
daily politicking during South Africa’s political transition. In reassuring the public that the 
government did not condone Satanism even though it was legal, Vlok noted ‘[t]oday there is 
the false perception by some people that the Government now condones Communism in 
South Africa, because it is no longer banned.’
199
 Whilst carrying long held fears over the 
borders of political and cultural change, the satanic menace also reflected considerable 
unease about the government and the right-wing.  
 
Echoing the rhetoric around the alleged ‘Third Force’ which threatened to plunge South 
Africa into bloody civil war as well as verkrampte claims that the National Party had 
betrayed its people, the satanic menace had allegedly infiltrated positions of power in South 
Africa.
200
 Amid calls for the government to take action, one newspaper noted ‘[i]t is time the 
issue was given attention at top level. The sinister veil of secrecy over the movement’s 
activities must formally be lifted and its ringleaders exposed, especially if – as has been 
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claimed – there are among them people in key positions in our community.’
201
 In contrast to 
the moral panic between 1978 and 1982, discussed in Chapter Three, these claims went 
relatively uncontested. Indeed, unlike the Paarl clergyman who dared repeat the rumour that 
members of the National Party might be Satanists, no tide of indignation resulted from the 
widespread rumours that influential public and community leaders were doing the Devil’s 
work.
202
 These rumours not only went unchallenged, they were corroborated in the similar 
statements made by public officials, including those of Vlok. Such claims were also made 
about the South African Defence Force, the mainstay of white South African masculine 
strength, and more specifically the visible power of the white government.
203
 As tales of 
Satanism infiltrating schools spread, so did rumours of devil worship in the military. Fears 
that servicemen were participating in such devilish behaviour were sparked in 1988 with 
reports of animal cruelty in the SADF camps, and again in 1989.
204
 Such fears underwent the 
same amplification as those over devilish behaviour among a rebellious, but vulnerable, 
youth. Indeed, by mid-1991 it was reported that ‘national servicemen have become 
unashamed about Satanism and actively try recruit members.’
205
 Moreover, while the 
verkrampte Conservative Party certainly strategically reaped the benefits of the moral panic 
by blaming the National Party, at times the right-wing was linked to the satanic menace. The 
swastika was shown as a satanic symbol, while some self-confessed Satanists alleged that 
they had been members of a right-wing organisation before joining a satanic cult.
206
 It was 
also alleged that Satanists were responsible for township violence, supplying black 
‘witchdoctors’ with guns in exchange for the babies and organs needed for their sacrifices. 
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After all, the aim of all Satanists was engender the ‘complete chaos and anarchy’ that would 
cripple white South Africa.
207
  
 
Essentially, sites of white hegemony were portrayed as both vulnerable to deviant influences, 
but also as perpetuating and disseminating these detrimental practices. More specifically, the 
segments charged with protecting and maintaining white South African values had been 
inverted – now facilitating the secretive cult of Satanists whose mission was to subvert and 
destroy society. Reflecting this widespread implicit loss of confidence in the South African 
State, the tales of child sacrifice in themselves symbolically articulated feelings of 
uncertainty in white South Africa. White children, the very future of white South African 
society, were being consumed by power-hungry white Satanists, or perverted by the deviant 
desires of the satanic cult.
208
 These feelings were also underscored by the repeated calls for 
the government to take action against the threat, as well as to limit ‘destructive freedom’ by 
banning Satanism. Such calls were never answered and the official position was never 
entirely clear: some public officials condemned Satanism outright, whilst others dismissed 
the notion as little more than a flight of fancy. Thus, by directing Satanism to the sites of 
white hegemony in South Africa, the discourse of the moral panic brought to the surface 
feelings of insecurity in white South Africa through the image of the white child as a victim 
of a pervasive social evil and as potential purveyor of evil, as well as the loss of faith in the 
apartheid government.    
 
Conclusion  
 
In the interregnum between the death of apartheid and the first breath of democracy in April 
1994, South Africans experienced a ream of anxieties and hopes for the ‘new South Africa’. 
Whilst various anxieties and desires played out in the political arena and the widespread 
violence in the country, this interregnum was also privy to the particularly morbid symptom 
of a satanic panic in white South Africa. Occurring with Botha’s stroke and the ensuing 
diarchy within the National Party and ending with interim constitution born from months of 
tense negotiations in 1993, this moral panic subsumed a variety of fears within a rapidly 
changing South Africa. As this chapter has shown, the constructed folk devil of Satanism, 
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and the emergent volk devil of the ‘holism peril’, served to vilify and funnel a variety of 
anxieties.  
 
There were strata of meaning in this moral panic over Satanism, 1989 – 1993. One layer 
involved the more explicit concerns regarding social change, observable in the convergence 
of certain types of behaviours and activities with the satanic threat. Certainly concerns about 
the potential effects of foreign influences were merged with those over white cultural 
fragmentation, of which the Voëlvry movement was deemed a particular threat. Other 
immediate concerns were similarly intensified through convergence with Satanism, including 
drug abuse, homosexuality and suicide. The closely associated ‘New Age’ movement was 
also besmirched by fears over Satanism, but also proved particularly absorptive of the 
attributes once ascribed to communism. This evolving volk devil, limited mostly to Afrikaans 
newspapers and commentators, also articulated concerns over the strength and permeability 
of cultural borders in a changing South Africa. Encompassed by the folk devil of Satanism, 
anxieties about the influences of the New Age movement from abroad and devil worship 
from within gravitated around the image of the white youth. Such expressions also 
underscored a loss of confidence in the general public – particularly in those institutions that 
were supposed to protect and maintain (white) ‘cultural values’. Thus, in a second, subtler 
layer involving the location of the satanic threat, sites of white hegemony were perceived as 
weak and corrupted.  
 
The articulation of these concerns expressed both immediate anxieties of social change as 
well as more widespread fears of uncertainty regarding the future of white society or the 
ability, and indeed, motives of the government and other cultural guardians to ensure that 
future. These fears did not only express themselves in terms of Satanism and the insidious 
deeds its followers were rumoured to perpetrate, nor was this particular folk devil all-
encompassing. Rather, these fears regarding the rise of satanic activity and influence – which 
occurred across the global West – served as a scapegoat: a horrific and emotive threat 
through which localized anxieties over social change, powerlessness and insecurity could be 
funnelled.   
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Chapter Six:   
Volk, Devils and Moral Panics 
 
 
Although never entirely eclipsed from the news, by the end of 1993 the Devil and his 
underlings had receded in the public imagination of white South Africa. As the country 
moved towards the first democratic election in April 1994, the communal alarm over the 
perceived satanic onslaught subsided despite the continued allegations by the police and press 
that Satanism was a problem. Indeed, parents were chided for overreacting and officials for 
inciting a witch-hunt.
1
 The growing optimism of the emergent Rainbow Nation even inflected 
some tales of the Devil’s children: ‘reborn Satanists’ advocated a ‘gentler’ form of devil 
worship that required no rape, murder or animal cruelty.
2
 The satanic panic faded from public 
memory, but remnants survived in urban legend and the Occult Related Crimes Unit. The 
Devil still lurked in a few places.  
 
Dubbed ‘Satan’s bridge’, the Devil is still thought to linger on the Van Staden’s bridge 
outside of Port Elizabeth. Once the lair of ‘satanic dabblers’, the Devil himself is believed to 
coax the suicidal over the bridge’s edge.
3
 The desecration of gravestones and churches, 
graffiti and some petty vandalism is still blamed on ‘satanic dabblers’,
4
 while pet owners are 
often urged to keep their black cats indoors over the ‘satanic’ night of Halloween.
5
 Self-
proclaimed Satanists continue to offer their testimony to the congregations of the church and 
the press. A convicted murderer reportedly wanted to testify at the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in exchange for his freedom, claiming to have trafficked children under the 
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apartheid regime as part of a satanic conspiracy by the secret police.
6
 Other criminals have 
implicated the Devil in their deeds. In 1995, for example, the ‘Ripper Rapist’, Frans du Toit, 
blamed his crimes on the insatiable ‘satanic demon’ inside him and underwent a highly 
publicised exorcism to prove it. Having confessed to raping three women, the last of whom 
survived multiple stab wounds and having her throat slit, the trial of the ‘Ripper Rapist’ gave 
pause to this ‘demon defence’. With a defendant blaming Satan, the court called in ‘God’s 
Detective’, Kobus Jonker.
7
 Having emerged from the satanic panic as South Africa’s most 
well known expert on the occult, Jonker exonerated the Devil from this particular crime 
spree. He argued that true demon possession would have left no memory of the crime, that 
Satan’s spawn was incapable of planning ahead, and that ‘demons don’t use condoms.’
8
   
 
Waging a government-sanctioned war against the Devil throughout the 1990s, the Occult 
Related Crimes Unit was the most durable relic of the satanic panic. Although an array of 
crimes ranging from those linked to esotericism and mysticism to ‘muti’ murder and witch 
purging have fallen under the broad banner of ‘occult related crime’, this specialised Occult 
Unit was primarily involved in combatting Satanism. As Petrus has noted, the emphasis of 
the educational ‘occult-related crime’ literature dispersed to police officers detailed various 
satanic memorabilia and warning signs of satanic involvement in children.
9
 Throughout the 
1990s the ‘Hound of God’ and his cult cops continued to warn against the satanic onslaught 
through articles, seminars, workshops and public talks.
10
 In addition to the Devil, however, 
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the Occult Related Crimes Unit also had to fight both waning public interest and statistics: 
only four of the 18 312 murders in South Africa during 1994 were related to Satanism, and 
between 1992 and 1998 the Unit made only 240 arrests.
11
   
 
The declaration of police during the heyday of the satanic panics that Satanism was the 
‘crime of the 1990s’
12
 proved prophetic: the last remnant of the satanic panic in white South 
Africa dissipated with the disbanding of the Occult Related Crimes Unit during the 
reorganisation of the police detective service in 2001.
13
 Although the Unit was officially 
closed down, a more muted, less high profile body of ‘occult crimes’ police detectives still 
functions in the South African Police Services, and is based in Pretoria. They still perform 
awareness campaigns in schools and say that their attention is half directed towards Satanism 
and half towards witchcraft.
14
 That same year, and the opening vignette of this thesis, the 
torso of a small African child was found floating in London’s River Thames, and was 
immediately deemed a victim of African witchcraft. In a case that came to express the fears 
and preconceptions about the ‘dangers’ of African cultural beliefs and African immigrants in 
the United Kingdom, the Case of Adam was shaped by vocabulary and expertise entrenched 
in the transnational, Eurocentric Satanism Scare of the 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, it saw 
the return of the term ‘ritual abuse’ to the mass media, and ‘ritual abuse’ experts like Valerie 
Sinason and ‘cult cop’ Jonker to the public stage. Underscoring the aggregated understanding 
of the ‘occult’, Jonker’s career had furnished a collection of ‘occult items’ from tribal masks 
to pin-stabbed dolls. Only recently have academics and professionals begun to advocate the 
need for a clearer distinctions between conceptualisations of African and European 
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formulations of the ‘occult’.
15
 Steeped in European preconceptions, the Case of Adam 
accentuated, albeit unwittingly, the problem of the term ‘occult’. Indeed, the interchanging 
terminology of the Case of Adam as a victim of ‘muti’, ‘voodoo’, ‘witchcraft’ and ‘ritual 
abuse’ underscores the difficulties of the aggregated occult in studying the multifarious 
beliefs in Africa.
16
  
 
However, as this thesis has shown, this problem of the ‘aggregated occult’ is also present in 
the Satanism of white South Africa. While linked to the global Satanism Scare that 
reverberated across the global West during the 1980s and 1990s, the satanic panic was not 
simply imported into the South African imagination. The objective existence of Satanism in 
South Africa and its local cadence and timbre is a relatively unexplored aspect of the South 
African occult in academia, swept aside by the more tangible and pressing issues of ‘muti’ 
and witchcraft in post-apartheid South Africa. Between 1991 and 1997, for example, there 
were over three hundred witchcraft murders in the Northern Province, 215 of which occurred 
in 1994.
17
 However, the Devil and his followers have journeyed beyond the tabloid media: 
emerging as a defence in trials, forming an integral aspect of Christian identity, and also 
shaping police procedure in the first years of the democratic South Africa. Existing in the 
arenas of the discursive and the objective, the spiritual and the criminal, Satanism provides an 
analytical intersection of class, race and gender in the cultural landscapes of South Africa. 
This thesis has raised many questions which warrant further academic attention, one of which 
is an ethnographic study of the Occult Related Crimes Unit itself, especially through a close 
reading of the internal police magazine Servamus. This thesis has focused on that which the 
Occult Related Crimes Unit sought to attack, but that which it sought to defend is important 
too: the white heterosexual family. Such an ethnographic study would open up shifting 
perceptions of white hegemonic masculinity and fatherhood in apartheid and post-apartheid 
South Africa. The changing political order overturned local social hierarchies, already 
changing under the flows of new technologies and identities in a globalising world, posing a 
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fundamental challenge to previously hegemonic identities as the white, heterosexual family 
lost its position as the minima of civilization.
18
 This also calls for an ethnography of changing 
forms of white rebellion who have embraced a satanic identity as a form of self-expression. 
Such studies would also serve to clarify the boundaries (always shifting and blurring) 
between Eurocentric and Afrocentric conceptions of spirituality, the ‘occult’ and identity in a 
post-apartheid and globalising South Africa.  
 
This thesis has explored an aspect of Satanism in its discussion of the ‘satanic peril’, the 
shifting perceptions of Satanism that manifested at particular moments of social change in 
white South Africa between 1976 and 1993. In so doing, this thesis has also touched upon a 
hitherto unexplored aspect of the global Satanism Scare and modern witch-hunt: two satanic 
panics in white South Africa in which the global and local, foreign but familiar, were always 
interacting. Disproportionate to the objective existence of the problem, this ‘satanic peril’ 
only appeared twice between 1976 and 1993: the first four years of P. W. Botha’s 
premiership during which the National Party made considerable changes to the country’s 
apartheid policy and rifts within Afrikaner Nationalism widened irrevocably; and the final 
four years of white supremacy when South Africa transitioned from a white oligarchy to a 
democracy. In tracing the inflections of social change in this heightened discourse on 
Satanism during these periods, this thesis has interpreted these as moments of moral panic in 
white South Africa. In doing so, this thesis has aimed to highlight the advantages of moral 
panic theory for social historians. Indeed, the study of moral panics may prove particularly 
fruitful for comparative and interdisciplinary studies in topics ranging from changing 
perceptions of ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ to the perceptions of vigilante violence in the media. 
Academic attention should also be directed towards comparing black and white moral panics, 
particularly – as Ashforth has shown – with the rise of the African Independent Churches, 
which saw ‘African’ witches start to be associated with Satan.
19
  
 
While it is true that some have studied such phenomena without turning to theory, this thesis 
has advocated that a critical understanding of moral panic theory draws to the fore dynamics 
that may have otherwise remained submerged. In a distinction discussed in Chapter Two, the 
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concept of the ‘moral panic’ has been used to foreground the dynamics of the historically 
recognizable moral panic phenomenon. The arguments and interpretations made in this thesis 
have been shaped further by an awareness of the social, geographic and temporal contours of 
the moral panic phenomenon. 
 
Shortly before the ‘nightmare nurseries’ began to engulf the United States in a wave of 
satanic scandal, South Africa endured its own virulent satanic panic. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, between 1978 and 1982 South Africa’s white youth was construed as particularly 
vulnerable to a host of satanic influences, as well as a secret cult of devil worshippers, the 
‘Black Mass’ and the satanic Buddha. Constituting a period of moral panic, the emergence of 
this ‘satanic peril’ was constructed as a danger to the morality and safety of all white South 
Africans. Shaped by the assertions of interest groups like the Dutch Reformed Church and the 
Action Moral Standards movement, the deviant image of the Satanist was further solidified 
by claims-makers. Social fears and allegations combined in the bizarre image of the cat 
killing, blood-swigging, satanic yogi who practiced kung-fu, listened to ‘modern music’ and 
habitually prayed for the downfall of white South Africa. This ‘moral onslaught’ was fostered 
during P. W. Botha’s ‘total onslaught’ rhetoric. Occurring in a period of fracturing Afrikaner 
nationalism and the first signs of the possibility of the end of apartheid, the moral panic 
between 1978 and 1982 expressed feelings of cultural insecurity, moral pessimism and even 
persecution. Satanists were perceived as placing their material ambition before those of the 
Afrikaner volk, attacking the religion of the Afrikaner volk, infiltrating the cultural 
strongholds of the Afrikaner volk and punishing good white South Africans with heart attacks 
and divorce.  
 
This widespread alarm faded quickly from newspapers and public concern. Alleged to have 
increased from 40 000 to 250 000 between 1978 and 1982, by 1983 only traces of the satanic 
menace lingered in local newspapers around the country. The decade of the 1980s was 
marked by successive states of emergency, the ‘people’s war’ and the emergence of the 
counterculture among white South Africans. While it endured no widespread apprehension 
over the satanic menace, the decade was dotted with some satanic-related debate, particularly 
where popular culture was concerned. However, this was not the case abroad, and Chapter 
Four has discussed the rapid development and transnational spread of the Satanic Ritual 
Abuse Scare during the 1980s and early 1990s. An important aspect of this international 
Satanism Scare was its narrative. Grisly tales of the ‘Satanic Mass’ constituted a modern 
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version of the Black Mass, in which Satanists ritually abused, tortured and murdered children. 
South Africa experienced a second satanic panic amidst this international Satanism Scare, the 
outbreak of which occurred in close proximity to that in the United Kingdom. While the 
narrative of the ‘Satanic Mass’ altered from country to country, this thesis has argued that 
South Africa’s satanic panic was distinctly different in that it did not centre on the problem of 
satanic ritual abuse. Of course, elements of the Satanism Scare trickled into South Africa at 
different rates – for example, the rumour and boycott of Proctor and Gamble, which 
originated in the United States in 1980, only arrived in South Africa in 1996. However, 
allegations of satanic ritual abuse appeared in South African newspapers as early as 1986, but 
failed to garner the attention of the South African public. Echoing trends abroad, South 
Africa’s satanic panic between 1989 and 1993 engendered an intensely more violent and 
explicit satanic narrative of the Black Mass than that of its earlier satanic panic (1978 – 
1982). However, while the narrative of the Black Mass transgressed geographic and temporal 
boundaries, it was inflected by the local context and expressed localized anxieties.  
 
Erupting in 1989, the satanic panic conceived during South Africa’s transition to democracy 
was articulated in terms of anarchy, rebellion and corruption. Proclaiming the impending 
‘satanic era’, the discourse of the moral panic built around the apparent ascendance of devil 
worship and the New Age in white South Africa. It was inculcated with the erstwhile 
characteristics of the communist peril, which had itself lost its power to scare with the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989. The emergent ‘holism peril’ of the New Age movement saw the 
mass protest of two ‘peace poles’, the public castigation of the Voëlvry movement, and 
attempted incineration of the ‘satanic’ Ninja Turtles. These acts served to amplify already 
circulating rumours that child murdering devil worshippers were now also recruiting 
vulnerable teenagers into the Satanism, and had infiltrated high schools, university campuses, 
the South African Defense Force and the government. Occurring in waves of report and 
rumour that both responded to and aggravated social concern, this panic reached its apex in 
1991. It crested when rapid myth-making and hearsay engendered a kidnap panic that saw 
hundreds of parents across the country remove their children from schools. As Chapter Five 
has shown, this satanic panic was fostered by hearsay rather than evidence, and actually 
began to subside after the creation of the Occult Related Crimes Unit in 1992 – the provision 
of actual cases of ‘satanic dabblers’ insufficient to resuscitate flagging public interest. 
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Powerful expressions of ideological discontent, these panics resonated with underlying 
anxieties in white South Africa. It was these concerns upon which the moral panic fed, as the 
folk devil was constructed as a predator circling the vulnerable social order. The perception 
that the social structure was weakened and destabilized pervaded both the satanic moral 
panics discussed in this thesis: divorce rates were increasing, parental authority was 
declining, and children were more vulnerable. Although these social problems have existed 
throughout the twentieth century, they were considerably heightened during the periods of 
moral panic and evoked the sense that social order was becoming social disorder. It appeared 
to be degenerating from an idealized time where white, moral, spiritual and familial authority 
was absolute. It was here that social boundaries were reiterated: white, heterosexual 
relationships were to be upheld, wayward women were vulnerable, ‘modern’ and foreign 
influences were to be treated warily rather than embraced, and material desire was to 
capitulate to the needs of culture and family. Of course, these concerns continued well 
beyond the borders of the moral panic, but the heightened moral discourse saw these slight 
alterations to the ideological contours of white society policed and debated during the panic.  
 
The moral entrepreneurs during both moral panics were predominantly, but not exclusively, 
educated middle class males who presented themselves as cultural guardians. However, these 
moral entrepreneurs and their condemnation of ‘satanic influences’ were not unique to these 
moral panics: in the shifting perceptions of social order the ‘satanic peril’ was rediscovered 
during periods of rapid social change. Certainly, as demonstrated throughout this thesis, 
interest groups maneuvered public concerns to their own advantage: in August 1981, P. W. 
Botha took the opportunity to condemn all those who sought to undermine the apartheid 
government as part of the satanic threat, the Action Moral Standards movement enjoyed far 
more favourable attention to their concerns between 1978 and 1982, while in 1989 the 
Conservative Party took every opportunity to blame the satanic encroachment on the 
negligence of the National Party. However, as this thesis has shown, the activities of interest 
groups and claims-makers are incapable of initiating moral panic on their own. Even the 
sensationalism of the press cannot foster public concern into widespread panic by itself. 
Rather, it is the convergence of media sensationalism, claims-making, the agency of interest 
groups, and heightened social anxiety that gives flesh to the ethereal folk devil.   
 
Moreover, these moral panics were heterogeneous and uneven: expressing a variety of social 
grievances and anxieties through convergence and symbolization that ranged from the 
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condemnation of drug abuse to the growth of materialism. Most importantly, as this thesis has 
argued, both the satanic panics in white South Africa articulated apprehension over cultural 
hegemony and solidarity. Between 1978 and 1982, growing moral pessimism and a sense of 
foreboding molded the ‘satanic peril’. While interest groups drew considerable attention to 
their concerns with eastern mysticism and changing youth norms, the public response bound 
these concerns to fears that Afrikaner solidarity was fragmenting and that white society was 
on the brink of losing control of its youth, culture and future. The allegations circulating in 
the media reflected a growing sense of powerlessness and unease during a period of 
economic tumult, the infighting of Afrikaner nationalism, and the recognizable divergences 
between class and cultural aspirations among white Afrikaners. Articulating the cultural 
concerns during a particular turning point in white South Africa, the vocabulary of this 
satanic panic returned in an intensified form less than a decade later. The satanic panic 
between 1989 and 1993 expressed a decade of cultural and political fragmentation. 
Influenced by global trends, the narrative of the Black Mass grew explicitly violent. Thus 
during this moral panic eastern mysticism was transformed into the more hostile threat of the 
New Age movement, a corrupted and rebellious youth became not only potential victims but 
a threat to white society, and cultural guardians were portrayed as incapable of protecting the 
ideological and physical interests of white South Africans.  
 
To conclude, the heightened discourse on Satanism discussed in this thesis expressed a 
complex of social changes between 1976 and 1993. Using the concept of the moral panic as 
an analytical tool, this thesis has shown how these moral panics and the emergence of the 
‘satanic peril’ echoed the shifting perceptions of cultural solidarity and hegemony as the 
edifices of Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid splintered under economic and political 
pressures. Although not restricted to Afrikaners, the interest groups that shaped and 
responded to these moments of collective anxiety were steeped in Afrikaner nationalism: the 
church, the government, and cultural organizations. Drawing their strength from the 
interlacing of moral, cultural and political identity under the auspices of Afrikaner 
nationalism, the folk devil of these satanic panics became volk devils. 
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